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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Survey, the Notre Dame Lawyer presents an analysis of selected
Church-State legal problems of contemporary importance. Its purpose is two-
fold: to delineate the nature and extent of these problems, and to contribute
in some way to their solution.
II. ABORTION
A. Introduction
Until the past several years there has been little said and done about abor-
tion. The great debate now in progress seems to have gained impetus from the
wide publicity surrounding Mrs. Sherri Finkbine's attempt to procure an abor-
tion in 1962.' In the same year the American Law Institute adopted its new
Model Penal Code which, inter alia, proposed changes in the existing abortion
I Brody, Abortion: Once a Whispered Problem, Now a Public Debate, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 8, 1968, at 28, col. 4. For Sherri Finkbine's own account of her abortion, see Finkbine,




laws.2 This too seems to have been an important factor in bringing about the
present debate.'
In this section of the Survey, the debate and the changes that already have
occurred in some states will be reported and analyzed. Special attention will be
given to the attitudes of individual Catholics and to the organized Catholic
opposition to reform.
B. Abortion Laws in the United States
1. Background
Like almost all other laws, the present abortion laws in the United States
have their roots in English law. In the thirteenth century, Bracton reported that
abortion by blow or by poison was homicide if the fetus is formed.4 Several
centuries later, however, Sir Edward Coke demonstrated an important difference
between abortion and murder in English law:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it
in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no mur-
der: but if the childe be born alive, and dieth of the potion, battery, or
other cause, this is murder: for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature,
in rerum natura, when it is born alive.5
The first book of Blackstone's Commentaries states that life "begins in contem-
plation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb."' Never-
theless, he reported that abortion was still only a "heinous misdemeanor": 7
To kill a child in its mother's womb, is now no murder, but a great mis-
prision: but if the child be born alive, and dies by reason of the potion or
bruises it received in the womb, it seems, by the better opinion, to be mur-
der in such as administered or gave them.8
In 1803 Parliament codified a stricter version of this common-law rule. The
first English abortion statute made it a felony to
wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully administer to, or cause to be admin-
istered to or taken by any of his Majesty's subjects, any deadly poison, or
other noxious and destructive substance or thing, with intent... to cause
and procure the miscarriage of any woman, then being quick with
child .... 9
This offense was punishable by death. If the woman was not yet "quick," the
punishment prescribed was one or more of several penalties such as fine, imprison-
2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Official Draft 1962).
3 Brody, supra note 1.
4 BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, cited in Quay, Justifiable Abortion -
Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 173, 431 (1960).
5 3 COKE, INSTITUTES *50.
6 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
7 Id. at *130.
8 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *198.
9 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, § 1, at 204 (1803).
SURVEY
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ment, whipping, or banishment." This first act was slightly amended in 1828,"
and the 1837 version omitted the requirements of quickening and pregnancy."2
Connecticut was the first American state to enact an abortion statute. In
1821 it passed an act based on the English act of 1803."3 Soon afterwards other
states followed suit.' 4 There is some authority that the purpose of these statutes
"was not to prevent the procuring of abortions, so much as to guard the health
and life of the mother against the consequences of such attempts."'5 However,
the language of some statutes 6 and other authority" shows that protecting the
life of the fetus was also a major purpose of these laws.
2. Present Laws
Today abortion is regulated in every state by statute. The overwhelming
majority of statesi' and the District of ColumbiaI' expressly permit abortion,
at least where it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother. 0 Only four
states 21 have statutes that prohibit abortion generally. However, since these pro-
hibitions are against "illegal" abortions, in three of these four states an abortion
would be allowable to save the life of the mother, either because of judicial
10 Id., § 2, at 205.
11 Offenses Against the Person Act of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 13.
12 Offenses Against the Person Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., c. 85, § 6. The first
case construing this act to not require actual pregnancy was The Queen v. Goodhall, 169
Eng. Rep. 205 (1846). For the development of English law on abortion until its recent
change see Quay, supra note 4, at 430-35. England's new abortion law is examined in note
105 infra.
13 Quay, supra note 4, at 435.
14 Id. at 435-38.
15 State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858). In the nineteenth century an abortion
was a much more dangerous operation than it is today. Guttmacher, Medical Considerations
and Genetic Hazards Posed by Present Laws, 23 NEW YORK MEDICINE v (March 1967).
16 E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.120 (1965).
17 E.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 41, 227 A.2d 689, 699 (1967) (concurring
opinion).
18 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962); AimE. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-211 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§
53-29 to 30 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.10
(1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 309-4 (1955); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1(b) (1967); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 10-105 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-410 (1964);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.020 (1963); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (1965); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 3 (.967); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18
(1964); Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-401 (1949);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-405 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 585:13 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-3 (1964); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 125.05
(McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.16
(Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 861 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1967);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1957); S.C. CODE § 16-82 (1962); S.D. CODE § 13.3101
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1196 (1961); UTAH
CODE ANN. 76-2-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.1-62 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-8
(1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1959).
19 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
20 The reform legislation, adopted by California, Colorado, Mississippi, and North Caro-
lina, which expands the justification for abortion beyond the grounds of preserving the mother's
life, is examined at text accompanying notes 72-77 infra.
21 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (Supp. 1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §
19 (1956); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87.1 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4718-19
(1963).
[June, 1968]
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are no clues as to how "unlawfully" is interpreted,24 but it seems that it would
include at least the exception for saving the life of the mother. If it does not,
this state would have the unique distinction of not permitting abortions for any
reason.
Besides the three states2" that have recently amended their abortion laws
along the lines of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,
2" six other
states, three by statute,' one by statutory inconsistency," and two by judicial
decision,' and the District of Columbia 0 allow abortions to protect the health
of the mother. The statutes of two other states, which prohibit only "unlawful"
abortions, might also be so interpreted."1
In general, then, the only ground for legal abortion in all but a few states
is preservation of the life of the mother.
3. Practice under Present Laws
An examination of the practice under the present abortion laws has led
one commentator to characterize illegal abortions as the "third largest racket"
in the United States."2 This appellation of "racket" is correct in the sense that
many abortionists are organized into abortion rings and mills." However, there
appears to be no connection between these "organizations" and organized
crime.3 4
22 Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (1944); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227 A.2d 689, 694 (1967).
23 Louisianas law has an inconsistency between its criminal statute, LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:87 (Supp. 1967), and its medical license revocation statute, LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §
37:1285 (1964). The latter provides an exception to save the life of the mother, while the
former does not. For a discussion of this inconsistency and other differences among the laws
of many states, see George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform, in
ABORTION AND THE LAW 1, 5-20 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
24 Trout, Therapeutic Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMPLE L.Q. 172, 185 (1964)
(discussing Pennsylvania).
25 The recent amendments to the laws of California, Colorado, and North Carolina will
be examined at text accompanying notes 73-77 infra.
26 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Official Draft 1962). This section of the Model Penal
Code will be examined at text accompanying notes 68-71 infra.
27 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A-5-3 (1964) (serious and permanent bodily injury).
28 The Oregon penal code, ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.060 (1967), allows abortion only to
save the mother's life; however, the Oregon medical license revocation statute, ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 677.190 (1967), provides an exception where the mother's health appears to be in peril.
29 Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (1944); State v.
Dunklebarger, 206 Ia. 971, 980, 221 N.W. 592, 596 (1928) (peril to life need not be im-
minent).
30 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4718-19 (1963); N.J. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87.1 (1953).
For differing opinions among the justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey as to the
interpretation of the New Jersey statute, see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 277 A.2d
689 (1967).
32 D. LowE, ABORTION AND THE LAw 6 (1966).
33 For an analysis of abortion mills and rings, see Bates, The Abortion Mill: An Insti-
tutional Study, 45 J. Cim. L.C. & P.S. 157 (1954).
34 LowE, supra note 32, at 77, states, without supporting citations, that some authorities
believe that organized crime is responsible for many illegal abortions. This seems erroneous
for several reasons. Hopefully, doctors, who perform most illegal abortions (see text ac-
companying note 35 infra), are not controlled by organized crime. These are also several
reasons why organized crime would not desire to organize an abortion market:
What about abortions? Why are they not organized? The answer is not easy,
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Most illegal abortions are performed clandestinely by physicians.3 5 Since
abortions are considered safe when properly performed, 36 the fact that a sub-
stantial number of people die from illegally obtained abortions indicates that
many abortions are performed by the unskilled. Estimates of the total number
of illegal abortions performed yearly vary widely. However, a reasonably accu-
rate figure would be one million. 7 Estimates of yearly fatalities usually run
between 5,000 and 10,000. Any such estimates must be taken cum grano
salis, since there has apparently been no comprehensive nationwide survey taken.
One statistical expert, Dr. Christopher Tietze, has called the above estimates
of yearly fatalities "unmitigated nonsense." 9  He estimates that the yearly
figure is from 500 to 1,000.40 In any event, there is evidence that a substantial,
although uncertain, number of women die as a result of abortions poorly per-
formed, either by the woman herself or by an unskilled layman.4
It is important to note that most abortions are sought, not by young un-
married women, but by married women who already have children.4 2 Doctor
Edwin Gold, Director of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Brooklyn Hospital in
New York City, has stated:
If we were to give a profile of the most common situation in which a woman
requests termination of pregnancy, we should describe a married woman
with two or three children, at the height of child-bearing, between 28 and
40.43
Of course, this does not mean that the number of unmarried women or girls
who seek abortion is insubstantial. This figure could be as high as 200,000
and there may be too many special characteristics of this market to permit a selection
of the critical one. First, the consumer and the product have unusual characteristics;
nobody is a regular consumer the way a person may regularly gamble, drink, or take
dope. A woman may repeatedly need the services of an abortionist, but each oc-
casion is once-for-all. Second, consumers are probably more secret about dealing
with this black market, and secret especially among intimate friends and relations,
than are the consumers of most banned commodities. Third, it is a dirty business
and too many of the customers die; and while organized crime might drastically
reduce fatalities, it may be afraid of getting involved with anything that kills and
maims so many customers in a way that might be blamed on the criminal himself
rather than just on the commodity that is sold. Schelling, Economic Analysis and
Organized Crime, in TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 114, 124 (The
President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice ed. 1967).
35 Rosen, A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, in ABORTION IN AMERICA 299, 307 (H. Rosen
ed. (1967); Guttmacher, Abortion -Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, in THE CASE FOR
LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 1, 8-9 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
36 Rosen, supra note 35, at 307.
37 J. BATES & E. ZAWADZKI, CRIMINAL ABORTION 3 (1964).
38 South Bend Tribune, Sept. 7, 1967, at 3, cols. 7-8.
39 Id. For a critical history of the sources used to reach these estimations, see Hellegers,
Law and the Common Good, 86 COMMONWEAL 418, 422 (1967).
40 Brody, supra note 1, at col. 3.
41 E.g., New York Assemblyman Albert H. Blumenthal, sponsor of New York's proposed
reform law, has stated that illegal abortions are the largest cause of pregnancy-related deaths
in New York City. South Bend Tribune, Sept. 7, 1967, at 3, col. 7. Hellegers, supra note
39, at 422, states that there are about four hundred reported abortion deaths per year in the
United States.
42 Kunmer, A Psychiatrist Views Our Abortion Enigma, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED
ABORTION Now 114, 115 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967); Lowe, supra note 32, at 8, estimates
that 80% of all illegal abortions are performed on married women.
43 Gold, cited in LowE, supra note 32, at 8.
[June, 1968]
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yearly." The report of a recently organized abortion service, composed of a
group of Protestant and Jewish clergymen in New York City, shows that many
unwed females seek abortions. The purpose of this service is to "offer advice
and counsel" to any woman seeking an abortion. A primary purpose of the
"advice and counsel" is to provide "the best medical advice to take care of the
problem pregnancy," i.e., to set up appointments with doctors who will perform
illegal abortions. In its first five months of operation, the service has counseled
over 800 women, half of whom were unmarried, and 90 percent of whom chose
to have an abortion."5
Illegal abortions are not performed solely by unskilled laymen, private doc-
tors, or abortion mills and rings. Many hospitals perform abortions that are
illegal under a literal reading of the applicable statute. 8 For example, the mean-
ing of "life" in statutes permitting abortions only to preserve the life of the
mother is sometimes stretched to include "health."4 7 Accordingly, abortions
have been performed to prevent serious injury, both physical and emotional,
and to prevent the advance of serious organic and emotional disease.4 Under
typical procedure, the physician of the woman seeking the abortion brings her
case before a board that the hospital has set up to hear and determine abortion
requests. 9 This procedure apparently gives the abortion an air of legality, since,
until recently, no physician using it has been prosecuted for violating the state's
abortion law."0 Such practices, however, are probably not widespread, because
44 Assuming there are 1,000,000 illegal abortions yearly (see text accompanying note 37
supra), 20% of this figure (see note 42 suprz) produces an estimated 200,000 illegal abortions
performed on single women.
45 Brody, supra note 1, at col. 4.
46 In a California survey conducted in 1958-59, 75% of the 26 hospitals polled felt
that their abortion practices did not strictly conform to the law. Packer and Gampell,
Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 417, 430 (1959).
Dr. H. Rosen believes the same can presently be said for the leading hospitals throughout
the country. Rosen, supra note 35, at 305.
47 Rosen, supra note 35, at 300-01.
48 Id. at 301. Dr. Rosen feels that socio-economic factors are often the real reasons for
seeking abortions. Id. at 302.
49 Dr. A. Guttmacher describes a typical abortion board proceeding:
The [abortion board system] was introduced at the Mount Sinai Hospital in
New York City in 1952. The director of the obstetrical and gynecological service
is chairman of its permanent abortion committee. The other members are the chief,
or a senior attending, from the departments of medicine, surgery, neuropsychiatry
and pediatrics. The board has a scheduled weekly meeting-hour, and convenes
routinely whenever a case is pending. No case is considered unless the staff obste-
trician-gynecologist desiring to carry out the procedure presents affirmative letters
from two consultants in the medical field involved. Five copies of each letter
must be filed at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting, so that each committee
member may have an opportunity to study the problem in advance. The obstetrician-
gynecologist whose case it is, and one of the two consultants who made the recom-
mendation, must make themselves available at the committee meeting for further
information when desired. In addition, if the chairman feels that an expert from
some other department, hematology or radiotherapy for instance, would be helpful
in arriving at a proper decision, this specialist is requested to attend as a non-
voting member. The case is then carefully discussed and if any member of the five
on the committee opposes therapeutic interruption, the procedure is disallowed.
Guttmacher, The Shrinking Non-Psychiatric Indications For Therapeutic Abortion, in ABoR-
TION IN AMERICA 12, 15 (H. Rosen ed. 1967); cf. Wilson, The Abortion Problem in the
General Hospital, in ABORTION IN AMERICA 189, 190-91 (H. Rosen ed. 1967).
50 The single prosecution currently pending is discussed in Leavey & Charles, Californi's
New Therapeutic Abortion Act; An Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal Procedure,
15 U.C.L.A. L. R:v. 1, 25 (1967).
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the procedure is strict 1 due to a fear of prosecution, 2 and because the poor
usually cannot afford the relatively high cost of a hospital abortion."2 It is doubt-
ful that any Catholic hospital uses such a procedure. Under the Code of Ethical
and Religious Directives to Catholic Hospitals, promulgated by the Catholic
Hospital Association of the United States and Canada, abortion is not permitted:
"Direct abortion is the direct killing of an unborn child and it is never permitted,
even when the ultimate purpose is to save the life of the mother.""4
Although the flouting of present abortion laws is rampant, prosecutions are
not. Besides the normal difficulties encountered in prosecuting any criminal
case, 55 prosecutions under abortion statutes present unique problems. Assuming
that a particular prosecutor desires to prosecute," he is faced with the problem
that most women will not report receiving an illegal abortion. There is an im-
portant reason for this. Since abortions are now generally considered to be as
safe as a tonsillectomy if performed by a competent person, 7 women who have
received such an abortion have no reason to complain against the abortionist.
Indeed, their most earnest desire would be to keep the abortion a secret because
they fear either damage to their reputation or prosecution as accessories.5" With-
out the aid of these women, the prosecution can hardly establish a case unless
the police arrest the abortionist during the act or can find other competent
witnesses. It seems, however, that most abortionists are wise enough to make
sure that the only witnesses are themselves and the patient."5 Some doctors have
their assistants conduct preliminary negotiations and preparations and perform
the abortion itself hidden behind a screen. 0 Even the use of policewomen decoys
has not been entirely successful in gaining convictions for attempted abortion
either because of insufficient proof of attempt,6 or perhaps, because extensive
51 In the board described in note 49, supra, if one member opposes a petition, it is dis-
missed. Empirical studies show that this procedure is one of the factors causing a decrease
in the number of hospital-performed abortions. Wilson, supra note 49, at 191.
52 Some hospital boards use quotas because of this fear. Time Essay, The Desperate
Dilemma of Abortion, TIME Oct. 13, 1967, at 32, 33 [hereinafter cited as Time Essay]. If
the hospitals bend the abortion law "too often or too far, it will snap, which may arouse
community censure or legal reprisals like we are witnessing in San Francisco where nine
ethical physicians have been indicted for performing rubella abortions." Guttmacher, supra
note 15, at vii.
53 Brody, Abortion: Once a Whispered Problem, Now a Public Debate, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 8, 1968, at 28, cols. 2-3.
54 Quoted in ABORTION: LEGAL AND ILLEGAL; A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ATTORNEYS AND
PSYCHIATRISTS 9 (J. Kummer ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as DIALOGUE].
55 The difficulties of burden of proof, presentation of evidence, etc. encountered in prose-
cutions under abortion statutes are discussed in 1 C.J.S. Abortion §§ 15-35 (1936), Supp.
1967).
56 Some prosecutors may not want to prosecute because of sympathy for reforming present
abortion laws; e.g., some district attorneys of New Jersey have stated that grounds additional
to the justification for saving the life of the mother will be accepted as "lawful justification"
within the meaning of the New Jersey statute, N.J. REV. STAT ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1953). They
recommend that this statute be interpreted to permit abortion on the basis of a physician's
good faith determination when made in accordance with accepted medical standards. Report
of the Prosecutors' Comm. Concerning the Validity and Enforceability of 2A:87-1 (Abortion
Law) 4. Also, the taking of bribes by prosecutors is not unprecedented. See Bates, supra
note 33, at 164-67.
57 Rosen, supra note 35, at 307.
58 Lowe, supra note 32, at 75.
59 Id.
60 Bates, supra note 33, at 164.
61 People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); Commonwealth v. Willard,
179 Pa. Super. 368, 116 A.2d 751 (1955).
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use has not been made of policewomen in this area.
Another source of evidence and information that a prosecutor might use
is hospital records of patients who have had a miscarriage or abortion. Some
cities have ordinances requiring hospitals to divulge such information to the
prosecutor.2 The utility of these ordinances, however, is questionable. New
York City's ordinance has not fared well because it is inconsistent with a state
statute prohibiting a doctor from disclosing "any information which he acquired
in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity."6 The district attorney of Kings County
believed that the ordinance nullified the application of the general statutory
prohibition s4 pro tanto and that it allowed the grand jury full access to the
records of every case on abortion so that it could decide which cases involved
criminal abortions and which did not.6" The superintendent of Kings County
Hospital refused to honor a grand jury subpoena requiring the production of
all the hospital's records of abortion cases, contending that the general statutory
prohibition forbade such a disclosure. The district attorney then moved the
Kings County Court to hold the superintendent in contempt. In affirming the
denial of this motion, the appellate division held that the ordinance limited the
general statute only as to "cases currently being treated by doctors in which
a criminal abortion practice is discovered or suspected."66  Consequently, the
grand jury could engage in no fishing expeditions in violation of the statutory
privilege.
Even when the prosecutor builds a strong case, there still remains the diffi-
culty of selecting an Impartial jury, i.e., one not overly sympathetic" for the
defendant doctor (a layman probably would receive no sympathy) and per-
suading it against the defense counsel's pleas to emotion.
62 See Rosen, supra note 35, at 307.
63 N.Y. Civ. Pac. LAw § 4504(a) (McKinney 1963).
64 At the time the action was brought the applicable statutory provision covering the
physician-patient privilege was § 352 of the Civil Practice Act.
65 In re the Investigation into Alleged Commission of Criminal Abortions in the County
of Kings, 286 App. Div. 270, 274, 143 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (1955).
66 Id. at 274, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
67 The following survey, taken by the National Opinion Research Center on 1,482 adult
Americans, shows the attitudes of the public on abortion.
Question asked: "Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible
for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion . . ."
Yes No Don't Know
1. if the woman's own health is seriously endangered
by the pregnancy ........ ................... ....... 71 26 3
2. if she became pregnant as a result of rape ........ 56 38 6
3. if there is a strong chance of serious defect in
the baby .............................................................. 55 41 4
4. if the family has a very low income and cannot
afford any more children ........ -- -.21 77 2
5. if she is not married and does not want to marry
the man ................. ............... . 18 80 2
6. if she is married and does not want any more
children .......................... . ..... 15 83 2
Quoted from Rossi, Public Views on Abortion, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 26,
36 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967). The first question asked has been criticized as ambiguous since
"health" can mean "survival," avoiding a threat of serious but non-fatal sickness, or "mental
health." Drinan, Strategy on Abortion, 116 AMERICA 177, 178 (1967).
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C. Proposals for Reform
Out of this background of widespread violation of present abortion laws by
doctors, public dissatisfaction, and extreme hardship and even death in certain
cases, have come proposals for reforming these laws. These reform proposals
and the reform legislation already adopted will now be examined.
1. Model Penal Code
Some advocate repealing all existing prohibitions on abortion.6  However,
the most famous and most successful proposal is that of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code.69 Basically, under this proposal an abortion is
justified under three circumstances: (1) if a licensed physician believes there
is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would "gravely impair the
physical or mental health of the mother," or (2) that the child would be born
with a "grave physical or mental defect," or (3) if the "pregnancy resulted
from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse." These justifiable abortions
must be performed in a hospital except in the event of an emergency. Before
performing the abortion, two physicians must certify in writing the circumstances
that justify the abortion. The certificate must then be submitted to the appro-
priate hospital, and in the case of abortion following felonious intercourse, to
the prosecuting attorney or the police. In no event is abortion justified after
the twentieth week of pregnancy.
Since the official adoption of this proposal by the American Law Institute
in 1962, four states have enacted reform legislation. In a fifth state, the legis-
lature passed a reform act that was vetoed by the governor.7" Legislation is now
pending in twenty-six states.7'
2. State Legislation
Mississippi has passed the mildest of the recent acts.7" It allows abortion
on only one new ground: when the pregnancy is a result of rape. This act differs
from the Model Penal Code in that "rape" alone is the only ground, and
that the abortion apparently can be performed anywhere.
Colorado was the first state to enact an abortion law along the lines of the
Model Penal Code.7" All three grounds are adopted, but the defective offspring
ground is stricter than that of the Model Penal Code, since there must be a
likelihood of a "grave and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation."
(Emphasis added.) Each hospital that performs abortions must set up a special
board of three physicians to meet regularly to rule upon abortion requests. The
statute presumably allows the performance of an abortion at any time prior to
birth.
North Carolina has legalized abortion on the same grounds as the Model
68 This approach is examined at text accompanying notes 198-203 infra.
69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Official Draft 1962).
70 Both houses of the Indiana General Assembly passed a reform act in 1967 which was
vetoed by Governor Roger D. Branigin. South Bend Tribune, May 12, 1967, at 1, col. 8,
at 13, col. 1.
71 N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1968, at 36, col. 6 (city ed.).
72 Miss. CODE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1966).
73 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 (added by H.B. No. 1426 (1967)).
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Penal Code but has varied the Code's language and has adopted more stringent
procedures: a residency requirement of four months except when the woman's
life is in danger; a certificate of three doctors stating the circumstances why the
abortion should be performed; mandatory performance in a hospital, without
exception; reporting of a rape to a law-enforcement agency or court official
within seven days.' Like Colorado's act, the North Carolina legislation also
presumably allows the performance of an abortion at any time prior to birth.
California's new ace' legalizes abortion on two of the grounds recom-
mended by the American Law Institute: (1) where there is substantial risk to
the physical or mental health of the mother, or (2) where the pregnancy results
from rape or incest. Like the North Carolina act, the abortion must be per-
formed only in a hospital with the approval of at least two physicians (three
physicians after the thirteenth week of pregnancy). In no event will an abortion
be approved after the twentieth week of pregnancy."6 In case of rape or incest,
a well-defined procedure has been established in which the hospital must report
the case to the appropriate district attorney. It must then await his answer that
there is probable cause that the pregnancy results from rape or incest before
the abortion may be performed. If he does not answer within five days, the
abortion may be performed. If he answers that probable cause is lacking, the
applicant for abortion may appeal to the appropriate trial court. One additional
aspect of the California Act is worthy of note. It defines the evasive term "men-
tal health" as "mental illness to the extent that the woman is dangerous to
herself or to the person or property of others, or is in need of supervision or
restraint."
77
D. The Abortion Debate
1. Arguments for these Reforms"8
The American Law Institute advocates a policy of "cautious expansion
of the categories of lawful justification of abortion,"7' based upon four principles:
(A) Indiscriminate abortion must be adjudged a secular evil since
the procedure involves some physical and psychic hazards.
(B) Abortion, at least in early pregnancy, and with consent of the
persons affected, involves considerations so different from the killing of
a living human being as to warrant consideration not only of the health
of the mother but also of certain extremely adverse social consequences
74 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Adv. Pamphlet No. 3, 1967).
75 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54 (West 1967).
76 Although an abortion is considered medically safe (see text accompanying note 57
supra), the chances of injury increase as the pregnancy continues. Also the fetus comes
closer and closer to becoming a human being.
77 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25954 (West 1967).
78 In this section arguments in favor of reform are presented. Due to the obvious limita-
tion of space and a desire to concentrate on the arguments of the American Law Institute
and state legislators, some of the numerous arguments must, of necessity, not be fully de-
veloped. For a comprehensive treatment of the arguments in favor of reform, see D. LoWE,
ABORTION AND THE LAW (1966); ABORTION AND THE LAW (D. Smith ed. 1967) (most of
the essays collected in this work favor reform); THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now
(A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
79 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, at 150 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
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to her or the child, e.g., bastardy resulting from rape; prospective gross
physical or mental defect in the child.
(C) The criminal law in this area cannot undertake or pretend to
draw the line where religion or morals would draw it. Moral demands
on human behavior can be higher than those of the criminal law precisely
because violations of those higher standards do not carry the grave conse-
quence of penal offenses. Moreover, moral standards in this area are in
a state of flux, with wide disagreement among honest and responsible people.
The range of opinion among reasonable men runs from deep religious con-
viction that any destruction of incipient human life, even to save the life
of the mother, is murder, to the equally fervent belief that the failure to
limit procreation is itself unconscionable and immoral if offspring are
destined to be idiots, or bastards, or undernourished, mal-educated, rebels
against society. For many people sexual intercourse divorced from the end
of procreation is a sin; for multitudes of others it is one of the legitimate
joys of living. Those who think in utilitarian terms on these matters can
differ among themselves as widely as moralists. Voluntary limitation of
population can be seen as national suicide in a world-wide competition
for numerical superiority, while to others uncontrolled procreation appears
equally suicidal as tending to aggravate the pressure of population on
limited natural resources and so driving nations to mutually destructive
wars. To use the criminal law against a substantial body of decent opinion,
even if it be minority opinion, is contrary to our basic traditions. Accord-
ingly, here as elsewhere, criminal punishment must be reserved for behavior
that falls below standards generally agreed to by substantially the entire
community.
(D) Criminal liabilities which experience shows to be unenforceable
because of nullification by prosecutors or juries should be eliminated from
the law. Such nullification usually points to a situation of divided com-
munity opinion. Also, "dead letter" laws, far from promoting a sense of
security in the community, which is the main function of penal law, actually
impairs [sic] that security by holding the threat of prosecution over the
heads of people whom we have no intention to punish. 0 (Footnote omitted.)
The ALI offers relatively brief and, at times, unclear reasons for suggesting
legalization of abortion on each of the three specific grounds previously men-
tioned. After noting that at least six jurisdictions allowed therapeutic abortions
(one that is performed to preserve the health of the mother) in 1959,81 the
Institute gives the following reasons for allowing such abortions:
The advance of medicine has in recent years reduced the number of
situations where abortion is necessitated by physical conditions of the
mother. There has been increased reliance on diagnosis or prediction of
impairment of mental health. Psychiatric justifications for abortion are
harder to classify and verify, and psychiatrists themselves have expressed
concern at the shadowy line between medical and social justification. When
a woman threatens suicide unless her pregnancy is terminated, it is difficult
to segregate the factor of "illness" from such rational and social elements
as her desire to avoid disgrace or excessive child-bearing, or to save a job
which she would lose upon maternity. The problem is further complicated
by the recognition that there are mental health hazards for some patients
in having an abortion, as well as in continuing with the pregnancy.
80 Id. at 150-51.
81 Id. at 152.
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Despite these difficulties, we have no alternative but to rely upon
professional opinion on mental health questions, with the safeguards of
certification and hospital or other supervision. . 8...2 (Footnotes omitted.)
The 1959 draft of the Model Penal Code recognized the lack of precedent
for the second proposed ground of legalized abortion- abortion to prevent
gravely deformed offspring. It therefore relied upon the fact that such abor-
tions are "regularly performed by responsible physicians in hospitals throughout
the country."8" The Institute reasoned that
The criminal law should speak unambiguously on the authority of
the physician to act where he believes that continuance of the pregnancy
entails substantial risk that the offspring will be a physical or mental
casualty. The prospective birth of a seriously defective child may even
constitute a threat to the mental health of the apprehensive mother, but
it seems preferable to rest the matter directly on scientific prognostication
of the child's state of health rather than on the more uncertain prediction
of the mother's reaction. 4 (Footnote omitted.)
A "grave" defect is not confined to an irremedial defect. A grave defect can be
remedial in part, the chances for curing it may be high or low, or an attempt to
cure it may involve high risk to the child's life. 5 The term is intended to be
elastic so that the decision in a particular case is "left to the prospective parent,
counselled by the physician, once it has been established that there is occasion
for a conscious decision to terminate the pregnancy due to substantial risk of a
grave defect in the child.""9
The third proposed ground for legalizing abortion is pregnancy resulting
from rape, incest or other criminal intercourse. The Institute concedes that this
ground is an innovation, but in order to show that it is not regarded as an
antisocial act, relies upon the following authority: (1) the dearth of American
prosecutions in situations where abortions are performed on women pregnant
from felonious intercourse;17 (2) the acquittal of a doctor, in the famous case of
Rex v. Bourne,8 who performed an abortion upon a girl who was raped; (3)
an account of a married woman impregnated by rape who.could not obtain a
legal abortion and thus had to give birth. 9 The AL feels that the case for
incest is even stronger because there is some basis for believing that inbreeding
involves the chance of producing defective offspring, and because there is no
hope for legitimizing such offspring by marriage of the parents.9"
82 Id. at 153.
83 Id. at 154.
84 Id.
85 Id. But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 (1967), which requires "permanent"
injury.
86 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, at 154 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
87 Id.
88 [1939] 1 K.B. 687 (1938). This case actually held that the doctor could be acquitted
under the then existing English statute which provided an exception only for saving the
mother's life, if he reasonably believed that continuance of the pregnancy would make the
rape victim a physical or mental "wreck." Id. at 694.
89 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, at 155 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
90 Id.
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Senator Anthony C. Beilenson, the sponsor of California's new act,9 ' feels
that it is "a most conservative and reasonable approach 9 2 to the abortion
problem. Senator Beilenson begins his argument by reviewing some of the prac-
tices under traditional abortion laws, e.g., over one million abortions performed
yearly,93 resulting in 5,000 to 10,000 deaths.9 Relying on this background, he
contends that California's old law was "inadequate, discriminatory, hypocritical,
[and] that it often [led] knowingly and premeditatively and unnecessarily to
tragedy .... 395
The new law remedies this situation by adding two new grounds96 for legal
abortion, which are now accepted as proper and humane by the vast majority
of the medical profession,9" by many organizations, 8 and apparently by the vast
91 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54 (West 1967).
92 Statement by Anthony C. Beilenson on the Therapeutic Abortion Act (Delivered at
a Hearing of the Assembly Procedure Committee of the California Legislature, 1967) 6 [here-
inafter cited as Beilenson).
93 Id. at 1.
94 Id. Contra, text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
95 Id. at 2-3.
96 See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
97 Most members of the medical profession seem to favor reform. The American Medical
Association adopted reform proposals in 1967 similar to those adopted by the American Law
Institute. Chicago Daily News, June 21, 1967, at 1, col. 4. In 1966 a survey was taken
among selected California obstetricians and gynecologists. The following table shows the
strong support given for reform.
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERAPEUTIC ABORTION IS JUSTIFIED
Yes No Uncertain t
1. For imminent risk of maternal
death? .................................. 91% (682)* 7% (51) 2% (13) 60%
2. For definite risk of shortened
maternal life? ....... ... 87% (646) 9% (69) 4% (31) 68%
3. For psychiatric certification of
suicidal risk? ............................ 67% (501) 18% (132) 15% (113) 61%
4. For risk or material impairment
of maternal health, physical or
mental? .................................... 729% (535) 16% (116) 12% (89) 49%
5. For material risk of significant
fetal abnormality? ..................... 77% (574) 14% (104) 9% (67) 64%
6. For proved forcible rape or
incest? ...................................... 83% (616) 12% (90) 5% (40) 10%
7. For purely socio-economic rea-
sons? .................................. 21% (157) 60% (447) 18% (136) 4%
* Percent quoted is that of total respondents to each question; figure in paren-
theses is actual number of replies; not all questions were answered by all re-
spondent[s].
t Percentage of respondents who had actually performed therapeutic abortions
for these indications.
Quoted from DIALOGUE, supra note 54, at viii-ix.
Surveys also indicate that most New York obstetricians favor liberalization. See Jakobovits,
Jewish Views on Abortion, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 124 n.1 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
Psychiatrists also favor reform. In California 91%, in New York 93%, and throughout
the nation 86% favor it. DIALOGUE, supra note 54, at ix. It seems, however, that with one small
exception, no organized group of psychiatrists has thus far come out in favor of reform.
Id. at ix-x.
98 The following organizations and individuals supported the passage of Senator Beilenson's
bill:
California Medical Association, State Department of Public Health, Los Angeles Obstet-
rical and Gynecological Society. Obstetrical and Gynecological Assembly of Southern Cali-
fornia, Northern California Obstetrical and Gynecological Society, Senior Staff of the Depart-
ment of Obstetrics and Psychology at the University of California School of Medicine, State
Junior Chamber of Commerce, American Association of University Women, Conference of
California State Bar Delegates. Beilenson, supra note 92, at 5.
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majority of the citizens of the state of California.99 Senator Beilenson's argument
stresses two main points. First, the act is not "intended to permit abortion as
a method of birth control, and that it has absolutely nothing to do with the
great majority of abortions which are now being illegally performed in Cali-
fornia and elsewhere."'0 0 Rather it is intended only to avoid threats to the
mother's health and to terminate the pregnancy "in those outrageous instances
of rape or incest .... "I0 Second, the new law is entirely voluntary. Thus,
[n]o one whose moral, religious or philosophical beliefs are offended by
this bill or are different from the indications for abortion set forth in this
bill need avail herself - nor would she avail herself - of the protection
of this law. 0
2
This statement accords with the Senator's philosophy of criminal law:
I believe . . . that the State has a right to regulate individual behavior
only to a certain point and no further. I believe that the State has satisfied
its own interest by prescribing reasonable, acceptable indications in sets
of circumstances under which an abortion may legally be performed. Beyond
that, and within these prescribed sets of circumstances, it is my belief that
the individual must make her own judgment. She must make this decision
with herself, her husband, her family, her own doctor, her own friends
or whomever else she may rely upon, and her own clergyman. 03
The principal sponsor of New York's proposed abortion law,1 ' Assembly-
man Albert H. Blumenthal, relies on the passage of the new acts in California,
Colorado, North Carolina, and England 0 5 to show that liberalization has gained
greater acceptance.' He also cites the support of the American Medical Associa-
tion and America,0 T as well as Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Senators Javits
and Kennedy, and Mayor Lindsay.0 In addition to stating many of the argu-
99 Id. at 4.
100 Id. at 6.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103. Id. at 10.
104 In addition to the three grounds previously mentioned, the New York bill would allow
abortion where the pregnancy occurs while the woman is declared to be mentally disabled
or incompetent. S.B. 529-A.B. 761, § 2950(b) (5). This bill was killed in the Codes Committee
in the 1967 session of the New York Legislature. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1967, at 42, col. 1
(city ed.). In the 1968 session it' was reintroduced with the co-sponsorship of forty-three
Senators and Assemblymen. This year it was reported out of committee and was debated.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1968, at 1, col. 1. Assemblyman Blumenthal had expressed "cautious
optimism" as to its chance for passage. Id. at 36, col. 4 (city ed.). Nevertheless, on April 3,
1968, the bill was once again sent to the Codes Committee. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1968 at 1,
col. 2.
105 England's new law is broader than the reform legislation enacted in the United States.
Besides expressly allowing abortion for two of the three grounds adopted by the ALI, it adds
a fourth ground: an abortion is legal if any of the mother's existing children might be injured
mentally or physically by the continuance of the pregnancy. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1967, at 1,
17, col. 1 (city ed.). In effect, this act allows abortion on request for married women with
families.
106 Statement by Assemblyman Albert H. Blumenthal, Overseas Press Club, New York
City, Dec. 13, 1967, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Blumenthal].
107 In an editorial statement, America shows that it not only favors liberalization of
abortion laws but also active engagement in such reform by the Catholic Church. 117 AmERICA
706 (1967).
108 Blumenthal, supra note 106, at 2.
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ments expressed by the American Law Institute and Senator Beilenson, Assembly-
man Blumenthal concentrates on addressing the opposition. Like Senator Beilen-
son, he regrets the feelings of those who oppose reform on religious grounds and
adds that the purely voluntary procedure preserves a woman's religious free-
dom." 9 In answer to those who regard the fetus as human, Assemblyman Blu-
menthal states that
One's view of the nature of prenatal life need not dictate one's view
of this bill. The bill merely preserves the existing rights in the Penal Law
which all of us, men and women, have to protect ourselves from harm;
and the criteria used in the Dominick-Blumenthal bill are at least as
strict as those used to justify self-defense.110
He discounts the fear that reform will lead to abortion on request, euthanasia,
infanticide, or genocide by pointing out that those who supported the legaliza-
tion of bingo in churches are not now advocating licensing of bookies and
legalization of gambling."' His view of the function of criminal law is similar
to that of the American Law Institute and Senator Beilenson:
We believe that in a plural society, the Penal Law should not be used
to set moral standards that are unenforceable and that discriminate against
the economically deprived. Such use of the law merely decreases society's
ability to regulate itself and substantially diminishes the respect for the
public law that is essential to its enforcement.
11 2
The American Civil Liberties Union has also spoken out in favor of reform.
The ACLU argues that most of the existing abortion laws should be changed
because they are unconstitutional in one or more of the following respects:
(1) they are unconstitutionally vague, (2) they deny to women in lower
economic groups the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, since abortions are now freely available to the
rich but forbidden to the poor, (3) they infringe the constitutional right
to decide whether and when to have a child, as well as the marital right
of privacy and the privacy of the relationship between patient and physician,
(4) they impair the constitutional right of physicians to practice in ac-
cordance with their professional obligations, in that they require doctors to
refrain from a medical procedure whose failure to perform would, except for
the abortion laws, amount to malpractice in many cases, and (5) they
deprive women of their lives and liberty, in the sense of deciding how their
bodies are to be used, without due process of law." 3
Two additional constitutional arguments have been posed. It has been
suggested that many of the present abortion laws violate the first amendment
rights of free speech and press, as well as that amendment's establishment and




113 Memorandum by Alan Reitman & Trudy Hayden, Abortion Policy and the Question
of the Viable Fetus 1 (1967) (on file with the ACLU).
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free exercise clauses.14 In short, proponents of reform feel that the practice
under most present laws, i.e., their widespread violation and the resulting in-
convenience and even death in some cases, warrant liberalization of abortion
laws along the general lines of the Model Penal Code.
2. Arguments against these Reforms
a. The Composition of the Opposition
The present abortion debate has been characterized as Catholics versus non-
Catholics by many people who feel that Catholics are trying to impose their
views on abortion on the rest of society." 5 This characterization is, in one sense,
absurd; yet, in another sense, it is absolutely correct. It is absurd for several
reasons. First, a recent poll shows that almost one-half of California's Catholics
were in favor of reform of some kind." 6 Another poll indicates that forty-nine
percent of Catholic doctors favor reform."17 Indeed, the last needed vote in the
California Senate to pass that state's new law was supplied by a Catholic."
Second, there has been some urging for a reconsideration, on the theological
and philosophical levels, of the Catholic Church's view of the fetus."' Third,
such a characterization of this debate can lead only to name calling and clouding
of the real issues."' Fourth, it is erroneous to assume that the Catholic Church's
position is radically different from that of other religions. Orthodox Jewish
teaching is opposed to abortion on any grounds except to save the mother's
life. 2' Protestant teaching favors only a very limited reform, if any. Most
Protestant denominations favor abortion to save the life or to preserve the
health of the mother; however, they do not generally espouse it where the child
would be born defective, or where the pregnancy is a result of felonious inter-
course.12  Finally, a moral philosophy that regards a fetus as a human being
and gives absolute value to life need not be confined to Catholicism.
However, in another sense, the characterization of the current debate as
Catholic versus non-Catholic is quite correct. It is a hard political fact that the
only organized opposition to the reform movement comes from the Catholic
Church, especially from the Catholic hierarchy. Unsuccessful attempts at reform
as early as 1961 in New Hampshire and Illinois were opposed virtually only
by Catholics."' More recently, the Catholic bishops of California opposed re-
114 Pilpel, The Abortion Crisis, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 97, 113
(A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
115 See, e.g., Hall, Commentary, in ABORrbON AND THE LAW 224, 231 (D. Smith ed.
1967); Pilpel, supra note 114, at 103.
116 DIALOGUE, supra note 54, at vii.
117 Time Essay, supra note 52, at 33.
118 Letter from Senator Anthony C. Beilenson to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Jan. 2, 1968
[hereinafter cited as Beilenson Letter].
119 Pleasants, A Morality of Consequences, 86 COMMONWEAL 413 (1967); Wassmer, Ques-
tions About Questions, 86 COMMONWEAL 416 (1967).
120 See Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Life, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 107,
108 (D. Smith ed. 1967); Neuhaus, The Dangerous Assumptions, 86 COMMONWEAL 408, 409
(1967).
121 jakobovits, supra note 97, at 129.
122 Drinan, Contemporary Protestant Thinking, 117 AmECA 713 (1967).
123 LOWE, supra note 78, at 84.
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form there," and the bishops of New York are presently opposed to the proposed
New York legislation.' 25
It seems fair to infer from such activity that there is a Catholic lobby.
However, this lobby is no more an attempt to impose Catholic morality on the
rest of society than it would be if the Catholic Church were campaigning to
outlaw murder. It is only because that Church believes that a fetus is fully human
and, thus, views the direct killing of a fetus as murder that it opposes abortion
reform. Rather than being an attempt to impose Catholic morality on society,
the Catholic position is a call for the Catholic layman to become a responsible
and active member of society. This role of the laity has been reaffirmed in a
recent pastoral letter by the Catholic Bishops of the United States.
A Catholic becomes responsible when he realizes that his own dignity
and destiny are bound up with the dignity and destiny of all men....
Therefore, indignity, injustice, and inhumanity at any time, in any
place, toward any man should arouse in us a deep and burning concern....
A Catholic must be one who truly believes that as one of us suffers, all
suffer, as one of us is healed, all are healed, when one of us is denied
justice, all are threatened.
12 6
The Catholic opposition to abortion reform is merely an attempt to insure that
justice is not denied to that portion of humanity of which the fetus is a member.
Thus, while it is fair to doubt the Catholic Church's major premise that a fetus
is a human being, it is not fair to criticize that Church or anyone else for
proselytizing this argument. A statement made by the Cuyahoga County Legal
Committee for the Protection of the Unborn at a legislative hearing considering
an Ohio reform bill makes this point forcefully:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: You have the right
under our laws to believe whatever you choose to believe, so long as you
do not infringe upon the rights of others. May we respectfully point out
that these proposed changes in the Ohio abortion law would most certainly
infringe upon the rights of the unborn. It thus becomes the moral and
legal obligation of each and every member of the Ohio General Assembly,
and particularly you gifted members of this committee, regardless of re-
ligious belief or lack of belief, to protect those least able to protect them-
selves - the unborn.
1 127
Indeed, the Catholic Church's position seems desirable from a secular point of
view since it directs the debate to its central issue: What is the nature of a fetus
and what rights does it have?
b. Catholic Views on the Nature of the Fetus
A look at the history of the Catholic Church's stand on abortion shows
124 Beilenson Letter, supra note 118. The California Bishops continued their opposition
even after the bill was passed by the legislature. About 200,000 signatures were collected at
Sunday masses to influence Governor Reagan to veto the act. Id.
125 N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1967, at 42, col. 1 (city ed.).
126 N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1968, at 24, col. 2.
127 Statement by the Cuyahoga County Legal Committee for the Protection of the Unborn
In Opposition to Ohio House Bill No. 408, June 14, 1967, at 4.
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that abortion was condemned from the beginning.'2 However, the present
official teaching, that the fetus is an ensouled human being at the moment of
conception, has been promulgated relatively recently. In 1588 Pope Sixtus V
issued a papal bull stating that abortion was homicide at any stage of preg-
nancy.'29 This seems to have been the first official denunciation of abortion
without regard to the age of the fetus. Before, and even long after this pro-
nouncement, there was disagreement as to when a fetus becomes ensouled. In
1591, Pope Sixtus' bull was modified by Pope Gregory XIV to apply only to
abortions performed on an ensouled fetus.' This official position continued until
1869 when Pope Pius IX, in the constitution Apostolica Sedis, disregarded the
distinction between abortion of an ensouled and a nonensouled fetus." This
change implied the acceptance of the notion of immediate animation," 2 i.e.,
that a fetus is ensouled immediately upon conception. The former distinction
between an ensouled fetus and an unensouled fetus has been explained as being
a false one .... Today, and indeed for a very considerable period, it has
been accepted by biologists that there is no qualitative difference between
the embryo at the moment of conception and at the moment of quickening.
Life is fully present from the moment of conception. It follows that if
there is a soul, it, too, must be present from the time of conception.
33
The present Church position has been stated by Pope Pius XII in an address
to the Italian Catholic Society of Midwives in 1951.
The baby in the maternal breast has the right to life immediately
from God. - Hence there is no man, no human authority, no science,
no medical, eugenic, social, economic or moral "indication" which can
establish or grant a valid juridical ground for a direct deliberate disposition
of an innocent human life, that is a disposition which looks to its destruction
either as an end or as a means to another end perhaps in itself not illicit. -
The baby, still not born, is a man in the same degree and for the same reason
as the mother. 3 4
It is on this premise, that abortion is homicide, that the Catholic Church op-
poses abortion.
c. Criticism of Reform in General
Arguments for reform based upon the existence of social evils. 5 under
present abortion laws can be criticized, since the new acts will not solve most
of these problems. Even their sponsors admit this.' 6 Moreover, since the over-
128 See Noonan, The Catholic Church and Abortion: A Summary History, 12 NATURAL
L.F. 85, 89-97 (1967).
129 Id. at 110.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 115.
132 Id.
133 N. ST. JOHN-STEVAs, THE R IGHT TO LIFE 32 (1964).
134 Quoted in Noonan, supra note 128, at 120.
135 See text accompanying notes 32-67 supra.
136 Estimates with regard to the percentage of women these new laws will affect run
from 5%, DrALOGUE, supra note 54, at 22 (remarks of Dr. J. Kummer), to 20% or 30%,
South Bend Tribune, Sept. 7, 1967, at 3, col. 6 (remarks of Assemblyman Blumenthal). The
American Law Institute admits its proposal "will not solve all the problems." Id., col. 3.
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whelming majority of women who seek abortions are married with families,"3 7
the reform movement has been criticized as merely a movement for an additional
method of birth control."' 8 There is also a plausible argument that liberalizing
abortion laws may lead to an increase, rather than a decrease, in illegal abortions.
What the American Law Institute ignores is that law itself is one of
the greatest educating and civilizing forces. The moment that our law in
America says that abortion is permissible under certain circumstances, many
more people will avail themselves of legal abortions. Many people, how-
ever, would be reluctant to go and make a public record of what they're
doing. They would say, in their conscience, that if the law permits abortion,
then abortion can't be morally wrong: Therefore, I am free to go some-
where to get an underground operation, to an illegal abortionist.139
A similar argument has been suggested to the Ohio legislature. 4
Today, there is little or no argument against abortion based on the premise
that it is medically unsafe. Physical aftereffects, such as sterility and inability
to enjoy sexual intercourse and achieve orgasm, seem very rare.' 4' Psychological
aftereffects such as guilt feelings, also seem rare.4 2
The constitutional arguments against the traditional laws on abortion 4
are premised on the idea that the fetus has little or no rights. On the other
hand, a strong constitutional argument has been made against reforming these
laws, based on the premise that a fetus is a human being. Walter L. Trinkhaus,
legal representative of the California Conference of Catholic Hospitals, em-
ployed such an argument against Senator Beilenson's bill:
[A]I1 of these bills [based] on the suggestions by the American Law Insti-
tute are unconstitutional. They are unconstitutional because they are in
violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution - the
due process clause - both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally:
Because the hearings which Mr. Beilenson proposes would be held in secret.
There would be no representative for the unborn child. There would be no
way for this child to gain an appeal or review of his case. Substantively:
Because it is plainly unreasonable to take the life of an existing person for
something so ethereal as a risk of impairment to mental health. Certainly,
physical health is a vague enough term. But, "mental" health is far
vaguer.
144
Trinkhaus believes that the same violation of substantive due process occurs
when a fetus is aborted because the pregnancy results from rape or incest, or
because there is substantial risk that the fetus will be born deformed.
4 5 Of
137 See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
138 Shaffer, Abortion, The Law and Human Life, 2 VAL. U.L. Rv. 94, 100-02 (1967).
139 Fr. Robert F. Drinan quoted in LowE, supra note 78, at 83.
140 Statement, supra note 127, at 5.
141 DIAorUE, supra note 54, at 18; Hardin, Abortion and Human Dignity, in THE CASE
FOR LEGALIZED AiORTION Now 69, 75 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
142 DIALOGUE, supra note 54, at 18.
143 See text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
144 Walter R. Trinkhaus, quoted in LowE, supra note 78, at 88.
145 Statement by Walter R. Trinkhaus, Legal Objections to Pending Bill Authorizing
Abortions, Hearing on California A.B. 2310, at 2 (1964).
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course, the validity of this legal argument depends on the legal status accorded
the unborn child. 4
Mr. Trinkhaus also makes a good general criticism of abortion reform:
The proponents of liberalized abortion recite real and hypothetical
situations of stress and difficulty. Notwithstanding our sympathy and con-
cern for the unfortunate, it should be pointed out that the truly difficult
situations are rare. Of the estimated million of illegal abortions in the
United States each year, only a minute fraction constitutes the hard and
difficult cases. If 90% of the abortions are on married women, which has
been estimated, most of these are performed for reasons of convenience.
And even if the inconvenience to be occasioned by a birth is a serious one,
it must be weighed on the scales of justice against the taking of a human
life.
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d. Criticism of Each Proposed Ground
In this section arguments against the three proposed (or enacted) new
grounds for legal abortion will be considered. Most of these arguments are based
on the philosophy that a fetus is a human being and therefore has all the rights
of a human.
The first new ground for permitting abortion expands the old exception,
to preserve the life of the mother, to include her health also. One critic feels that
this may be the "most appealing and compelling reason for a justifiable abor-
tion," but goes on to ask how the law should balance the mother's right to
safety against the fetus' right to life.'4 He seems to doubt the validity of the
proposition that the mother's health is paramount to the life of the fetus and
that the state has no duty to speak for, or to protect, the fetus. 4 Even the broadest
reading of Griswold v. Connecticut,' which struck down the Connecticut statute
banning the use of contraceptives as an unconstitutional invasion of marital
privacy, applies only to the right to conceive or not to conceive children. Once
children are conceived or born, the state has an interest in their welfare.'
Another critic, in examining the work of a physician discussing medical
indications for abortion, which shows that such indications are uncommon or
unreal, 5 2 argues that "medical indications" are not medical at all. "These are
146 For an examination of the legal status of a fetus see text accompanying notes 163-89
infra.
147 Statement, supra note 145, at 10.
148 Drinan, supra note 120, at 117.
149 Id.
150 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a good discussion of this landmark case, see Katin, Gris-
wold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NoTa
DAE LAWYER 680 (1967).
151 Drinan, supra note 120, at 117-19.
152 Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, in, ABORTION AND THE
LAW 37 (D. Smith ed. 1967). In examining the medical indications for a therapeutic abortion,
Dr. Niswander finds that the danger of cardiovascular disease "has decreased substantially,"
that ulcerative colitis (inflamation of the large bowel characterized by ulceration of its lining
membrane) is "not a common" disease, that renal diseases do not "significantly affect the
risk of maternal death," that multiple sclerosis and epilepsy do not increase "the risk of death
during pregnancy," that tuberculosis is "no longer as important as it used to be" as an indica-
tion of risk of life or health, that diabetes increases the risk to the fetus, "but this would
seem to have little to do with the 'health' or 'life' of the mother," that there is "no convincing
evidence .. . which shows that subsequent pregnancy affects adversely the prognosis in extra-
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now, under 'danger to life' statutes -as they will be under 'danger to health'
statutes - fictions (or hypocrisies, to use the medical term)." '153 This seems
supported by a statement made by this same doctor: "[S]ocial factors often seem
to be a prominent consideration in the decision to abort."'I'
The second new ground for legal abortion is where a danger exists that
the fetus will be born with a grave physical or mental defect. Advocates of
this ground must
concede either (1) that the non-viable fetus is really not the repository
of any inviolable rights or (2) that the strong and dominant members of
society may extinguish or terminate the life of those individuals whose
physical or mental development may, in the judgment of society, be so
substantially arrested that they cannot attain a life worth living.1 55
These alternatives have been criticized as propounding euthanasia, a practice
repugnant to an absolute principle of Anglo-American Law - the principle
that the life of an innocent human being may not be taken away simply be-
cause, in the judgment of society, non-life for this particular individual would
be better than life.""'
The strongest argument against this ground stems from speculation as to
how a fetus would decide if it were faced with the decision of choosing birth
with deformity or no birth at all.
The fear and risk of a deformed child are real, but require an informed
medical profession for evaluation. With an acknowledged risk of 60 percent
for a deformed child to be born to a mother with rubella in the first few
weeks of gestation, the odds may be more than most parents and society
can bear. If an abortion is performed, it in fact is done for the family
and society, not for the unborn child. Although some parents and physicians
have indicated a desire to abort out of compassion for the child who would
bear these defects, this is a difficult moral line to follow. People ask, "How
would you like to be born deformed?" The child might reply, "If it is a
choice of that or no life at all, I might choose life." One prominent gyne-
cologist made a plea for "someone to speak for the fetus." If someone is
speaking for the fetus, he must realize that it might say, "Let me live."' 57
(Footnotes omitted.)
The life of Helen Keller shows that a person endowed with substantially less
than all talents can be fruitful. "A classic statue by a supreme master is no less
priceless for being made defective, even with an arm or a leg missing.'2
58
The third proposed ground for legal abortion is where the pregnancy
uterine malignancy," that it is difficult to prove that other diseases "actually threaten the life
of the pregnant patient. . . ." Id. at 41-45. Accord, Rosen, A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy,
in ABORTION IN AMERICA 299, 302-03 (H. Rosen ed. 1967).
153 Shaffer, supra note 138, at 96.
154 Niswander, supra note 152, at 45.
155 Drinan, supra note 120, at 114-15.
156 Id. at 115. The status of the fetus in American law is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 163-89 infra.
157 Ryan, Humane Abortion Laws and the Health Needs of Society, in ABORTION AND
THE LAw 60, 66 (D. Smith ed. 1967).




results from rape or incest. One critic concedes that a young girl who is raped,
and must then bear the product of such an awful act, pays a bitter price.
159
However, he adds that "nothing short of the preservation of innocent life would
justify it."16 Thus, assuming that a fetus is a human being, it deserves to live
despite any inconveniences the mother may experience. Also, there is no cer-
tainty that abortion will solve many of the social ills resulting from impregnation
through rape or incest. Consider the following case.
[A] 14-year-old mentally retarded girl . .. was impregnated by her father.
A public hospital in Denver was unable to perform an abortion, and she
had to have her baby. What happened? The father is in prison. The
family is on relief. The girl is under a psychiatrist's care. God knows
where the baby is.""
Now suppose an abortion had been performed.
The father would still be in prison and the family still on welfare. Abor-
tion won't prevent sex crimes or produce wealth. The girl -who was
mentally retarded - might well be under psychiatric care in any event
(and abortion might have made her worse). It is possible that the only
difference abortion would have produced in this case is that everybody
would know where the baby is, because he would be dead. 62
E. Can this Debate Be Resolved?
It is obvious that this whole debate boils down to one essential issue: What
is the legal status of the fetus? In this section the present theories defining the
legal status of the fetus are examined. Next, an attempt will be made to resolve
the debate. Finally, the probable future course of abortion laws will be de-
lineated.
1. Legal Status of the Fetus
An unborn child has always been recognized as having some legal status
in English law, as the above quotations from Bracton, Coke, and Blackstone
show." The oldest legal recognition of a fetus is probably its right to inherit.
An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed
in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or
a surrender of a copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned
to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take
afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in
this point the civil law agrees with ours. 64
The writ de ventre inspiciendo issued to a presumptive heir to inspect a mother
who claimed she was with a child who when born would cut off the claim of
the heir. The purpose of this writ was not only to safeguard the rights of the
159 Shaffer, supra note 138, at 100.
160 Id.
161 Star, We'll be the Abortion Mecca for the Nation Next, Loox, July 11, 1967, at 67, 69.
162 Shaffer, supra note 138, at 100.
163 See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
164 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130.
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living heir but also to safeguard the rights of the unborn heir. 65 A stay of execu-
tion ex necessitate legis, granted to a condemned woman who was pregnant,
is another instance of the common law recognizing an unborn child. 6 That
this stay was granted "out of the necessity of law" indicates that the law took
an interest in the birth of an unborn child.
It should be noted, however, that the common law never viewed a fetus
as completely human. This is evidenced by the fact that at common law abortion
was not a felony but only a "heinous misdemeanor."' 67 Indeed, a series of cases
as recent as the 1830's held that a woman would not be guilty of murder for
killing what would now be considered a newborn baby unless it could be shown
that the baby was "born alive."16 Even the fact that the child breathed was
held not sufficient proof. 6 9 Fortunately, this result was soon overruled in a
similar case involving the killing of a newborn child who had breathed.'
In this country, the most obvious example of legal recognition of the fetus
is found in both traditional and reform abortion laws. That a legal abortion
can be performed only under exceptional circumstances indicates that the fetus
has a legal right to be born.
Another great contribution of American law in recognizing the existence
of legal rights in the unborn is in the area of tort litigation.',- After an unsuc-
cessful beginning, 72 and later travail,7 3 the fetus is now recognized in most
states that have decided the question as having standing to sue for damages in
tort. 4 Indeed, the trend now seems to be toward recognizing this right without
regard to whether the fetus is viable or not.7 5 There is some controversy over
whether birth is a condition precedent to recognizing the legal personality of an
unborn child for the purposes of allowing the parents to maintain an action
for wrongful deathY.6 However, the policy considerations behind this controversy
concern compensation to the parents rather than the legal rights of the fetus.
7
1
This law of tort damages demonstrates that a fetus, when born, has a right
to be compensated for any deformities it must bear. Moreover, another area of
the law explicitly states that a fetus has a right to be born. In Fitkin Memorial
Hospital v. Anderson17 a pregnant mother refused a blood transfusion because
it was contrary to her religious convictions as a Jehovah's Witness. The hospital
165 Id. at *456.
166 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *413.
167 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
168 Rex v. Sellis, 173 Eng. Rep. 370 (1837); Rex v. Brain, 172 Eng. Rep. 1272 (1834);
Rex v. Crutchley, 173 Eng. Rep. 355 (1833); Rex v. Enoch, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (1833);
Rex v. Poulton, 172 Eng. Rep. 997 (1832).
169 Rex. v. Poulton, 172 Eng. Rep. 997 (1832).
170 Regina v. Trilloe, 174 Eng. Rep. 674 (1842).
171 For an excellent survey of an unborn child's right to damages in tort, see Gordon,
The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 579 (1965); see generally, W. PROSSER, TORTS §
56 (3d ed. 1964).
172 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
173 See Gordon, supra note 171, at 583-85.
174 Id. at 585.
175 Id. at 590. "There is no doubt but that this end result is proper and just, and it may
be confidently asserted that in the future the courts will lift the bar of viability." Id.
176 See cases cited in id. at 592, nn.80-81.
177 See id. at 594-95.
178 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), noted in 40 NoTa
DAME LAWYER 126 (1964).
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brought an action seeking authority to administer transfusions in the event that
they might be necessary to save the defendant mother's life and the life of the
unborn child. The Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
held that the judiciary could not so intervene in the case of an adult or an
unborn child. Although the question became moot when the defendant left
the hospital, the Supreme Court of New Jersey honored the request of both
parties to decide the case, since it felt that such an issue was likely to arise again.
In a brief per curiam opinion, the court relied on only two precedents: (1) the
State's concern for the welfare of a living child justifies blood transfusions despite
the objection of its parents," 9 and (2) a child can sue for prenatal injuries.'
On this basis the court held: "We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled
to the law's protection and that an appropriate order should be made to insure
blood transfusions to the mother ... .""'1 Such a decision is probably not an
unconstitutional encroachment on religious freedom. The United States Supreme
Court has spoken on this issue with respect to a living child. No doubt, its
rationale applies to an unborn child as well:
Acting to guard the general interest in the youth's well being, the state as
parens patriae may restrict the parents' control .... Its authority is not
nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's
course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim free-
dom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or
the latter to ill health or death.8 2 (Footnotes omitted.)
In a more recent case, Gleitman v. Cosgrove,"' the New Jersey Supreme
Court again expressly stated that "[t]he right to life is inalienable in our so-
ciety."'8 4 In this case, plaintiffs- mother, father, and child- brought a mal-
practice suit against the defendant doctors, alleging negligence in the doctors'
failure to inform the parents of the possibility that the child might be born
with defects due to the mother's German measles. The plaintiffs' theory was
that, had the parents been so informed, they might have sought an abortion.
Their complaint alleged three claims: claim one, on behalf of the child for
birth defects; claim two, by the mother for effects on her emotional state caused
by the child's condition; claim three, by the father for costs incurred in caring
for the child. In deciding the case, the court assumed that the parents could
have obtained a legal abortion, but that they did not do so because they relied
on the advice of defendants.'85 Recovery on claim one was denied. "By assert-
ing that he should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically
179 State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); accord, Application of Presi-
dent and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964).
180 Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
181 Fitkin Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538, cert. denied,
377 U.S. 985 (1964).
182 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
183 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
184 Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
185 Id. at 27, 227 A.2d at 691.
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impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of the impossi-
bility of making the comparison required by compensatory remedies."' 18 6 Claims
two and three were also denied in an alternative holding:
Though we sympathize with the unfortunate situation in which these
parents find themselves, we firmly believe the right of their child, to live is
greater than and precludes their right not to endure emotional and finan-
cial injury. We hold therefore that the second and third counts of the
complaint are not actionable because the conduct complained of, even if
true, does not give rise to damages cognizable at law; and even if such
alleged damages were cognizable, a claim for them would be precluded
by the countervailing public policy supporting the preciousness of human
life.'87 (Emphasis added.)
Two things must be pointed out about this case. First, the opinion of the
court concluded with the following dicta which seems inconsistent with the
holding.
It may well be that when a physician performs an abortion because of a
good faith determination in accordance with accepted medical standards
that an abortion is medically indicated, the physician has acted with lawful
justification within the meaning of our statute and has not committed a
crime. See § 207.11 Model Penal Code, comment 4, 153-154 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959).188
Second, this was a four-to-three decision. The three dissenting justices felt that
the claims of the parents should be permitted.
If the duty [to tell the mother of the possibility of the birth of an abnormal
child] had been discharged, Mrs. Gleitman could have been safely and
lawfully aborted and have been free to conceive again and give birth to
a normal child. Instead she was told, according to her testimony which
the majority assumes for present purposes to be true, that her child would
not be at all affected. In reliance on that she permitted the pregnancy to
proceed and gave birth to a child who is almost blind, is deaf and mute
and is probably mentally retarded. While the law cannot remove the
heartache or undo the harm, it can afford some reasonable measure of
compensation towards alleviating the financial burdens. 8 9
2. Is Reform Consistent with the Legal Status of the Fetus?
The right of recovery in tort for prenatal injury seems incongruous with
the three new grounds for legal abortion. In other words, a person cannot
lawfully injure a fetus, but he can lawfully kill it under certain circumstances. 90
186 Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. The court mentioned two other cases that denied recovery
in "wrongful life" actions: Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d
885 (App. Div. 1966); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
187 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
188 Id. at 31, 227 A.2d 689, 694. Two dissenting justices felt that New Jersey's statute
prohibiting abortion "without lawful justification," N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1953),
allowed an abortion in this case. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 52-55, 227 A.2d 689,
704-06 (1967) (dissenting opinion). The majority left this question open.
189 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 49, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (1967) (dissenting opinion).




The only way to reconcile this inconsistency is that in the former case, the
mother wants the child to be born, while in the latter, she does not. Yet, this
means that the mother can decide whether or not the unborn child will be
born. Even assuming that the right to recover in tort does not imply a right
to be born, such a proposition is definitely opposed to the holdings of the Fitkin
and Gleitman cases. In effect, this means that abortion on any grounds other
than to preserve the life 91 of the mother is unconstitutional, either procedurally,
or substantively, or both.'92
If a court finds Gleitman persuasive, there seem to be three possible ways
to avoid this conclusion. The fact that the majority in Gleitman failed even to
hint that abortion for grounds other than preserving the health of the mother
is unconstitutional or contrary to its holdings might well indicate that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey does not reach the same conclusion. However,
it would be an excellent example of change within stare decisis if that court
were now to hold that abortion for any reason other than to preserve the
mother's life satisfies procedural due process. It would be only a little less diffi-
cult for the court to find that substantive due process was satisfied.' The
second way to escape this conclusion is suggested by the fact that three dissenting
justices in Gleitman disagreed with the majority's view that "the right of their
child to live is greater than and precludes their right not to endure emotional
and financial injury."'.9 4 This may foreshadow a split of judicial opinion on
this vital issue when the question arises in other courts. Third, the recognition
of the right to life by the majority in Gleitman might be confined to a viable
fetus.
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These possible evasions of Gleitman's irresistible conclusion and the narrow
margin of the Gleitman decision itself suggest that no reliable prediction can
now be made as to how the liberalized abortion laws will fare in their first con-
stitutional test. If the majority of a court feels that the right to life of a fetus,
whether viable or not, is absolute, then the reform law in question will be uncon-
stitutional. If a majority feels that the right to life of a fetus is inferior to the
mother's health, to its own health, or to the right of a rape victim not to bear
the product of rape, then the law in question will be constitutional. In short,
this issue will turn on the American judiciary's personal philosophy of the nature
of a fetus. The chances of passage of future reform bills will turn on the per-
sonal philosophies of legislators and of the public who influence them. It is a
matter of balancing the rights of human beings to comfort, health, and other
needs against the rights of potential human beings to life.'
191 Abortion to preserve the life of the mother is clearly constitutional on a theory of
self-defense.
192 See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra.
193 Id.
194 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
195 The California law prohibits abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy. CAL.
HEALTIC & SAFETY CODE § 25953 (West 1967). New York's bill would prohibit abortion
after the twenty-fourth week. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1967, at 42, col. 3 (city ed.).
196 This statement may be a bit naive because it assumes that all proponents of reform
will give some consideration to the rights of the fetus.
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F. Perspective for the Future
1. Goals of Reformers
The ultimate goals of the reformers are often unclear. The legislators spon-
soring reform legislation wisely state that their ultimate goals are simply those
contained in their bills."9r Perhaps the most active proponent of reform, Dr.
Alan F. Guttmacher, admits that his ultimate goal is the elimination of all
legal restrictions on abortion. However, he believes that this transformation
should come "by evolution" rather "than revolution," since an abrupt change
would cause bitter dissension.198 One psychiatrist favors abortion on request,
but with the requirement that the woman be given medical, psychiatric, and
spiritual advice before making the decision to abort.'99 Other advocates of
reform,"' including the American Civil Liberties Union,2"' desire abortion on
request.
The advocates of abortion on request have at least one persuasive argu-
ment. Such an abortion procedure would do away with the social ills that many
proponents of reform argue are due to traditional abortion laws. While the
proposals previously discussed will do little to alleviate these problems, abortion
on request will solve them almost completely. This may be the law of the future,
if most Americans consider the solution to these problems to be superior to a
fetus' right to life. Oddly enough, Fr. Robert F. Drinan, one of the most active
critics of the reform proposals based on the three grounds discussed above, would
prefer no law regulating abortion over any of the recent reform acts. He feels
that repeal of existing laws has at least the merit of not involving law and society
in the business of selecting those persons whose lives may be legally terminated.0 2
Another critic of reform, Professor Thomas L. Shaffer, feels that abortion on
request has at least the advantage of being "candid," as opposed to present
reform laws which he calls "phony."
20 3
2. Future Developments
Two future developments may cause the abortion debate to become
almost0 . moot.
a. Abortifacient Pills
There are two types of abortifacient pills now being developed. One is
197 Beilenson, supra note 92, at 6; Blumenthal, supra note 106, at 3.
198 Guttmacher, Abortion - Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, in THE CASE FOR LEGAL-
IZED AnORTION Now 12-13 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
199 DIALOGUE, supra note 54, at 17-20 (remarks of Dr. Aaron).
200 E.g., Hardin, Abortion and Human Dignity, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION
Now 69 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967); California Comm. to Legalize Abortion, Stanford, Calif.;
Illinois Citizens for the Medical Control of Abortion, Chicago, Ill.
201 N.Y. Times, March 25, 1968, at 35, col. 1.
202 Drinan, The Right of the Fetus to Be Born 8 (unpublished paper prepared for the
International Conference on Abortion, Washington, D.C., Sept. 6-8, 1967).
203 Letter from Prof. Thomas L. Shaffer to Alan Reitman, Associate Director of the ACLU,
Nov. 6, 1967, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer. Professor Shaffer is a member of a special
ACLU committee to study abortion of the viable fetus. This letter is part of his report to
the ACLU Board.
204 Abortion will always be needed as a "backstop." Hardin, supra note 200, at 80.
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popularly known as the "morning after" pill;2 5 the other is popularly known
as the "month after" or "once-a-month" pill.2 Although these pills are not
yet fully perfected,"' if and when they are, the difficulty of detection will make
abortion a matter of private conscience. This is so even though such pills come
under the ban of most existing abortion statutes."" Obviously, it would be
easy to create a market for these pills with a minimum of risk. Yet, this in
turn may create bigger problems than that of the widespread flouting of present
laws by illegal operations. While there are reasons why organized crime does
not want to be involved in abortion by operation,"' there is no reason why it
would not want to market abortifacient pills. There is also a possibility that
counterfeit or unsafe pills, that could cause damage to the user's health, may
be put on this future "black market." Such possibilities suggest future cam-
paigns to legalize these pills. When this occurs, a new but similar debate will




Advances are being made in creating totally reliable contraceptive devices,2 '
and their use is becoming more widespread. It has even been suggested that
"women may some day become essentially infertile and thus free to decide
precisely when they wish to become fertile."21  However, there still remain
some legal barriers to the dissemination of both contraceptive information and
contraceptives themselves. While only one state completely bans the sale of
contraceptives,"3 a large number of states regulate their sale and distribution 1
and prohibit their advertisement.1 Thus, widespread dissemination of contra-
205 This pill, technically known as diethylstilbestrol, prevents the implantation of the
fertilized ovum on the wall of the uterus. TIME, May 6, 1966, at 60.
206 This pill kills the fetus by depriving it of an essential hormone, progesterone. South
Bend Tribune, Nov. 7, 1967, at 3, cols. 1-2.
207 Time Essay, supra note 52, at 33.
208 See the statutes collected in notes 18-21 supra.
209 See note 34 supra.
210 E.g., one member of Pope Paul's birth control commission has already stated that the
Pope will never approve of such pills because of their purpose. South Bend Tribune, Nov. 7,
1967, at 3, cols. 1-2.
211 E.g., the Ford Foundation has granted 15.7 million dollars to various institutions to
seek better contraceptive devices. Also, birth control pills for men are now being studied.
Chicago Daily News, Nov. 7, 1967, at 3, cols. 3-8, at 4, cols. 1-3.
212 Time Essay, supra note 52, at 33.
213 MIss. CODE ANN. § 2289 (1956).
214 E.g., APx. STAT. ANN. § 82-944 (1960); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6804-b (McKinney Supp.
1967); S.D. CoDE- § 13.1726 (Supp. 1960).
215 The following states prohibit all advertizing of contraceptive devices: ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-213 (1956); Ax. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-944-950 (1943); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18-603 (1947); IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.5 (1946); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:88(2)
(1950); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 20 (Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2289 (1956);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3609 (1947); NEv. REV. STAT. § 202.190 (1960); N.J. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-76 (1952); ORE. REv. STAT. § 435.010 (1967) (But cf. text accompany-
ing notes 221-22 infra); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4525 (1963); S.D. CODE § 13.1726 (Supp.
1960); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.68.030 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 151.15(1)-(2) (1957);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-105 (1957).
In one state, it seems that only "obscene" advertisement of contraceptives is illegal,
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.229 (1962). Other states ban advertising only of those contraceptive
devices tlat are used to prevent Venereal disease, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-10-3
(1963); Ns. REV. STAT. § 28-923 (1964).
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ceptives and advice on contraceptives may well be illegal in these states.21 How-
ever, the constitutional validity of such statutes may be doubted in light of
Griswold v. Connecticut." Yet, since Griswold dealt with a statute banning
the use of contraceptives as applied to a married couple, it leaves open the
question of the constitutionality of statutes banning and regulating the sale21
and advertisement of such devices, as well as the constitutionality of statutes
banning the use of contraceptives as applied to unmarried persons. The nar-
rowness of the decision warns against making an absolute statement of law on
this point.
Much more certain for those who wish to disseminate contraceptive in-
formation is the recent legislative trend toward making such proselytizing legal.
Within the last few years, five states have repealed" 9 or amended220 their laws
to allow such practices. Another state, while continuing its former ban,22' has
enacted enabling legislation to allow county health agencies to disseminate
contraceptive information and devices.222
While there may have been some Caiholic opposition to this trend in the
past, there is none noticeable now. Indeed, that a majority of Catholics under
the age of thirty-five presently use contraceptives223 makes the future appearance
of such opposition extremely remote. While the last Church-State Survey
224
cited some strong opposition by Catholics to government-administered birth con-
trol programs,22 there seems to be very little opposition now. The last official
statement on such programs by the Bishops of the Catholic Church in the United
216 E.g., in a declaratory judgment action the Arizona supreme court said that the Arizona
statute banning the advertisement of contraceptive devices would be violated if the Planned
Parenthood Committee would "aggressively solicit" to gain its objectives. The court also
upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maicopa County,
92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719 (1962).
217 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The following dicta of Justice White seems typical of the
Supreme Court's attitude toward these laws:
The anti-use statute, together with the general aiding and abetting statute, prohibits
doctors from affording advice to married persons on proper and effective methods
of birth control . . . And the clear effect of these statutes, as enforced, is to deny
disadvantaged citizens of Connecticut, those without either adequate knowledge
or resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical assistance and up-to-date
information in respect to proper methods of birth control .... In my view, a statute
with these effects bears a substantial burden of justification when attacked under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 503 (concurring opinion).
218 See People v. Baird, 47 Misc.2d 478, 262 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1965), where the court
appears to distinguish bans on the use of contraceptives from bans on their sale.
219 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 53 (Supp. 1967); Mo. RaV. STAT. § 563.300 (Supp.
1967); OHro Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 2905.32 to .34 (Page Supp. 1966).
220 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.251
(Supp. 1967).
221 ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.010 (1967).
222 ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.205 (1967).
223 How U.S. Catholics View Their Church, NEWSWEER, March 20, 1967, at 68, 71.
224 Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1964-66), 41 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 681 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1964-66 Church-State Survey]. The four other
previous surveys are: Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1955-57), 33 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 416 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1955-57 Church-State Survey]; Religious In-
stitutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1958-60), 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 405 (1960) [here-
inafter cited as 1958-60 Church-State Survey, part I], 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 537 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as 1958-60 Church-State Survey, part II]; Religious Institutions and Values:
A Legal Survey 1960-62), 37 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 649 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
1960-62 Church-State Survey]; Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1963-
64), 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 427 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1963-64 Church-State Survey].
225 1964-66 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 749-50.
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States was made in November of 1 9 6 6 .2" Although parts of this statement
might indicate that the Bishops are opposed to the use of public funds for con-
traception under any circumstances,22 it has been suggested that the whole
statement bears the inference that the Bishops are opposed only to those govern-
ment-administered programs of birth control that are "coercive and violative of
the right to privacy .... "I Even if the former inference is true, there has
been little or no recent clamor from the Catholic Church on this issue. Even
Pope Paul's recent encyclical, On the Development of the Peoples, might be
interpreted to suggest the possibility of Catholic cooperation in birth control
programs.
229
It is interesting to note that the present abortion debate may have had
some effect on the apparent change in the Catholic position on the use of con-
traceptives by society. Realizing that birth control may solve or at least minimize
many of the problems emphasized by proponents of abortion reform, Catholics
would seem to prefer prevention of conception of a fetus to termination of its life.
III. ARTIFIcIAL INSEMINATION
A. Introduction
As predicted,2 ' increased utilization of artificial insemination has had its
inevitable impact on the law.22' This Survey is therefore treating the problem in
more depth than has been done in the past." 2 Artificial insemination, unheard
of at common law, is a new concept developed by the scientific and medical
professions.2 3 Basically, there are two types of artificial insemination being
utilized in contemporary practice: artificial insemination of the husband's semen,
226 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1966, at 25, col. 4.
227 E.g.:
It should be obvious that a full understanding of human worth, personal and
social, will not permit the nation to put the public power behind the pressures for
a contraceptive way of life...
We call upon all - and especially Catholics - to oppose, vigorously and by
every democratic means, those campaigns already underway in some states and at
the national level toward the active promotion, by tax-supported agencies of birth
prevention as a public policy, above all in connection with welfare benefit programs.
Id.
228 Sirilla, Family Planning and the Rights of the Poor, 13 CATHOLIC LAW. 42, 44 (1967).
229 Neuhaus, The Dangerous Assumptions, 86 COMMONwEAL 408, 412 (1967) has so
interpreted this encyclical. The encyclical states, in part:
It is true that too frequently an accelerated demographic increase adds its own
difficulties to the problems of development: the size of the population increases
more rapidly than available resources, and things are found to have reached an
apparent impasse. From that moment the temptation is great to check the demo-
graphic increase by means of radical measures. It is certain that public authorities
can intervene, within the limit of their compentence, by favoring the availability of
appropriate information and by adopting suitable measures, provided that these be
in conformity with the moral law and that they respect the rightful freedom of
married couples. POPa PAUL VI, ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLES 50 (B.
Ward ed. 1967).
230 1964-66 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 749.
231 See generally text accompanying notes 307-13 infra.
232 E.g., Compare 1966-68 Church-State Survey with 1964-66 Church-State Survey,
supra note 224, at 749, and 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 464-65.




usually termed A.I.H., and artificial insemination of the semen of a third-party
donor, usually termed A.I.D.3 4 No one perceives legal difficulties in an A.I.H.
situation." 5 In the A.ID. situation, however, the legal difficulties are multi-
tudinous." 6 It has been estimated that there may be as many as 250,000 people
in the United States who were conceived by artificial insemination," 7 and that
this figure increases by 20,000 annually.3 8 Almost invariably, these conceptions
occur with the consent of the husbands.3 '
B. Theoretical Problems
The theoretical problems of artificial insemination seem to fall into four
broad areas: medical, legal, religious, and social. Artificial insemination advo-




Succinctly stated, "[a]rtificial insemination is the introduction of semen (or
at least spermatozoa) into the female reproductive tract otherwise than by sexual
intercourse."2 4 But before this simple act is performed, the physician spends
long hours counseling the couple, pointing out the difficulties - moral, legal,
psychological, and technical - that they may have failed to realize.241 The
physician then subjects the couple to psychological testing and a thorough back-
ground investigation242 - similar to the procedures used by adoption agencies.
Consent forms are usually required by the physician." 3 Both partners generally
sign these forms2 " in order to avoid possible legal problems, e.g., charges of
234 Id. at 1089. The most common reasons for utilizing A.I.H. is external hindrance to
conception or deficiency of sperm in the semen (oligozoospermia). The motive for using A.I.D.
is most commonly sterility, an incompatible Rh factor, or heriditary disease. Verkauf, Artificial
Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and Confusion - An Appraisal of Current Medico-Legal
Status, 3 Hous. L. REV. 277, 282 (1966). See also Weisman, Symposium on Artificial In-
semination: The Medical Viewpoint, 7 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 96, 97 (1955).
235 Rice, A.I.D.-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 510, 513 (1959).
The author's only exception to this rule is whether A.I.H. constitutes legal consummation of
the marriage. Id.
236 See text accompanying notes 260-64 infra.
237 Corbett, The Artificially Inseminated Child, 40 Wis. BAR BULL. 39, 44 (Oct. 1967).
238 W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 111 (1964).
239 88 Sci. NEWSLETTER 135 (1965).
240 O'Rahilly, Artificial Insemination: Medical Aspects, 34 U. DET. L.J. 383, 383-84
(1957).
241 Id. at 385.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 386.
244 A typical consent form:
I, .... ...................... ., residing at ...............-............ ,of my own free will and
volition have requested Dr .....-...... ...... . to inseminate my wife artificially with
the sperm of a male selected by Dr . ....................... This request has been made
with the full knowledge and consent of my wife, whose authorization is hereto
annexed. I am making this request because it is not possible for me to procreate
and because both my wife and I are extremely anxious to have a child and because
our mutual happiness and the well-being of my wife will be best served by this
artificial insemination.
On this ------ day of ................... 19 ., before me came -.. ...............
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adultery, grounds for divorce, etc.2 45 In the case of oligozoospermia 246 the
physician may mix the husband's semen with that of the donor in order to
incite hope into the couple that the father of the child might really be the hus-
band.
2 47
Perhaps the most difficult problem facing the physician is an ethical one,
i.e., whether to attend the birth of the child himself, or whether to direct the
couple to another physician, who is unaware of the artificial insemination, in
order to give the child a birth certificate that fraudulently certifies the child to
be the natural child of both the mother and the husband. If no explicit legislation
is enacted to rectify this difficulty, the physician will have to content himself
with only his own conscience.24
b. Donors
One of the prime concerns of the physician is the selection of a competent
donor. Some of the recommended characteristics of such a donor are:
The donor should not be a relative. His identity should remain unknown
to the couple and vice versa. He should be more than 35 years of age, so
that latent hereditary conditions may be excluded. He should be married
and have at least two healthy children but unmarried donors have been
used. 249 (Footnotes omitted.)
This selection procedure should, of course, guard against incompatible Rh factors,
venereal disease, tuberculosis, and congenital disease. But for one exception,
New York City,250 the selection procedure is not regulated in the United States.
Elementary safeguards similar to those enacted in New York City should be
instituted wherever artificial insemination is practiced.
Current donor selection procedures commonly include a payment to the
donor for his services. Where artificial insemination is widely practiced, regular
donors receive a remuneration varying from twenty-five dollars in New York
City to fifteen dollars in Pittsburgh.2 ' Compensated donors usually supply semen
about once a week.252 Although it is claimed that students and other donors
are matter-of-fact about the process and ask no questions about the ultimate
to me known and known to me to be the person described herein and who acknowl-
edged to me that he executed the foregoing consent.
Notary
I. . .. , join in my husband's request above stated and hereby
authorize Dr ................................ to inseminate me artificially with the sperm of
a male selected by Dr... ...........................
Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 LA. L. REv. 484, 499-500
(1948).
245 O'Rahilly, supra note 240, at 386.
246 See note 234 supra.
247 G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY op LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 119 (1957).
248 Address by C. J. Stetler, Director of Law Department of American Medical Associa-
tion, Headline Club, Chicago, Feb. 25, 1955.
249 O'Rahilly, supra note 240, at 387.
250 NEw YORK CITY HEALTH CoDE, art. 21 (1959). For the text of this code, see note
306 infra.




use of their sperm,"' the process is nonetheless criticized on the ground that it
is, in fact, nothing more than onanistic prostitution. 54 One author's reaction
to this aspect of the donor selecting process is repulsion; he classifies it with
prostitution255 - although he admits that the social problems are obviously
different.25
c. Sperm Banks
Sperm banks are special repositories where sperm is stored and classified
according to the donor's hereditary characteristics. This process of selectivity
is a giant stride toward the scientific age of the future.25 Indeed, one gynecologist,
Dr. Samuel Behrman of the University of Michigan, has reported conception in
a woman by artificial insemination of sperm that had been stored for two and
one-half years.25 At least one sperm bank may have some practical appeal:
"[T]o protect the issue of the astronauts from mutations resulting from ionizing
radiation in space, a technique has been developed for them to deposit their
sperm in a sperm bank and to preserve it indefinitely .... "2 s With such a
federally sponsored sperm bank in existence, it appears certain that the trend will
be toward wider use.
2. Legal
As stated above,2"' few legal problems attend the A.I.H. situation because
the offspring is the child of the husband of the mother.2"' Hence, its legal rights
seem clear.262 But in the A.I.D. situation, a question exists whether the child is
legitimate (with all the related problems of succession, support, custody, in-
heritance, etc.) and whether the act of artificially inseminating the woman con-
stitutes adultery.26 These legal problems are explored in more detail below.2"4
253 Id.
254 Marcel, Psychological and Moral Incidences, 2 NEW PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL ETHICS
20, 21 (D. Flood ed. 1954).
255 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 247, at 140, where he states:
The position is, then, that these donors masturbate themselves in order to sell their
bodily secretions. It is a natural reaction to regard this as not only repulsive but
wrong. The parallel easily suggests itself between the donor-or rather vendor-
of semen and the prostitute: both sell the use of their bodies in respect of their
sexual or reproductive functions.
256 Id.
257 Cf., A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); G. ORWELL, 1984 (1950). Indeed,
one writer has bluntly stated that this "[a]esthetic finesse on the human stud farm is a
novelty which ought to be encouraged." O'Rahilly, supra note 240, at 387 n.32.
258 NEwswEEx, April 18, 1966, at 101. This same article reports that the sperm is stored
in liquid nitrogen deep freezes.
259 Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent,
48 A.B.A.J. 942, 943 (1962). Will this be a violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities? See
Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 H.umv. L. REV. 973, 979 (1965).
260 See text accompanying note 235 supra.
261 Goldfarb, Symposium on Artificial Insemination: The Legal Viewpoint, 7 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 108, 109 (1955).
262 Id.
263 Id. at 109-13; Holloway, supra note 233, at 1090-91; Comment, Artificial Insemina-
tion: The Law's Illegitimate Child? 9 VILL. L. REv. 77, 80-81 (1963). But see Bartholomew,
Legal Implications of Artificial Insemination, 21 MODERN L. REV. 236, 255-56 (1958).
264 In this section only the issues are raised. Whatever answers do exist will be treated
in the discussion of cases, text accompanying notes 282-300 infra, and in the discussion of





The Roman Catholic Church has taken a firm position against A.I.D."6 '
based on the following principles: "[I]t is contrary to the divine plan for mar-
riage; it is the product of a false philosophy of life; it generally involves the
immoral procurement of sperm; and its consequences on social life are apt to
be disastrous."26 The Catholic Church's condemnation of artificial insemination
focuses upon the arguments of illegitimacy," 7 masturbation,
26 and adultery. 269
Pope Pius XII has spoken twice on the topic and has given the Church's definite
stand. The first mandate was given in an address to the Fourth International
Congress of Catholic Doctors on September 29, 1949, in which he stated that
it "is for the spouses alone who have a mutual right over their bodies for gen-
erating a new life, and this right is exclusive, nontransferable [and] inalien-
able."27' In an allocution to the Italian Catholic Midwives on October 29, 1951,
he again condemned artificial insemination for reducing the conjugal act into
"nothing more than a biological laboratory."2 '
b. Protestant
It is difficult to state a definitive or up-to-date Protestant position because
there are "few, if any, official announcements on this subject . . . [and] [e]ven
if there were, their authority would be distinctly limited."27 2 But the general
view of the Protestant faiths is much more liberal than that of the Catholics,
although it is by no means a blanket endorsement of artificial insemination.7
One Protestant commentator favors continuance of research in order to allow
artificial insemination on a voluntary basis for those couples who comply with
proper safeguards for its use.274 Complementing this view is that of another
author who does not believe that laws should prevent artificial insemination
for those people who wish to make it a part of their marriage.2" Given progress
in research and medical and legal safeguards, the Protestant position appears
265 Kelly, Artificial Insemination: Theological and Natural Law Aspects, 33 U. DET. L.J.
135, 138-39 (1956).
266 Id. at 139.
267 Hassett, Freedom and Order Before God: A Catholic View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1170,
1180-81 (1956).
268 Ryan, Symposium on Artificial Insemination: The Religious Viewpoints- Catholic,
7 Svsucusn L. Rav. 99, 99-100 (1955). For this reason, some physicians refuse to perform
the impregnation on members of the Catholic faith and, of course, refuse to employ Catholic
donors. W. FiNEGoLD, supra note 238, at 79-80.
269 Ryan, supra note 268. "Adultery is adultery whether or not the husband consents to
his wife's having sexual relations with another man. It is not rendered less adulterous by
nature of the fact that the semen has been artificially introduced." Hassett, supra note 267,
at 1179.
270 3 CANON L. DIG. 433 (T. Bouscaren ed. 1963). For the complete, untranslated,
official text, see 41 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 557 (1949).
271 3 CANON L. Di. 434 (T. Bouscaren ed. 1963). For the complete, untranslated,
official text, see 43 ACTA APOSTOLICAR SEDIS 835 (1951).
272 Noble, Symposium on Artificial Insemination: The Religious Viewpoints -Protestant,
7 SYRAcusE L. REv. 101 (1955).
273 Id. at 103.
274 Id.
275 Ramsey, Freedom and Responsibility in Medical and Sex Ethics: A Protestant View,
31 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1189, 1198 (1956).
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to be amenable to a prospective general acceptance of artificial insemination.
c. Jewish
The trend of the Protestant faiths is the accepted view of the Jewish faith.
One Jewish Rabbi states that "[iln this connection Jewish law is exceedingly
liberal. A woman is not guilty of adultery when she is impregnated artificially
with the sperm of a donor and the child is legitimate, whether or not the mother
is married."2 6 Jewish civil law is also flexible enough to accommodate the in-
heritance and support problems - even to the extent of relieving the father-
donor of all liability for support.27
4. Social
One author contends that the most dangerous effect of A.I.D. is not a
religious one, but is rather a devastating sociological catastrophe.2 7 8 A.I.D. is
seen to be nothing more than a wedge that is forced "into the monolithic structure
of marriage. ' 27 1 Indeed, by the marriage contract itself, a woman vows to
exclude sexual relations with all but her husband. It is therefore argued that




The introduction of a child into a crumbling marriage may help to save it.
But it may also be that a child conceived by artificial insemination might actually
accelerate the destruction of the marriage. The mother may not see in the child
a mirror of her husband, but instead, she may see a child whose father is the
type of person "who will masturbate for a price and assume the function of




Decisional law is still trying to establish a direction in this tumultuous
area.282 With no express guidelines, judges have based their decisions on a num-
ber of factors.8 One author has praised the decision in an early Canadian
case, Orford v. Orford,284 as the only case that really reached the basic issue,
i.e., the exclusiveness of the reproductive function.2 85 In Orford, an action for
alimony, the court stated that the act of artificial insemination was adulterous.
276 Rackman, Morality in Medico-Legal Problems: A Jewish View, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1205,
1208 (1956).
277 Id. at 1210.
278 LoGatto, Artificial Insemination: Ethical and Sociological Aspects, 1 CATHOLic LAw.
267, 273 (1955).
279 Id.
280 Tesson, Artificial Insemination and the Moral Law, in 2 NEw PROnLEMS IN Ma.DICAL
ETHIcs 38, 52 (D. Flood ed. 1954).
281 Kelly, supra note 265, at 145.
282 1963-64 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 464.
283 Compare Orford v. Orford, [1921] 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921), with Strnad v. Strnad, 190
Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948), and Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d. 1083,
242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886,
246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
284 [1921] 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
285 LoGatto, Artificial Insemination: Legal Aspects, 1 CATrOLIC LAW 172, 180 (1955).
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In my judgment, the essence of the offense of adultery consists, not
in the moral turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary
surrender to another person of the reproductive powers or faculties of the
guilty person; and any submission of those powers to the service or enjoy-
ment of any person other than the husband or the wife comes within the
definition of "adultery.
'28
The most recent case dealing with artificial insemination is People v.
Sorensen.2" As opposed to earlier cases, which were usually civil cases,
2 8
Sorensen was a criminal prosecution for failure to support a child.2 9 Folmer
Sorensen and his wife had consented to the process of artificial insemination
which was performed by a San Francisco physician. In 1964, the Sorensens
were separated and subsequently divorced."' 0 In a lower California court,29 '
Judge James E. Jones, Jr., relied on an estoppel theory and on the presumption
of legitimacy in ruling that Sorensen was the child's father and therefore guilty
as charged.9 ' Before the court of appeals, the issue was whether "the husband
of a woman who, with his consent, was artificially inseminated may... be found
guilty of the crime of failing to support a child who is the product of such in-
semination .... "293 In reversing the conviction, Judge Devine emphasized that
it was a criminal case, and that estoppel, when used in a criminal case, could
not be used "in order to prove an essential element [fatherhood]2 94 of the crime
of which appellant is charged." 295 The Supreme Court of California, sitting en
banc, reversed the appellate court and affirmed Sorensen's conviction.29 Judge
McComb, speaking for the court, changed the emphasis from "natural father" to
"lawful father."M
29
The anonymous donor of the sperm cannot be considered the "natural
father," as he is no more responsible for the use made of his sperm than is
286 Orford v. Orford, [1921] 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (1921).
287 254 Cal. App. 2d 869, 62 Cal. Rptr. 462 J1967), rev'd, 36 U.S.L.W. 2536 (Feb. 26,
1968).
288 E.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963), Strnad
v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
289 People v. Sorensen, 254 Cal. App. 2d 869, 62 Cal. Rptr. 462, 463 (1967), rev'd, 36
U.S.L.W. 2536 (Feb. 26, 1968). The charge was violation of California's child support
statute, Section 270 of the Penal Code:
A father of either a legitimate or illegitimate minor child who willfully omits
without lawful excuse to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical atten-
dance or other remedial care for his child is guilty of a misdemeanor and punish-
able by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in
a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1967).
290 People v. Sorensen, 254 Cal. App. 2d 869, 62 Cal. Rptr. 462, 463 (1967), rev'd, 36
U.S.L.W. 2536 (Feb. 26, 1968).
291 The municipal court, or more properly, the Appellate Department of the Superior
Court in the County of Sonoma, California. Id.
292 Id. at 465; ThaE, April 14, 1967, at 80.
293 People v. Sorensen, 254 Cal. App. 2d 869, 62 Cal. Rptr. 462, 463 (1967), rev'd, 36
U.S.L.W. 2536 (Feb. 26, 1968).
294 "Because section 270 of the Penal Code places criminal responsibility only upon the
father of a child, whether the child be legitimate or illegitimate, the prosecution has the
absolute burden of proving that the person charged is the father." Id. at 464.
295 Id. at 466.




the donor of blood or a kidney .... Since there is no "natural father,"
we can only look for a lawful father.28
The court went on to rule that the presumption of legitimacy is satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt when a husband consents to the creation of a child through
the means of third-party donor artificial insemination.
Therefore, since the word "father" is construed to include a husband who,
unable to accomplish -his objective of creating a child by using his own
semen, purchases semen from a donor and uses it to inseminate his wife
to achieve his purpose, proof of paternity has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt.299
This case is inconsistent with earlier artificial insemination cases.3 ° In order
to achieve clarity in this judicial enigma, a frontal attack must be made by the
courts, hopefully with the aid of clear and comprehensive legislation.
D. Legislation
1. Introduction
Notwithstanding the obstacles of indifference and religious opposition, "° '
legislation, either pro"' or con," has been consistently urged in order to attain
legal certainty. "Public policy on [such] important and controverted issues should
be formulated and declared so that individuals may conduct their lives accord-
ingly, avoiding needless hardship. "
3 0 4
2. Implied Statutory Authority
Some states have treated the problem of artificial insemination on an
implied or peripheral statutory basis. For example, an Arizona statute" ' de-
clares a broad policy of legitimacy - presumably broad enough to encompass
a child conceived by artificial insemination. The City of New York, while silent
on the actual practice of artificial insemination, appears to approve of it in-
directly by establishing regulations for the physician, donor, and recipient and
298 Id.
299 Id. at 2537.
300 See cases cited in note 283 supra.
301 TIMFE, April 14, 1967, at 80.
302 E.g., Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 LA. L. REv.
484, 503 (1948). For an examination of the drastic change in Oklahoma, see text accom-
panying note 308 infra.
303 Rice, A.I.D.-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 510, 528-29 (1959).
He states that a "rule of illegitimacy would seem to be dictated by the inherently extra-
marital nature of AID .... ." Id. at 529. See also Comment, Natural Law and Artificial
Insemination, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 189 (1955), in which the author, without a develop-
ment of natural law on relevant public policy or morality, summarily concludes that a statute
prohibiting A.I.D. is the only possible natural law solution to the problem. Id. at 191.
304 Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L. REv.
859, 883.
305 AnIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956) states in pertinent part:
A. Every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to
support and education as if born in lawful wedlock ....
C. This section shall apply although the natural father of such child is married
to a woman other than the mother of the child, as well as when he is single.
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by providing for confidentiality of the records.308 If a New York statute were
enacted to provide for the legitimacy of the offspring, the New York coverage
of the problem would appear to be complete.
3. Legitimacy Statutes
Oklahoma has become the first state to provide for statutory legitimacy
of children born as a result of heterologous artificial insemination, i.e., A.I.D: 0 7
The technique of heterologous artificial insemination may be per-
formed in this State by persons duly authorized to practice medicine at
the request and with the consent in writing of the husband and wife de-
siring for the utilization of such technique for the purpose of conceiving
a child or children.
Any child or children born as the result thereof shall be considered
at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child
of the husband and the wife so requesting and consenting to the use of
such technique.
No person shall perform the technique of heterologous artificial in-
semination unless currently licensed to practice medicine in this State, and
then only at the request and with the written consent of the husband and
wife desiring the utilization of such technique. The said consent shall be
executed and acknowledged by both the husband and wife and the person
who is to perform the technique, and the judge having jurisdiction over
adoption of children, and an original thereof shall be filed under the same
rules as adoption papers. The written consent so filed shall not be open
to the general public, and the information contained therein may be released
only to the persons executing such consent, or to persons having a legitimate
interest therein as evidenced by a specific court order.308
The principal arguments against the law's passage were its immorality and the
306 NE w YorEK Crry HEALTH CODE, art. 21 (1959):
No person other than a licensed physician shall perform an artificial insemina-
tion or collect, offer for sale, sell or give away human seminal fluid for the purpose
of causing artificial insemination.
A proposed donor of seminal fluid shall have a standard serological test for
syphilis and a smear and culture for gonorrhea within one week before his seminal
fluid is taken and, immediately prior to taking his seminal fluid, he shall be given
a complete medical examination with particular attention to his genitalia.
A proposed donor and a proposed recipient of seminal fluid shall each have a
blood test to establish their respective Rh factors before artificial insemination is
attempted. Such test shall be made by a laboratory operated pursuant to Article 13
and classified for hematology, including blood grouping and Rh typing. If the
proposed recipient is negative for the Rh factor, only seminal fluid from a donor
who is also negative for the Rh factor shall be used.
A person who is affected with a venereal disease, tuberculosis, brucellosis or
who has any congenital disease or defect shall not be used as a donor of seminal
fluid for artificial insemination.
A physician who performs an artificial insemination shall keep a record of
(1) the names and addresses of the physician, donor, and recipient, (2) the results
of the medical examination and serological and all other tests, and (3) the date
of artificial insemination.
Records kept by a physician pursuant, to this section shall not be subject to
inspection by persons other than authorized personnel of the Department. A person
who has access to these records shall not divulge any part thereof so as to disclose
the identitfy of the persons to whom they relate.
307 TIME, April 14, 1967, at 80.
308 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-53 (Supp. 1967).
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"personal consideration[s]" of the legislators. " After some debate in the House
and very little in the Senate, 1 ' the bill passed both houses by May 4, 1967."1L
Governor Dewey Bartlett accepted it as sound legislation and approved it on
May 11, 1967.12
Thus, Oklahoma has been the innovator. In enacting the statute, it has
solved the problems of adultery and legitimacy. However, no provision is made
to establish regulations for the donor as are provided in New York City.13 s Either
other states will follow Oklahoma's example, hopefully with a comprehensive law,
or Oklahoma will become a mecca for those desirous of this controversial and
novel means of procreation.
4. Perspective for the Future
The issue can no longer be ignored. A failure to legislate might be inter-
preted as a delegation by the legislature of its policy-making function to the
judicial branch. 14 Some states have considered this type of bill in the past, but
have rejected it."'5 Now the states must re-evaluate their position. There is
a necessity for every state to thoroughly examine the problem and to produce
legislation - comprehensive legislation - both as a means of ensuring that
A.I.D., if practiced, will be practiced with high standards for all parties con-
cerned, and as a means of ensuring the legitimacy of the A.I.D. child.1 ' These
steps are necessary to protect the overall interest of society.
31 7
E. Conclusion
More and more donor inseminations are performed each year.1 ' Dr.
Wilfred Finegold, Head of the Division of Sterility of the Pittsburgh Planned
Parenthood Center, has made an excellent and timely observation on the overall
problem:
The lawyer who claimed that the law's response to artificial insemination
will be perfect horror, skepticism, curiosity and then acceptance has diagnosed
309 Questionnaire accompanying a letter from Representative George Camp to Merle F.
Wilberding, Feb. 1, 1968, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer. Once it was realized that
this bill was merely permissive legislation for those needing it and rationally desiring it,
passage was assured.
310 Id.
311 Copy of Official Enrolled House Bill No. 707, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
312 Id.
313 See note 306 supra.
314 Corbett, The Artificially Inseminated Child, 40 Wis. BAR BULL. 39, 44 (Oct. 1967).
315 E.g., Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin. Hager,
Artificial Insemination: Some Practical Considerations for Effective Counseling, 39 N.C.L.
REv. 217, 230 n.46 (1961); Note, supra note 304, at 881 n.117.
316 See Note, supra note 304, at 883-84. For a general set of requirements for a com-
prehensive A.I.D. bill, see Note, Artificial Insemination -Legal and Related Problems, 8
U. FLA. L. REv. 304, 315-16 (1955). An excellent and comprehensive model statute, gov-
erning all actors, phases, and procedures is incorporated into a student article. See Comment,
Artificial Insemination: The Law's Illegitimate Child? 9 VILL. L. REv. 77, 90-93 (1963).
317 The author does not personally advocate the use of artificial insemination, but he
does urge legislation as a safeguard for those who do wish to practice it. "The prohibition
imposed by a religious belief should not be applied by law to those who do not share the
belief, where this is not required for the worldly welfare of society generally." 0. WILLIAMS,
TIsr SANCTITY oF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 312 (1957).
318 W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 69 (1964).
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the situation correctly. We believe the "horror" stage has passed and that
the public and the legislatures are moving in the area of skepticism and
curiosity. Before long, there will be acceptance.319
This statement was made in 1964. Now, the "acceptance stage" exists in one
state. It will undoubtedly be created in others. Legal acceptance is not, however,
moral and social acceptance. A long evolutionary period is necessary before the
public generally accepts artificial insemination as a part of its mores.
IV. "ANTI-MsCEGENATION
On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court tolled the death knell for anti-
miscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia.'2" Although the trend was toward
the eradication of these deplorable statutes, 2' as of the decision date, sixteen
states had not yet done so. 22
The history of Loving goes back to June, 1958, when two Virginia residents,
Richard Loving, a white man, and Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, traveled
to the District of Columbia and were married. 2 s The Lovings returned to their
home in Caroline County, Virginia and were indicted by the grand jury for
violating Virginia's statutory bar against interracial marriages."" After pleading
guilty, the Lovings were sentenced to one year in prison, suspended upon condi-
tion that they remain outside Virginia for a twenty-five year period. 5 A sub-
sequent motion in the trial court to vacate the judgment "on the ground that
the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,"32 was denied on January 22, 1965."' The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statute and af-
firmed the Lovings' convictions. 28 An appeal to the United States Supreme
Court was successful and the opinion of the Court provoked no dissenters. 29
According to Chief Justice Warren, the issue was "whether a statutory scheme
319 Id.
320 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
321 1964-66 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 752-53.
322 388 U.S. at 6 n.5.
323 Id. at 2.
324 Id. at 3. The Lovings were indicted and sentenced under a combination of these
two sections of the Virginia law:
§ 20-58 If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State,
for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married
out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife,
they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed
by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their co-
habitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage.
§ 20-59 If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored
person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than
five years. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-58 to 59 (1950).
For a historical discussion of Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes, see Wadlington, The Loving
Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perpective, 52 VA. L. Rxv. 1189
(1966).
325 388 U.S. at 3.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78 (1966), r.ev'd, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
329 Justice Stewart concurred, expressing his belief that it is inconceivable that the crim-
inality of an act could depend upon the race of the actor. 388 U.S. at 13 (concurring opinion).
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adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriage between persons solely
on the basis of racial classification violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." ' The Court first noted that there was
"patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial dis-
crimination which justifies this classification," ' and, hence, there was no doubt
but that the statute's classification constituted unequal protection of law. The
Court also held that the fundamental freedom to marry, if restricted solely on
the basis of racial classification, is a deprivation of liberty without due process
of law."3 2 The Lovings' conviction was therefore void and their marriage
valid. 33
In Delaware, a similar case was decided two weeks later.3 4 William Davis,
a Negro, and Sandra Drummond, a white woman, sought a marriage license
in New Castle County.3  The clerk refused to process their application33 6 be-
cause of a Delaware statute outlawing interracial marriages. ' The plaintiff
sought a declaration of the statute's invalidity and an injunction against its
enforcement. 38 The federal district court, in striking down the statute, based
its decision completely on Loving. "The ruling of the Supreme Court clears the
board of all racial barriers to marriage."'139 The Loving case ends the problem
completely. The anti-miscegenation statutes are now a dead issue.
V. TIlE STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE STATE UNIVERSITY
A. Introduction
The study of religion in a state university is a topic that has not been
previously treated in the biennial Church-State Survey. But this subject has
now risen to major importance and must be examined.
The dialogue of an intellectual community is not complete without
the participation of theology. We cannot afford to leave its voice indefinitely
muted or to hear it at most only tangentially and indirectly. Ideally, this
discipline overtly and forthrightly should resume its 'historic university
role.
40
330 Id. at 2.
331 Id. at 11.
332 Id. at 12.
333 Richard Loving and his wife, Mildred, now "legally married," have returned to Cen-
tral Point (Caroline County, Virginia) to rear their three children. Booker, The Couple
that Rocked Courts, EBONY, Sept., 1967, at 78-79.
334 Davis v. Gately, 269 F. Supp. 996 (D. Del. 1967).
335 Id. at 997.
336 Id.
337 DEL. CoDa ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1953), provides in pertinent part:
(a) A marriage is prohibited and void between-
(2) A white person and a Negro or mulatto.
§ 102 The guilty party or parties to a marriage prohibited by section 101 of this
title shall be fined $100, and in default of the payment of the fine shall be imprisoned
not more than 30 days.
338 Davis v. Gately, 269 F. Supp. 996, 998 (D. Del. 1967).
339 Id. at 999.
340 Louisell & Jackson, Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education, 50 CALIF. L.
Rav. 751, 792 (1962).
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This dialogue, however, must be reconciled with a very formidable obstacle,
the first amendment. The contentions are strong on both sides: "Religion is
essential to any understanding of human nature that reaches beyond the most
restricted laboratory experiment;"'" and, the establishment clause is "a wall of
separation between church and State." '4 2 This dialectic has been stimulated
because of the accelerated trend of religious instruction in tax-supported uni-
versities:
In many parts of the country, religious studies are being given a larger
place in tax-supported colleges and universities. Until very recently the
trend was gradual, but it has greatly accelerated in the nineteen sixties.
This development is apparently due to a wider recognition of several facts:
that religion is an important aspect of culture, that religion can be studied
in ways which meet the highest academic standards, and that religious studies
in state universities are not prohibited by law. There is increased recogni-
tion, also, that public education 'has an obligation to contribute to the




In Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents,3 44 one of the
few cases to reach the merits on this question, 45 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton upheld the constitutionality of a University of Washington English course,
"The Bible as Literature." The court found that the course
was taught in a completely objective manner; had no effect on religious
beliefs; was not slanted toward any particular theological or religious
point of view; did not indoctrinate anyone; did not enter into the realm
of belief or faith; and was not taught from a religious point of view.3 46
The court believed that these findings were sufficient to justify its conclusion
that the Bible literature course was not violative of the constitutional mandate
of separation of church and state. 47
The United States Supreme Court has faced the problem only peripherally
thus far. 4 ' The Court's initial position was that the first amendment wall
341 White, What Place Has Religion in State University Education?, in Religion and the
State University 89, 91 (E. Walter ed. 1958).
342 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). See also Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
343 Katz, Religious Studies in State Universities, 1966 Wis. L. Rzv. 297.
344 436 P.2d 189 (1967).
345 E.g., in a taxpayer suit, a complaint to enjoin the use of university facilities by student
religious groups was dismissed -without reaching the merits-by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota for the taxpayer's failure to have first presented the issue to the governing board
of the institution. State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minn., 236 Minn. 452, 54 N.W.2d 122
(1952). See also North v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 137 Ill. 296, 27 N.E. 54
(1891); Hanauer v. Elkins, 217 Md. 213, 141 A.2d 903 (1958); D. BOLES, THE BIaLE,
RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 158-61 (1965).
346 436 P.2d at 194.
347 Id.
348 E.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 336 (1948) (concurring opinion).
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between church and state must remain "high and impregnable." ' 9 But a modi-
fication began in 1947 in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education."'
In concurring, Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
And I should suppose it is a proper, if not an indispensable, part of prepara-
tion for a worldly life to know the roles that religion and religions have
played in the tragic story of mankind .... One can hardly respect a sys-
tem of education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of the
currents of religious thought that move the world society .... s 1
The strongest dicta in support of the study of religion in a state university are
found in School District of Abington v. Schempp.5 2 Mr. Justice Clark, writing
for the majority, made this appealing observation:
[I]t might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study
of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to
the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible
is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have
said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when pre-
sented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be
effected consistently with the First Amendment.
5 3
The strength of this comment should be sufficient to uphold the right to objec-
tively study religion in a tax-supported university. The academic analysis of reli-
gion - for example, the philosophy of religion in a pluralistic society - broadens
the overall knowledge of the citizenry and, hence, raises the intellectual level of
the country. This is definitely a secular purpose, and it has a primary effect "that
neither advances nor inhibits religion."
3 54
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Schempp, added strength
to the dicta of the majority:
The holding of the Court today plainly does not foreclose teaching
about the Holy Scriptures or about the differences between religious sects
in classes in literature or 'history. Indeed, whether or not the Bible is
involved, it would be impossible to teach meaningfully many subjects in
349 "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must
be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach." Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); cf. Louisell & Jackson, supra note 340, at 756.
350 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The Court held that the utilization of public school buildings
for religious instruction of public school pupils violates the first amendment.
351 Id. at 236. For a general review of the Supreme Court cases in this area, see Mc-
Closkey, Principles, Powers, and Values: The Establishment Clause and the Supreme Court,
in 1964 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3 (D. Giannella ed. 1965). In light of the Mc-
Collum case, the State University of Iowa School of Religion revised its articles of incor-
poration in order to clarify its strictly educational position. As revised article II reads as
follows:
1. To provide courses that will help students gain an understanding of the history
and literature of religion and a thoughtful insight into its nature and meaning.
2. To foster through the study of religion an appreciation of the spiritual values
in human culture. M. LAMPE, TE STORY OF AN IDEA 10 (1963).
See also text accompanying notes 385-92 infra.
352 374 U.S. 203 (1963). This case held that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania cannot
require reading of the Bible or recitation of the Lord's Prayer in a public school.
353 Id. at 225.
354 Id. at 222.
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the social sciences or the humanities without some mention of religion3 55
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in another concurring opinion, reemphasized this point
by stating that current judicial thought would uphold the propriety of "teaching
about religion, as distinguished from the teaching of religion 3 56 in tax-supported
institutions.
Beginning with Schempp, separation of church and state has not meant
mutually exclusive isolation. Rather, it means freedom from government spon-
sorship and government restraint, 7 i.e., "neutrality." But, it has been said that
neutrality has about it a "deceptive simplicity,"'5 since absence of religion is,
in fact, the promotion of nonreligion. Absence of religion would therefore
make the public [university] a sectarian institution - promoting an atheistic
faith. This identification of the public [universities] with a minority reli-
gion, namely atheism, would be no more justified than its advocacy of
the religious consensus. Yet whenever the school acts as if religion did
not exist, it allies itself, willingly or not, with this esoteric sectarianism.3 59
One writer has formulated a test, within constitutional imits, that is neutral, yet
not ignorant of the problem:
Stated briefly, the test, at least in theory, is this: any study of religion whose
purpose it is to inculcate religious belief - sectarian or non-sectarian - is
constitutionally forbidden; a study of religion whose purpose is to attain
understanding of religion is permitted. 60
The extreme flexibility of the Constitution allows current policy considera-
tions and current competing interests to shape it through judicial decisions into
a sculptured model of contemporary public opinion. This concept of historical
interpretation s6 ' is an initial necessity in upholding the constitutionality of
academic evaluation of theological philosophies in state universities. The right-
ful role of the university must be reconciled within the context of the Constitu-
tion. This should be no problem in the university since it differs from the ele-
mentary or secondary school in many essential respects.36 2 Some writers who
attack the constitutionality of these programs at lower levels would uphold them
at the university level. 6 3
I do not believe the objective teaching of religion is today practicable
at the elementary school level, or that violation of the Constitution can be
355 Id. at 300 (concurring opinion).
356 Id. at 306 (concurring opinion).
357 Katz, supra note 343, at 298.
358 P. FREUND & R. ULICr r, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 12 (1965).
359 G. Forell,- The Illusion of Neutrality 5 (unpublished paper available from the Iowa
School of Religion, Iowa City, Iowa).
360 Pfeffer, Constitutional Aspects of Religion in State Universities, in RELIGION IN THE
STATE UNIvEsrr, 44, 48 (H. Allen ed. 1950).
361 Kauper, Law and Public Opinion in RELIGION AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 69, 71
(E. Walter ed. 1958).
362 Id. at 79-80. See also Ohoper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitu-
tional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329, 383 (1963). But see Littell, Church, State, and
University, in 1963 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 78, 79 (D. Giannella ed. 1964).
363 Kauper, supra note 361 at 80; Pfeffer, supra note 360, at 49-50.
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avoided otherwise than by excluding the content of religion from the cur-
riculum. However, this is not necessarily true of colleges or universities ....
The college student has received his basic religious training in his home
or church and is thus ready for exploration of other religious or even non-
religious beliefs. Moreover, unlike the elementary school child, he no longer
accepts as incontrovertible truths all he hears from his teacher or reads in
a textbook.
364
The language of the courts and of the writers indicates that the Constitution
does not forbid the existence of theology in a state university. One writer has
suggested that the state university's responsibilities and limitations can be put
into focus by answering these two political questions: "Does the policy or act
proposed contribute to the strengthening of voluntary religion and its free exer-
cise?"3 5 and "Does the decision duly respect the integrity of conscience and
dignity of person of citizens of other persuasions . . . ?""s Given the flexibility
of the Constitution, the tax-supported university, in fulfilling its proper function,
must be free to include the study of religion as a proper academic discipline.
C. Theoretical Justification - The Function of a University
Since a university is essentially a place for communication and development
of thought,36 7 it should be a forum for the expression of the community's values
and ideas. 6 Religion must be considered an inseparable part of this expression
and should, therefore, be a part of the education that incites the ideas within
the students.6 9 To do less would be to make the state university "the supreme
leader of the secularization of life and education."
370
Once a state university recognizes its responsibilities to help students under-
stand society' 71 through the development of pluralistic religious perspectives, it
must program the study of religion into its existing framework of curricula.
"[R]eligion, theoretically and practically, is inseparable from education; hence
it should be taught, even in a tax-supported university, not indirectly or surrep-
titiously, but unapologetically, comprehensively, and in line with the best edu-
cational procedures."''
364 Pfeffer, supra note 360, at 49-50.
365 Littell, Religious Liberty in a Pluralistic Society, 8 J. CHuURCH & STATE 430, 443
(1966).
366 Id.
367 J. NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERsITY 464 (1927).
368 Haas, Theology at the State University, 40 THOUGHT 506, 509 (1965).
369 Miller, Responsibility, Not Immunity, in RELIGION IN THE STATE UNVERSrrY 84, 87
(H. Allen ed. 1950).
370 Id. at 84. Secularism has been described as follows:
Secularism is the assumption that sense experience is our sole proof of truth,
that material reality is the only reality, and that the only values are pragmatic
enjoyments of a this-worldly, immediately experienced, hedonistic type. Secularism
is reinforced by a mistaken view of science. Because natural science studies phe-
nomena which are verified through the senses and neglects other aspects of life, it
is falsely assumed that no other aspects exist. Neglect, methodological omission,
means denial of spiritual reality, of God-values. Id. at 88.
371 See Pollock, Our Heritage of Religious Values and Basic Issues of Higher Education,
50 RELiGous EDuc. 298, 299 (1955).




Given its place within the curricula of the university, the program of reli-
gious instruction must be objective. The usual pronouncement is that the
courses must be about religion and not be the instruction of religion." 3 For
this to be achieved, the instructor must rigidly follow a plan of scholarly
objectivity and comprehensiveness." 4 "He . . . [must] lift the whole religious
tradition of mankind to the level of analytical, historical, and comparative dis-
course.". 75 Objective instruction is a key item in the success of this program.
It is possible in a university where students can maturely meet competing spir-
itual and intellectual aspects of conflicting religious dogmas.""0
Professor Kauper, of the University of Michigan Law School, compares
the distinction between the study about religion and the instruction of religion
to the distinction between the study of political science and the indoctrination
of political values:
No state university can have a theological position any more than it can
have a political position. But just as freedom from a political position does
not preclude a study of political science, so lack of commitment to a theo-
logical position does not preclude a study of theology. What is important
is that the state should not promote a particular theology for purposes of
religious indoctrination, but that rather it should afford opportunity for
study of religious ideas, religious behavior, and religious institutions at the
hands of competent scholars. 77
The last obstacle on the practical level is the formulation of a plan con-
sistent with the proper role of the university and with the concept of "neutrality"
as required by the Constitution.7 The latter requirement is no small obstruc-
tion. "Fear of violating the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution has
sometimes acted as a barrier to the development of a distinctive curricular pro-
gram in religion." ' 9 Primary consideration must therefore be given to three
conditions that comprise the sine qua non to the establishment of theology as
an intellectual discipline: (1) Participation must be on a purely voluntary basis;
religion courses cannot be made a requirement for graduation." (2) There
must be no discrimination of one religion over another; 8. neither should ad-
373 E.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (concurring opinion); P.
FREUND & R. ULICH, supra note 358, at 43; Greene, Religion and the Humanities, in RELI-
GION AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 120, 128 (E. Walters ed. 1958); cf. Phenix, Religion in
American Public Schools, in 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 82, 100-09 (D. Gian-
nella ed. 1966).
374 P. FREUND & R. ULIcH, supra note 358, at 43.
375 Id.
376 Shedd, Religion in the American State Universities: Its History and Present Problems,
in RELIGION IN THE STATE UNIVERSITY 13, 27 (H. ALLEN ed. 1950).
377 P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 99 (1964). See also Haas, supra note
368, at 510-11.
378 See text accompanying notes 361-66 supra.
379 4 RELIGION 2 (April, 1967) (Bulletin of The Kansas School of Religion at the Uni-
versity of Kansas).
380 62 THE UNIV. OF KAN. NEWSLETTER No. 33, March 30, 1963, at 6 [hereinafter cited
as NEWSLETTER]; Kauper, supra note 361, at 82-83; Louisell & Jackson, supra note 340, at
766.
381 NEWSLETTER, supra note 380 at 6.
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herence to a particular creed be a criterion for admission into the program.3 8 2
(3) The goal of instruction must be an increase in understanding, not an aid
to propagandizing. 83
It is a proper function of the state university to inject knowledge and under-
standing; it is not a proper function to seek commitment and indoctrination. 84
Compliance with these elementary conditions is a threshold requirement in
preserving the constitutionality of this instructional program.
E. Existing Practice
1. Classification of Programs
State universities have, in fact, instituted programs of instruction in reli-
gion. The curricula of the various universities are not identical, however. These
programs have been classified into the following six categories:
1. An independent school of religion adjacent to the campus, inde-
pendently financed, but with faculty status at the university such as the
Indiana School of Religion.1355 ]
2. Courses taught by local clergymen accredited by the university,
as at the University of Illinois.[ass]
3. Courses about religion taught in various departments of the uni-
versity, as at the University of Michigan.
4. Separate departments of religion as at Michigan State University,
and the State University of Iowa, where courses are taught in particular
religious doctrines by representatives of those religions.[87]
5. Extension courses offered by a sectarian university with transferable
credits, as at the University of New Mexico.
6. Televised courses offered for credit by a sectarian university such




382 Kauper, supra note 361, at 81-82.
383 NEWSLETTER, supra note 380, at 6.
384 Kauper, supra note 361, at 82.
385 On January 24, 1968, Indiana University announced that it became the fourth state
university to offer a master of arts degree in religion, joining the Universities of Iowa, Cali-
fornia at Santa Barbara, and the Pennsylvania State University. South Bend Tribune, Jan.
24, 1968, at 16, col. 4. It is reported elsewhere, however, that The Kansas School of Religion
also offers a master of arts degree in religion, 4 RELImON 3 (April, 1967) (Bulletin of The
Kansas School of Religion at the University of Kansas).
386 A similar program-is offered at the University of Texas at El Paso. Letter from Ray
Small, Dean, College of Liberal Arts, University of Texas at El Paso to Merle F. Wilberding,
Dec. 1, 1967, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
387 At Michigan State University, the Department of Religion is fully integrated into
and supported by the university. Letter from Harry Kimber, Chairman of the Department
of Religion at Michigan State University, to Merle F. Wilberding, Jan. 23, 1968, on file with
the Notre Dame Lawyer. At the University of Iowa, the university provides a large part of
The School of Religion's budget, but considerable additional support comes from denom-
inational grants and private contributions, The School of Religion, 1967-68 (leaflet available
from The Iowa School of Religion, Iowa City, Iowa).
388 Haas, supra note 368, at 507-08. For a slightly different breakdown of the categories,
see Bean, Historical Developments Affecting the Place of Religion in the State University
Curriculum, 50 RELimOUS EDUc. 275, 283-84 (1955). Other state universities, in addition
to those listed in the text, that offer religion courses are Alabama, California at Santa Bar-
bara, Florida State, Missouri, North Carolina, Penn State, Tennessee, and Western Michigan,





These state universities recognize the need for the development of the
whole man: "Since religion, personal and 'istitutional, is an important aspect
of life, it should be givren its rightful place in the training of a fully educated
man whether he enrolls in a private or tax-supported school." ' Indicative of
this attitude is language found in statements of the purposes and goals of the
religion departments of some of the schools that have instituted such programs.
The Missouri School of Religion states that its purpose "is to round out the
educational program of undergraduate University students preparing for voca-
tions and professions by providing for them instruction in the field of religion." '
Short and explicit is a similar statement of The Kansas School of Religion: "The
purpose of the school is to inform students in an atmosphere of free inquiry
rather than to evangelize." '' The final example is that of The Iowa School of
Religion. Its stated goal is
to present the facts of religion sympathetically but without indoctrination,
to reveal both differences and likenesses among historic and contemporary
religions, and to provide for the study of the whole role of religion in
human culture without obscuring any essential element - least of all its
significance in the life of those who teach it, yet with no appeal for response
from students except the appeal of all good education to broader and
deeper understanding, to integrity and to self-fulfillment.
3 92
F. Perspective for the Future
The success 93 of these programs will undoubtedly lead to their expansion
to other universities. Notwithstanding this fact, it appears doubtful that the
Supreme Court need speak on the issue of their constitutionality. If a proper
case comes before the Court, it is almost axiomatic that it will uphold the
validity of these programs. Their present general acceptance is indicated by
the recommendations of the Church-State Committee of the American Civil
Liberties Union. 9' The Committee recommends adoption by the ACLU of
a policy that the study of religion in state universities is not a church-state
conflict. The Committee specifically recommends:
a. That the curriculum and personnel for such programs [study of religion
in state universities] be administered exclusively by the university and be
governed by standards which apply to all other academic departments and
389 NEWSLETTER, supra note 380, at 6.
390 Catalogue, The Missouri School of Religion 15 (1963).
391 NEWSLETTER, supra note 380, at 3.
392 M. LAMPE, supra note 351, at 10.
393 For example, The Missouri School of Religion had 857 students enrolled in its courses
in 1967. Letter from Thomas R. Shrout, Dean, Missouri School of Religion, to Merle F,
Wilberding, Dec. 1, 1967, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer. The Kansas School of Reli-
gion reported registrations in 1966-67 of 915 - an increase from 306 in 1962-63. At the
same time, the University of Kansas' enrollment increased from 10,509 to 14,600 students.
4 RELGOrN 3 (April, 1967) (Bulletin of The Kansas School of Religion at the University of
Kansas).
394 Submission of these recommendations regarding public universities will not occur
until the committee constructs its recommendations for a proposed position on the teaching
of religion in public elementary and secondary schools. Hence, it is necessary to refer to
these as recommendations and not as ACLU policy. Letter from Susan Harkins to Merle F.
Wilberding, Dec. 19, 1967, on. file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
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disciplines in the university. A broad representation of approaches and
philosophies should be employed with respect to religious subject matter,
just as it should be employed with respect to all subject matter. Such a
representation should include traditions, expressions, and viewpoints which
are skeptical towards religion, and anti-religious as well as those which are
affirmative towards religion.
b. That courses in religion shall not be required of students although a
course in religion may be elected from among a number of offerings in
related disciplines in order to satisfy a general education or humanities
requirement.
c. That no funds be accepted from any source that presumes or expects
the university to make any religious commitment.
d. Nothing in this statement commits the Union [ACLU] to a position on
the question of public universities or schools granting credit for courses
taken at sectarian institutions. 9 5
G. Conclusion
The practices of the state universities, the legal opinions, and the authori-
ties' views and recommendations indicate the essential differences between uni-
versity study of religion and the study of religion on the elementary or secondary
level. A program of religious instruction in a state university is not a proposal
for indoctrination; rather, it is an objective approach to the topic for university
students who have the maturity to accept it as an analytical study. 97 As long
as there is no denominational favoritism or any element of compulsion, 9 " it is
"reasonably safe to conclude that the federal Constitution in no way prohibits
the treatment of theology or religion in public institutions of higher learn-
ing .. . ."399
VI. GOVERNMENTAL AID TO ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
A. Introduction
A consideration of governmental aid to private elementary and secondary
education necessarily involves many factors. The first question to be considered
is whether such aid is constitutionally permissible. If aid from the federal
government is contemplated, the first amendment to the United States Con-
stitution must be reckoned with. If aid from state government is desired, not
only is the first amendment pertinent,"' but state constitutional provisions on
the separation of church and state must be considered as well. Although a
legislature may often refuse to pass a bill because of foreseeable constitutional
difficulties, the determination of constitutionality is ultimately and finally decided
by the judiciary. The peculiar province of the legislature is in determining
395 Working Paper, ACLU Church-State Committee, Oct. 24, 1967.
396 Haas, supra note 368, at 506-07.
397 83 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 620 (1966).
398 J. MORmLL, THE ONGOING STATE UNIVERSITY 68 (1960).
399 Louisell, Constitutional Limitations and Supports for Dealing With Religion in Public
Higher Education, 50 RELiGIous EDUc. 285, 289 (1955).
400 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has generally been credited
with absorbing the religious guarantees of the first amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). For a discussion of the desirability of applying the religious free-
dom aspects of first amendment to the states, see Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Con-
gress and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395, 1429-30 (1966).
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whether granting aid to private institutions is advisable. Thus, legislatures are
prone to consider such policy reasons as the availability of funds, the desirability
of either encouraging or discouraging private education, and the political and
religious complexion of the community wherein the aid is contemplated. Since
each of these factors involves substantially different problems, they are treated
separately below.
1. The Constitutionality of Governmental Aid
a. Federal Constitution
When presented with church-state issues, the Supreme Court has been
successful in avoiding broad holdings, perhaps well aware of the sensitivity of
the subject matter. Accordingly, it has confined itself to a bits-and-pieces
approach to the question of governmental aid to private education.4"' How-
ever, in view of the increasing amount of such aid, on both the state °2 and
federal0 s levels, it is apparent that the Supreme Court will have to face squarely
the constitutional question in the near future." 4
Numerous legal theories supporting or attacking aid to private education
have received the attention of some court at some time. But there has been no
consistency in the application of these theories, and any attempt to utilize past
decisions to create a legal framework within which all future decisions can be
placed is virtually impossible.
The "child benefit" theory has provided the strongest support for the
advocates of aid to private education. A particularization of the secular pur-
pose doctrine, which allows aid to privately owned institutions serving a public
need, the child benefit theory is based on the presumption that an indirect
benefit to a religiously oriented school is not unconstitutional so long as the
primary and direct benefit goes to the child attending that school."' This theory
has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education'6
and Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education. °7 However, the precedent
value of both decisions in the church-state area is certainly suspect. Mr. Justice
401 E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (allowing public school children to
attend religion classes off public school premises); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (conducting religion classes on public school premises ruled
unconstitutional); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (school bus transporta-
tion for private school children allowed as a public welfare measure).
402 E.g., MbcH,. STAT. ANN. § 15.3622 (1968) (auxiliary services); N.Y. EDuc. LAw
§ 701 (McKinney Supp. 1967) (textbooks); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1361 (Supp. 1967)
(transportation).
403 The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (codified in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C. Supp. II, 1967) is the most recent and controversial federal aid program that
affects private schools.
404 For a historical analysis of what the framers of the first amendment intended it to mean
see Sky, supra note 400.
405 The child benefit theory has been defined as "the concept that the state may extend
certain welfare aid to students attending church-related schools in situations where general
aid to the parochial schools themselves would be unconstitutional." LaNoue, The Child
Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportation and Medical Care, 13 J. PUB. L. 76,
79 (1964). See generally Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Con-
stitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. Rav. 333, 339-42 (1950).
406 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
407 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
[Vol. 43:684] SURVEY
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
Douglas, who concurred in the 5-4 Everson decision, has more recently admitted
that "[t]he Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First
Amendment."4"" As pointed out by an advocate of aid to private education,
"the history of Everson does not encourage one to employ it as a firm foundation
for a case for federal aid to Catholic schools."4 9 The Cochran decision, handed
down in 1930, was decided before the first amendment's religion clauses were
specifically made applicable to the states and rested on the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause. 10 Thus, there is no dear judicial sanction of the
child benefit theory in relation to the first amendment.
Closely akin to the child benefit theory is the broader "secular purpose"
theory. Proponents of aid to private education argue that the secular purpose
of such aid is to make education available to all students regardless of where
this education is obtained.4 1' The secular purpose theory derives support from
the judicial determination that Sunday closing laws are valid.4" In McGowan
v. Maryland4. the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
held that a state statute that forbids the sale of certain goods on Sunday does
not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. The Court noted:
The present purpose and effect of most of [the Sunday closing laws] is to
provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens; the fact that this day is Sun-
day, a day of particular significance for the dominant Christian sects, does
not bar the State from achieving its secular goals. To say that the States
cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest . . . solely because centuries ago
such laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional interpre-
tation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere separation
of church and State.
41 4
However, the validity of the secular purpose theory cannot rest solely on the
fact that a private institution is serving a public purpose. "Some showing of
public necessity is required before financial aid will be given, and even then, the
government still has the discretion to reject the organization's request for
money." 415 Further, to be constitutional under the secular purpose theory, a
statute granting aid to a private institution must be religiously neutral in its
408 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962).
409 Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in THE WAIL BE-
TWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55, 60 (D. Oakes ed. 1963).
410 "The appellants ... brought this suit ... upon the ground that the legislation
violated specified provisions of the constitution of the State and also section 4 of Article IV
and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 281 U.S. at 373. See Note,
Textbooks Loans to Parochial Schools, 32 BRoox. L. REv. 362, 377 n.93 (1966).
411 Symposium-The First Amendment and Financial Aid to Religion: Limits on the
Government's Conduct, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 782 (1966); cf. Gordon, The Unconstitu-
tionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
73, 90 (D. Oakes ed. 1963).
412 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961). In analyzing the Sunday closing law cases, Dean Robert F. Drinan has concluded:
[I]t is clear that the establishment clause has not been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to mean that the secular aims of the state must be achieved in a manner
deliberately designed to preclude any incidental aid to religion.
Drinan, supra note 409, at 62. See also Drinan, State and Federal Aid to Parochial Schools,
7 J. CHURCH AND STATE 67, 70 (1965).
413 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
414 Id. at 445.
415 Symposium, supra note 411, at 780-81.
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effect. In School District of Abington v. Schempp410 the Supreme Court held
that the Bible cannot be read and the Lord's Prayer cannot be recited in public
schools since this practice violates the establishment clause. In formulating the
test for government neutrality in the sensitive area of religion, Mr. Justice Clark
stated: "[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." 1" Thus, it is not sufficient to look only at the purpose of the
legislation; the effect, i.e., whether the primary though unintended result of the
legislation is assistance to religion, must also be considered. Therefore, it may
be closer to the truth to say that secular purpose is not enough; there must be
a secular effect as well.
A third line of reasoning, based on Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"'5 regards
private schools as quasi-public in nature since they perform a secular function
(education of the child). In Pierce the Supreme Court struck down a state
statute that required all children in the state to attend public schools. The Court
noted that the statute infringed on the rights of parents to send their children
to private schools. It is argued, therefore, that since the private schools are
public for the purpose of compulsory attendance laws, they should be designated
as public for the purpose of receiving governmental aid.4"9 From this premise,
it is argued that the private schools have a right to governmental aid. Aside from
the fact that a court or legislature is likely to take a dim view of any proposition
that a government must support a non-governmental institution, this theory
assumes too much in the way of a duty for the state. Every right has a correla-
tive duty, and the right of a parent to send his child to a private school is no
exception. The fallacy in the compulsory education argument is an assumption
that it is the affirmative duty of the state to provide a choice between public
and private schools by financially assisting both. The duty of the state in this
situation is merely to refrain from infringing upon the right of the parents.
Consequently, the compulsory education theory does not appear to support
the position that governmental aid to private schools would be constitutionally
required.
Opponents of governmental aid to private education, besides attacking
the child benefit and secular purpose theories, have affirmatively argued that
aid to private education is unconstitutional. Their attack is two-pronged. First
is the "permeation" argument; that is, any course taught in a sectarian institu-
tion, anything associated with a sectarian institution, is necessarily permeated
with sectarian ideology.42 Thus, if a subject taught in a private school is per-
416 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
417 Id. at 222.
418 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
419 Drinan, supra note 409, at 56.
420 Gordon, supra note 411, at 90. G. R. LaNoue, conducting research on the "secular"
subjects taught in religious schools, found that religious symbols permeated textbooks on such
subjects as science and mathematics. See LaNoue, Religious Schools and "Secular" Subjects,
32 HARV. EDUc. Rav. 255 (1962). Dean Drinan counters with a distinction "between the
factitious and indefensible insertion of sectarian symbols or teaching into secular subjects and
the conclusions or judgments based on religious values which are properly found in texts in
the area of the social sciences." Drinan, supra note 409, at 64. He goes on to note that
public school texts "can be fairly and properly criticized as beifig permeated with an excessive
emphasis on the secular, with a resulting failure to give adequate treatment to the sacred,
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meated with a sectarian orientation, any aid that facilitates the teaching of that
subject violates the establishment clause. Such an argument ignores the fun-
damental fact that religious permeation, if it does exist, still does not change
the secular character of the subject taught. Further, all courses are permeated
with the thoughts and philosophy of the teacher. Thus, in a public school, where
the teacher is bound to ignore the existence of religion, the subjects taught
are permeated with a secularistic outlook as much as the same subjects are
permeated with a sectarian outlook in a private school. As stated by Dr. Luther
A. Weigle, former Dean of Yale Divinity School, "[t]he ignoring of religion by
the schools inevitably conveys to the children a negative suggestion . . . it is
natural for them to conclude that religion is negligible, or unimportant, or
irrelevant to the main business of life."' Thus, if the permeation argument is
applied to its logical extent, governmental aid to secular (public) schools with-
out such aid to private schools not only possibly hinders the "free exercise" of
religion, but arguably promotes an "establishment" of religion (i.e., secu-
larism) 
4 22
Perhaps a more serious constitutional objection to governmental aid to
private schools is that even indirect aid, such as furnishing public transporta-
tion for private school children, results in a pecuniary benefit to the private
institution because it frees funds normally used for such purposes. Essentially,
this argument rejects the distinction between direct and indirect aid,'4 2 and
proposes that even indirect aid is an unconstitutional appropriation of public
funds. It is undeniable that indirect aid will, in some circumstances, result in
a financial benefit to the private school, but a total repudiation of the direct-
indirect aid distinction is untenable. For example, who would deny police and
fire protection to a church simply on the ground that the church is receiving a
benefit by such protection?42 4 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has upheld
the sectarian, or the spiritual elements in the life of man and of society." Id. Pope Pius XI in
his encyclical, On the Christian Education of Youth, declared: "It follows that the so-called
'neutral' or 'lay' school, from which religion is excluded, is contrary to the fundamental
principles of education. Such a school, moreover, cannot exist in practice; it is bound to
become irreligious." The quoted statement is found in 1 T. BouscAREN, THE CANON LAW
DIGEST 679 (1958).
421 Quoted in Blum, Freedom and Equality, in FEDERAL AID AND CATHOLIC SCHOOLS 43,
46 (D. Callahan ed. 1964).
422 If the state therefore cannot constitutionally give public money for instruction
in secular subjects if religious values are commingled in the instruction, the state is
equally disabled from financing instruction in secular subjects where the orientation
of the instruction is, by silence or by implication, permeated with a secularistic
outlook. Drinan, supra note 409, at 64.
423 Though most legal scholars who have addressed the church-state issue support the
distinction between direct and indirect aid, Professor Kurland finds the distinction of little
merit. He feels that even direct aid is valid. Kurland, Politics and the Constitution: Federal
Aid to Parochial Schools, 1 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 475, 493-94 (1966).
424 It is thus clear beyond cavil that the Constitution does not demand that every
friendly gesture between church and State shall be discountenanced. The so-called
"wall of separation" may be built so high and so broad as to impair both State and
church, as we have come to know them. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 172,
100 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
"It would, of course, be unthinkable to suggest that the establishment clause requires churches
and church schools to go without benefit of public police or fire protection, even if religion
is aided thereby." Gordon, supra note 411, at 91.
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indirect aid in certain cases. 25 The problem is drawing the line between direct
and indirect aid.
b. State Constitutions
Even if governmental aid to private education is permissible under the
Federal Constitution, it is necessary to determine whether such aid is permissible
under the state constitutions. Most state constitutions have provisions that
prohibit state support of private sectarian institutions, including schools,"'6 and
many of these provisions are much more strict and are interpreted more broadly
than the first amendment. 7 There is an endless variety of state constitutional
provisions which can affect state aid to private schools.4"' Even federal aid to
education programs are not free from restrictive state constitutions if the federal
programs provide for matching grants or for cooperation of state officials. 29
2. Advisability of Governmental Aid
Assuming that some forms of governmental aid to private education are
constitutional, it is necessary to consider the advisability of granting such assis-
tance. The fact that governmental action is constitutionally possible does not
make it mandatory,4 0 and the granting or withholding of aid is discretionary
425 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
426 E.g., ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 263: "No money raised for the support of the public
schools shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian or denominational
school." ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1: "No money shall be paid from public funds for the
direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution." A=u. CONST. art. IX,
§ 10: "No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church,
or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation." CAL. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 24:
Neither the Legislature nor any county, city and county, township, school district,
or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from
any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect,
church, creed, or sectarian purpose, or help to support or sustain any [sectarian]
school, college, [or] university ....
See generally C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS 173-239 (1965).
427 "Many of the states have adopted very specific constitutional language which appears
to preclude any public aid to institutions or organizations which are characterized as 'sec-
tarian.'" C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE, note 426 at 1. See Katz, Note on the Con-
stitutionality of Shared Time, in 1964, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 85, 89-94 (D.
Giannella ed. 1965); W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 4-5 (1964).
428 C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE, supra note 426, at 23. Among the examples
listed are clauses to the effect that no one shall be compelled to support any church, bans upon
grants of public funds or property to educational institutions not under state control, bans
upon the use of public funds to aid educational institutions under sectarian control, and pro-
hibitions on spending public funds in aid of any school where sectarian doctrine is taught.
429 The draftsmen of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 were faced
with this problem. They circumvented it in the following manner:
In any State . . . in which no State agency is authorized by law to provide
library resources, textbooks, or other printed and published instructional materials
for the use of children and teachers in any one or more elementary or secondary
schools in such State, the Commissioner shall arrange for the provision on an
equitable basis of such library resources . . . and shall pay the cost thereof ...out
of that State's allotment. 20 U.S.C. § 824(b) (Supp. II, 1967).
Thus, in a situation where state officials are prevented by the state constitution from distribut-
ing benefits to private schools, a federal official, in effect, cuts off state participation. See
text accompanying notes 528-29 infra. However, the federal official is still limited by any
restrictions in the Federal Constitution.
430 However, some would argue that the combination of the compulsory education laws
and Pierce make state aid a right. This view is untenable unless one admits that the privilege
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on the part of the government involved. Thus, policy factors come under con-
sideration when the legislature determines whether to exercise its power. Fore-
most among the policy factors are the effects of such aid on the private and
parochial school system, and on the public school system.
a. Necessity of Private Schools
The first question likely to be asked is whether private schools are necessary.
Consideration of this question involves the compulsory attendance laws and,
for Catholics at least, the Canons of the Catholic Church. Every state has com-
pulsory attendance laws, requiring school attendance by every child under a
certain age."' In 1925, in Pierce, the Supreme Court held that parents have
a right to educate their children in private schools if they so desire. Since Pierce,
it has not been seriously argued that the compulsory attendance laws may be
satisfied only by attendance at public schools.
Further, attendance at private schools is sometimes an obligation placed
on parents. Canon 1374 of the Roman Catholic Church forbids Catholic parents
from allowing their children to attend public schools except under special circum-
stances. 2 In his encyclical, On the Christian Education of Youth, Pope Pius
XI declared:
[T]he frequenting of non-Catholic schools, whether neutral or mixed, those,
namely, which are open to Catholics and non-Catholics alike, is forbidden
for Catholic children, and can be at most tolerated, on the approval of
the Ordinary alone, under determined circumstances of place and time,
and with special precautions . . . .4s
Thus, upon Catholics at least, there is an obligation to send their children to
parochial schools. And since this obligation is given judicial recognition by
virtue of Pierce, there is a necessity for private schools, at least from the stand-
point of Catholic and similarly situated religious groups.
b. Necessity of Aid
Granting the necessity of private schools to certain groups, the discretionary
nature of governmental aid requires an inquiry into its need by these private
schools. That is, do private schools need governmental aid to survive and to
provide an adequate education for their pupils? From the Catholic standpoint,
such aid is not only necessary for improving the quality of education, but is
necessary for the survival of the parochial school system. In 1960, the value
of Catholic school plants across the country totalled 7 billion dollars, and the
annual cost of maintaining and operating these plants was 1.8 billion dollars.4 s4
Almost 90 percent of all private school children attend Catholic schools." 5
of existence granted by the state necessarily confers a right to continue in existence with state
assistance. See text accompanying notes 418-19 supra.
431 E.g., MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 1 (Supp. 1966).
432 For a consideration of Canon 1374, see T. BouSC AEN & A. ELLIS, CANON LAW 704-07
(1946).
433 Quoted in I T. BoUSCAREN, supra note 420, at 679.
434 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION 60 (1965).
435 A. FRIEDLANDER, THE SHARED TiME STRATEGY 4 (1966).
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Whatever one's views on aid to private education, it cannot be denied that "[a]s
an achievement .. .the Catholic educational system certainly witnesses to the
zeal and determination of American Catholics. ' 43 ' And yet, with all this effort,
Catholic parochial schools are able to teach only 55 percent of Catholic students
on the elementary level, and 45 percent on the high school level.43 As stated
by one authority:
[T]he Catholic school system must gain public support if it is to be extended
or even maintained. Because of rising costs, and expanding school popu-
lation, the shortage of teachers, and the raising of standards for teachers,
as well as for buildings and equipment, it will soon be practically impos-
sible for unaided Catholic efforts to continue to handle the proportion of
young people now being served.
438
From the viewpoint of the Catholic educator, therefore, governmental aid ap-
pears necessary for survival.
c. Taxpayer Savings
From the viewpoint of the taxpayer, such aid may likewise be desirable.
If aid is denied, it appears likely that the great majority of private schools will
not continue in operation. Since it cost 7 billion dollars to build Catholic school
plants, and since an additional 1.8 billion dollars is needed yearly to maintain
them, the cost of duplicating and operating these facilities would be at least
as great for the taxpayer. Moreover, the cost of staffing an equal number of
public schools with higher-paid public school teachers would greatly increase
taxes. Clearly, the existence of private school systems in our country not only
performs a public function, but results in a substantial tax saving to the general
public as well.
If aid were granted the state would not be assuming the full cost of edu-
cating the private school child. Private elementary and secondary schools are
not asking for total subsidization, e.g., for construction grants or for teacher
subsidies; they are asking for some aid in areas where they are financially
incapable of supplying the need and where the primary beneficiary is the stu-
dent." 9 Whether the state is willing to assume the full cost of educating all
children as a consequence of refusing to give any aid to some children is there-
fore a factor to be weighed when considering aid to private education.
d. Effect on Public Schools
The economic benefit to the community and the necessity of private schools
are only a part of the picture. The effect of aid, or lack of aid, on private schools
must be measured against its effect on public schools. Thus, if state aid to
436 M. RYAN, ARE PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS THE ANSWER? 9 (1964).
437 Id.
438 Id. at 5.
439 In the context of federal aid, Dean Drinan has stated:
What then is the claim being made by Catholic parents and Catholic officials?
The claim is a very small one: the Catholic contention is that, if federal aid is to
be enacted, some recognition should be given to Catholic schools. Drinan, supra
note 409, at 57.
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private schools "threatens the survival of the secular common schools,""' this
policy consideration would necessarily outweigh the benefits of granting the
aid.
Critics of governmental aid to private education point to many evils that
would result if aid were granted. The primary concern of the critics is the
preservation of the public school as a unifying principle in American life. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Edu-
cation,4 . stated:
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the
State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools .... 4'
Opponents of aid to private education fear that such aid will result in a pro-
liferation of private schools and a consequent weakening of the unifying principle,
the public school."' It is argued that unpopular minority groups, such as the
John Birch Society or the Black Muslims, encouraged by the possibility of gov-
ernmental aid, might set up schools to teach their own peculiar doctrines.4"
So long as governmental aid does not amount to a total subsidization of private
schools, however, the danger of a proliferation of private schools to the extent
of weakening public schools is rather remote. 45 As pointed out by Dean Drinan:
The assumption behind such a prediction [that government aid to private
institutions would result in their proliferation] seems to be that church
groups and religious parents are now deterred from establishing a system
of church-related schools only by the lack of any tax support.44 6
On the other hand, it is alleged that governmental aid to private education
would have a positive effect on the public schools. Parents of private school
students, particularly Catholics, would be more sympathetic to appropriations
and bond issues for the support of public schools, since their children would
also share in the benefits of public education.4 4 But the effect of such support
may be negligible, depending of course upon the size of the Catholic popula-
tion in a particular locality, and the extent to which the benefit will affect
Catholic school children.
440 Gordon, supra note 411, at 74.
441 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
442 Id. at 231.
443 Pfeffer, Second Thoughts on Shared Time, 79 CHRISTIAN CENT. 779, 789 (1962).
See also Gordon, supra note 411, at 74-78.
444 Hearings on S. 370 Before The Subcomm. on Education of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2898 (1965); G. LANouE, PUBLIC FUNDS
FoR PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS? 36-38 (1963). See also Gordon, supra note 411, at 76; Note,
Constitutional Law - Church and State - Shared Time: Indirect Aid to Parochial Schools,
65 MICH. L. Rv. 1224, 1225 (1967).
445 In regard to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, it has been stated:
Although some increase in the number of parochial schools might be anticipated
as a result of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the increase should
be marginal since the parochial school would still have to finance the construction
and operation of its educational facilities and comply with minimum state educa-
tional standards. Note, supra note 444, at 1225-26.
446 Drinan, supra note 412, at 73.




e. Effect on Integration
In considering the advisability of aid to private education, the effect such
aid would have on school integration policies must not be overlooked. The
federal government, and a good many state governments, are committed to a
policy of racial integration. In Brown v. Board of Education,4 " the landmark
school segregation case, the Supreme Court rejected the "separate but equal"
test of Plessy v. Ferguson,44 as it applied to public schools.-"' However, despite
the efforts of the federal government to implement the ruling in Brown,""'
progress is slow.452 Therefore, the possibility that governmental aid to private
education may be aimed at creating a state supported "private" school system
in order to promote segregation is a very real one. In this sense, aid to private
education may not be advisable.
There are indications, however, that the courts may be formulating their
own solutions to this facade. In 1962, the State of Louisiana created the
Louisiana Financial Assistance Commission45s "for the purpose of providing
financial assistance to students attending private nonsectarian elementary schools
in this state ... .""' This was Louisiana's second attempt455 to provide aid to
children attending "private" schools instead of the "integrated" public schools.
In 1966, the constitutionality of the enabling statute was attacked by Negro public
school children and their parents in the case of Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial
Assistance Commission."' The plaintiffs asserted that the grant-in-aid program
"was created and is presently being administered as a scheme to allow pupils to
avoid attending desegregated schools and to assist in the maintenance of a
separate, racially segregated school system."'4 t5 The subsequently convened
three-judge district court, agreeing with this allegation, struck down the Louisiana
statute as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.""
In so doing, the court noted that "[a]ny affirmative and purposeful state aid
448 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
449 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
450 The Supreme Court stated the issue thusly: "Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible'
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational op-
portunities?" 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
451 E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d,
2000a-h-6 (1964).
452 For example, the target date for complete desegregation in the South has been changed
to September, 1969, two years later than originally planned. See Leeson, Desegregation: A
New Approach, A New Deadline, SOUTHERN EDUC. REPORT Jan./Feb., 1968, at 14, 17.
It is estimated that in the 1965-66 school year only 6% of Negro children in the South at-
tended school with white children. Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9
Wss. & MARY L. REv. 39-40 (1967). The situation is little better in the North, where 72%
of all Negro first-graders attend schools which have a majority of Negroes. Id. at 40.
453 LA. REv. STAT. § 17:2952 (1963).
454 LA. REv. STAT. § 17:2955 (1963). A private, non-sectarian elementary or secondary
school was defined in the Act as "a school whose operation is not controlled directly or in-
directly by any church or sectarian body or by an individual or individuals acting on behalf
of a church or sectarian body." Id.
455 In the first attempt, public school buildings were used for the operation of "private"
schools. This grant-in-aid program was invalidated in Hall v. Saint Helena Parish School
Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
456 258 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. La. 1966).
457 Id. at 162.
458 Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 36 U.S.L.W. 2150 (E.D.
La. Aug. 26, 1967).
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promoting private discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause. There
is no such thing as the State's legitimately being just a little bit discriminatory." '
The effect of Poindexter is to make every private school that receives govern-
mental aid a quasi-public school, potentially subject to Brown. However, this
does not mean that every private school receiving governmental aid must in-
tegrate. Poindexter looks at the purpose of the aid; if the purpose is promotion
of segregation, it violates the equal protection clause.46 As one authority has
noted, "If not disturbed by a higher court, [Poindexter] could mark the end of
circumvention of the Brown decision by southern states through the use of
phony private schools."461 It is submitted that Poindexter could also remove the
objection that governmental aid to education may conflict with the federal
government's policy of abolishing segregation.
3. Types of State Aid
It is quite possible that the constitutionality of aid to private education
may rest in part on the type of aid envisioned. One type of aid may be more
direct than another; another may be justifiable in terms of secular purpose or
benefit to the child. In this context then, the type of aid involved may shed
light on a court's or legislature's decision as to its constitutionality.
a. Textbooks
In 1966, the New York legislature enacted a statute which, inter alia,
provides:
[]oards of education .. . shall have the power and duty to purchase and
to loan upon individual request, to all children residing in such district
who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a public or private school
which complies with the compulsory education law, textbooks. (Emphasis
added.) 42
Described by one of its sponsors as "merely an extension of the library system
of loaning books to all children,"46 the statute was quickly attacked as violative
of both the state6 4 and federal constitutions, and a court test was called for to
determine its validity.465 The test was not long in coming, for in early July of
459 Id.
460 The decision refers to "affirmative and purposeful state aid promoting private dis-
crimination .... Id.
461 Dorsen, supra note 452, at 45-46.
462 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
463 See N.Y. Times, May 29, 1965, at 26, col. 8.
464 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (formerly § 4) provides:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or credit
or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly,
in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or
institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any
religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught .... "
465 In an editorial, the New York Times said: "[A] test there certainly should be, because
if this law is constitutional the State Constitution doesn't mean what it appears to say." N.Y.
Times, June 3, 1965, at 34, cols. 3-4. Another commentator expressed the same 'sentiment:
"In passing the textbook statute, the Legislature has failed in its solemn duty to legislate within
the confines of New York's Constitution. The duty to preserve the integrity of the state
constitution now falls upon the judiciary." Note, Textbook Loans to Parochial Schools, 32
BROox. L. R~v. 362, 385-86 (1966).
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1966, an adion that sought to have the textbook law declared invalid was brought
by an upstate school board. The school board's attorney contended that the law
would pave the way for further aid, and that it was a violation of the requirement
of separation of church and state.46 The trial court struck down the statute
as repugnant to the establishment and free exercise dauses of the first amend-
ment to the Constitution. " This decision was reversed by the Appellate Divi-
sion, 6 and the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. In upholding the
validity of the textbook statute, the court, in Board of Education v. Allen,"
noted that "the Constitution does not demand that every friendly gesture between
church and State shall be discountenanced."'"7  The court rested the validity
of the statute on the child benefit theory:
Since there is no intention to assist parochial schools as such, any benefit
accruing to those schools is a collateral effect of the statute, and, therefore,
cannot be properly classified as the giving of aid directly or indirectly.
4 7 1
Judge Van Voorhis spoke for the dissenters:
[T]his statute will create and foster a pressure to dominate the choosing
of books that shall be used in the public schools (so that they may be used
also in parochial schools) which will always be latent, and at certain times
and places irresistible, and, as action begets reaction, there will be an op-
posite tendency, equally dangerous, on the part of the state to dominate
the church.
12
The point of Judge Van Voorhis is valid insofar as it attacks the advisability
of state aid, and if such a situation as he envisions occurred the statute would
be unconstitutional in its application. However, it appears certain that a well-
drafted textbook statute, that retains title and control of the textbooks in a public
agency, can be justified under the child benefit theory. Whether the child
benefit theory is valid under a state constitution depends on how high the con-
stitution in question bilds the wall between church and state. Whether the
child benefit theory is sound under the United States Constitution is an un-
answered question.
b. Transportation
Busing private school children has long been a form of aid to private schools.
In Everson v. Board of Education"3 the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey
statute that authorizes reimbursement of parents for bus fares paid in transport-
ing their children to private schools. The Court relied on a public welfare theory
466 See Buffalo Evening News, July 9, 1966, § A, at 12, col. 1.
467 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 51 Misc. 2d 297, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1966).
468 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 27 App. Div. 2d 69, 276 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1966).
469 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967), prob. juris. noted, 389
U.S. 1031 (1968).
470 Id. at 116, 228 N.E.2d at 794, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
471 Id. The court ignored the effect of the aid and focused entirely on its purpose. The
Schempp test, which would appear to be of universal applicability, requires a consideration
of the effect of the aid as well as its purpose. See text accompanying notes 416-17 supra.
472 20 N.Y.2d at 123, 228 N.E.2d at 798, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (dissenting opinion).
473 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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to justify the statute: "It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to
facilitate the opportunity of [all] children to get [an] . .. education serves no
public purpose." '74 Also, the Court pointed out that protection of a child from
the hazards of traffic is a state concern irrespective of that child's religion seems
to be a relevant factor. 5 However, the Everson decision has been criticized to
the extent that if a similar case were brought before the Supreme Court today,
the Everson holding would probably be repudiated.7 Coupling this with the
fact that many states now allow busing of private school students,477 it appears
that a reappraisal of the validity of busing statutes is in order.
Effective July 1, 1965, Pennsylvania amended its school transportation
statute to read as follows:
When provision is made by a board of school directors for the transpor-
tation of resident pupils to and from the public schools, the board of school
directors shall also make provision for the free transportation of pupils who





On September 2, 1965, a group of taxpayers brought suit to test the validity
of this statute under the state and federal constitutions. The state attorney
general immediately petitioned for and was granted certiorari to the Pennsyl-
vania supreme court. The supreme court, in Rhoades v. School District,
79
rendered five separate opinions in deciding 5-2 that the transportation statute
was valid. Six of the seven justices refused to consider the applicability of the
Federal Constitution, holding Everson controlling.48 As for the state constitution,
Justice Roberts, with whom three other members of the court concurred, believed
that:
the process of transporting parochial students in a public bus is so devoid
of any psychological, let alone religious, significance, that it does not bring
the government into an association with the school which implies the ap-
proval or sanction proscribed by our [state] Constitution.
4 8 '
Five members of the court agreed that the school bus statute was a safety
measure to protect children from road hazards.48 2
Rhoades, it appears, illustrates that courts are inclined to uphold public
welfare legislation, even if it provides an incidental benefit to religion.
4 8 3
474 Id. at 7.
475 Id.
476 See pp. 735-36 & notes 406-09 supra. Of course, state and lower federal courts are bound
by Everson until overruled by the Supreme Court.
477 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 § 29-4 (1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.3590(1) (1968);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:14-8 (Cum. Supp. 1964, Supp. 1967).
478 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 13-1361 (Supp. 1967).
479 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 11 (1967).
480 Id. at 217-20, 226 A.2d at 62-63 (opinion of Musmanno, J.); id. at 227, 226 A.2d
at 67 '(opinion of Jones, J.); id. at 229, 226 A.2d at 68 (opinion of Roberts, J.); id. at 240,
226 A.2d at 74 (dissenting opinion of Bell, C. J.).
481 Id. at 233-34, 226 A.2d at 70 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
482 Id. at 206-07, 226 A.2d at 56-57 (opinion of Musmanno, J.); id. at 228, 226 A.2d
at 67 (opinion of Jones, J.); id. at 232, 226 A.2d at 69 (opinion of Roberts, J.).





A challenge has been issued by Roman Catholic educators to their public
school counterparts to enter into a new partnership. They want them to
help provide the very best education opportunities for all children in the
community. It appears that public school men are accepting the challenge
that is put forth in Shared Time.484
Shared time is a comparatively popular form of aid used by the states to assist
private schools. The procedure has been described in the following manner:
In a shared time program of education, students enrolled in Catholic
and other church-related schools take some courses (e.g., religion, social
studies, fine arts) in their own schools and others (e.g., science, mathematics,
industrial arts) in public schools; in a similar manner, public school stu-
dents [may] take some of their courses in Catholic schools.
48 5
Shared time, also referred to as "dual enrollment," is not a new concept. The
city of Pittsburgh has had such a program since 1913.488 No court has as yet
faced the question of whether shared time, when implemented for the benefit of
private school students, constitutes a violation of the establishment clause of
the first amendment.8 7 However, the increased interest in church-state relations
and the widespread and ever increasing use of this type of aid render a court
test probable.
Notwithstanding its popularity, shared time has not been unanimously
regarded as a solution to aid to education problems. Shared time is viewed as a
blessing by some private school educators. Others, believing the purpose of
private education to be essentially different from the purpose of public education
and fearing that shared time will subject the private school to decisions of state
bodies, have taken a contrary view. 88 Public school educators are similarly
divided. Some view shared time as potentially capable of destroying the public
school system,8 " while others believe it is a viable compromise in the church-
state dispute.
90
Practically speaking, however, the validity of shared time can be sustained
on one argument: If children, irrespective of religion, are allowed to comply
with compulsory education laws by attendance at either public or private
schools,8 . it should not be unconstitutional for them to fulfill this requirement
by part-time attendance at both. 9 2 Shared time could also be sustained on the
484 A. FRIEDLANDER, THE SHARED TIME STRATEGY 26 (1966).
485 1964 NATIONAL CATHOLIC ALMANAC 532 (Foy ed. 1964). Most shared time programs,
however, provide only for private school children taking courses in the public school.
486 See A. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 484, at 11.
487 While the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of voluntary released
time programs when the religious instructions are offered on a location other than
public school premises, the validity of shared time arrangements has not yet been
fully considered by the courts. 1964-66 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 717.
488 See A. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 484, at 6-7.
489 Pfeffer, supra note 443.
490 Note, supra note 444, at 1227-28; see Comment, 57 RELIGIOus EDUC. 29, 30 (1962).
491 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
492 "[S]ince it is not unconstitutional for a child to attend a parochial school full time,
it should not be unconstitutional for him to attend both a parochial and a public school."
Note, supra note 444, at 1227-28.
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child benefit theory, since it is the child who benefits from the use of the public
facilities. On the other hand, shared time could be viewed as unconstitutional,
since freeing the parochial schools from the necessity of teaching certain subjects
frees funds which can be used for church purposes." 3
A court test of shared time recently took place in Illinois. The Chicago
Board of Education was conducting an experimental shared time program to
determine its feasibility. High school students enrolled in the program took all
their courses in a public school except English, social studies, music and art,
which were taught at nearby Catholic schools. In Morton v. Board of Educa-
tion,"4 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the program, arguing on a statutory inter-
pretation basis as well as on the program's state and federal constitutionality.
After upholding the program on the basis of statutory interpretation, the Illinois
Appellate Court appeared to further justify it by combining the child benefit
theory with Schempp's neutrality theory:
The program applies to all non-public educational institutions and
not to any religious group or groups, and offers its benefits to individual
students on a purely voluntary basis upon application by the parents or
legal guardians of those children.49 5
Morton is significant because it at least offers a test by which the constitutionality
of a particular shared time program can be gauged. Whether higher courts,
or courts of other states,"' will accept or reject the Morton test lies in the realm
of conjecture.
d. Auxiliary Services
A problem somewhat different from the type previously discussed arises
under state auxiliary services acts. Basically, these acts provide services of a
special nature that most private school systems are unable to afford. Such services
include health and nursing, speech correction, counselling for emotionally dis-
turbed children, and remedial reading.49 ' Perhaps the most controversial aux-
iliary services act is found in Michigan.9 8 The Michigan act provides:
Whenever the board of education of a school district provides any of the
auxiliary services specified in this section to any of its resident children
in attendance in the elementary and high school grades, it shall provide
the same auxiliary services on an equal basis to school children in attendance
in the elementary and high school grades at non-public schools. 99
493 See text accompanying notes 423-25 supra.
494 69 I1. App. 2d 38, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1966).
495 Id. at 49, 216 N.E.2d at 310.
496 In Special District v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966), an action similar to
Morton, the Supreme Court of Missouri struck down a shared time program for children
with speech defects. However, the court never reached the constitutional issue, since it rested
its decision on interpretation of the statute.
497 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN § 15.3622 (1968).
498 Id. O'Hare v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., (E.D. Mich. filed Jan. 17, 1966) challenges the con-
stitutionality of the Michigan Auxiliary Services Act. However, the three-judge federal court
abstained pending determination of questions of state law in the Michigan courts. See
COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, LITIGATION DOCKET
OF PENDING CASES AFFECTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 22 (Dec. 1, 1967); Note, The Constitutionality of the Michigan Auxiliary Services
Act: Two Views, 44 J. OF URBAN L. 363 (1966).
499 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.3622 (1968).
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Insofar as, auxiliary services are performed on public school premises, the prob-
lem is no different from shared time. Although the benefit to the child is more
apparent in an auxiliary services program, if shared time is found to be un-
constitutional, it would appear that the greater benefit of the auxiliary services
program would not serve as a valid basis for distinction. Likewise, if shared time
is upheld as constitutional, then there is little doubt that the auxiliary services
programs on public school premises would also be held valid.
But the principal dispute over the validity of auxiliary services acts is that
the services are often provided in the private school by a public school teacher.
Thus, the issue is not whether the rights of the child are being infringed upon,
but whether the rights of the public school teacher have been violated. As one
commentator has observed:
The Auxiliary Services Act [of Michigan] would require teachers who
are public employees to teach in nonpublic schools and to exercise super-
visory control over religious school authorities, or in the alternative, accept
an assignment that would necessarily force him to express a belief in
religion.
50 0
It is, therefore, a very plausible argument that the right of a public school
teacher to freely exercise his religion would be hindered by requiring him to
teach in a private, sectarian school. On the other hand, if he did not accept
assignments in private schools, a public school teacher could face discharge
and loss of livelihood. An editorial in America has attempted to answer this
argument with an example:
[T]he situation of . . . a Jewish teacher assigned to give remedial reading
in a parochial school is very similar to the position of a Catholic nurse
who is asked to assist at a therapeutic abortion in a public hospital. In
either case, the individual may ask to be excused on the ground of con-
science; but in neither instance may she impose her conscience on the in-
stitution. If the free exercise of religion is no barrier to abortion, it is not
an obstacle to remedial reading. 501
This example is logically compelling, but there is validity to the idea that,
unlike the private school child who attends the public school, as in shared time,
sending a public school teacher to a private school is an inhibition of that
teacher's free exercise of religion. Thus, it appears that constitutionality is a
closer question as regards auxiliary services than it is for other types of aid,
and constitutionality may very well depend upon the place where the auxiliary
services are rendered.
4. Federal Aid
Federal aid to private school students has taken many forms, most of which
are unobjectionable." 2 But the most recent provision for federal aid, the Ele-
500 Note, supra note 498, at 376.
501 Shared Services and Conscience, 114 AMERIcA 543 (1966).
502 E.g., special milk programs, 7 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (1964); National Defense Loan
Program, 20 U.S.C. § 421 (1964); loans for scientific and language equipment, 20 U.S.C.
§ 445 (1964); national school lunch program, 42 U.S.C. § 1751-60 (1964).
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mentary and Secondary Education Act..5 [hereinafter ESEA] has unleased a
storm of litigation."" Regarded by some as a "settlement" of the church-state
dispute in the area of aid to private education,0 5 it is more apt to say that it
has enlivened the controversy. A settlement may arise, however, if the Supreme
Court sheds its traditional reluctance to review cases in this area."0 ' The ESEA is
the perfect vehicle to utilize in testing the validity of aid to private education
since it provides for federal assistance in most forms commonly used in the
states,5"' and since it can be justified by the child benefit theory.0 ' Of the act's
six titles, only the first three are relevant to the purpose of this survey.
a. Title I-Assistance for Educationally Disadvantaged Children
Title I of the ESEA may be likened to the shared time" 9 and auxiliary
services5'0 programs provided by some states. The purpose of Title I is
to provide financial assistance . . . to local educational agencies serving
areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand
and improve their educational programs by various means ... which con-
tribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally
deprived children.51'
Among the programs eligible for assistance under Title I are guidance ser-
vices, school bus transportation, and shared time programs. 12 Section 205 (a) (2)
specifically provides for private school children. It directs state educational
agencies applying for aid to determine whether the various local educational
agencies have made provision for including the participation of private school
children "to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived chil-
dren in the school district.., who are enrolled in private elementary and sec-
ondary schools .... "ss To avoid the argument that private schools may secure
503 Codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. Supp. II, 1967.
504 There are presently six cases in the courts which either have contested or are con-
testing the validity of some aspect of ESEA: Carpenter v. Gardner (E.D. Pa., filed May 24,
1967) (Titles I & II); Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), appeal filed, 36
U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. July 25, 1967) (No. 416) (Titles I & II); Protestants and Other
Americans United v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (Title II); Polier
v. Board of Educ. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Dec. 1, 1966) (Title I); Yurick v. School Dist.
(Com. Pleas Ct. of Phil. County, filed May 26, 1967) (Title I); Smith v. School Dist.
(Com. Pleas Ct. of Phil. County, filed Nov. 1966) (Title I). A discussion of each of these
cases can be found in CoMssMISSoN ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, AMERICAN JEWISH CON-
GRESS, supra note 498, at 4-9.
505 Kelley & LaNoue, The Church-State Settlement in the Federal Aid to Education Act,
in 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 110 (D. Giannella ed. 1966).
506 See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
507 Though not specifically mentioned in the statute, assistance for shared time, auxiliary
service programs, and transportation may be obtained under Title I and assistance for text-
books may be obtained under Title II.
508 Whatever one thinks of the child benefit theory, it was the theoretical framework
on which the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 was built, and it does
potentially have enormous functional significance for public/private school relations.
Kelley & LaNoue, supra note 505, at 156.
509 See text accompanying notes 484-96 supra.
510 See text accompanying notes 497-501 supra.
511 20 U.S.C. § 241a (Supp. II, 1967).
512 The title is not limited to any specific programs, but numerous "suggestions" are found
in the legislative history of the bill. See S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) re-
published in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1446, 1455-56 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as SENATE REPORT].
513 20 U.S.C. 241e(a)(2) (Supp. I, 1967).
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a direct benefit through either control of Title I funds or through ownership of
property, assurances must be given that title to property and administration of
funds will remain in a public agency.51 The Senate Committee Report sets
out further limitations, presumably to preserve the constitutionality of the bill.
First, the committee's expectation was that in programs such as shared time,
the local educational agency was to "avoid classes which are separated by
religious affiliation."515 Second, the committee emphasized that "[t]he act does
not authorize funds for the payment of private school teachers." ' 6 However,
it was noted that public school teachers who provide "specialized services" may
teach on private school premises when the services are not normally provided
by the private school.5 1 This procedure may raise constitutional objections as
an infringement on the teacher's right of free exercise of religion.1
But the greatest challenge to Title I may arise, not under the Federal
Constitution, but because of limitations in the state constitutions. Title I de-
pends on state and local officials for administration and control of programs
and funds. A state constitution may operate adversely on Title I in two ways:
It may prohibit the distribution of public funds for a private purpose,519 or it
may forbid state officials to administer programs for the benefit of private school
children.52 In reality, these are two sides of the same coin, but different theories
have been advanced to answer each objection. The former objection has been
countered by arguing that since the funds are given to the states in trust, the
state agency, as trustee must distribute the funds according to the terms of the
grant, notwithstanding state constitutional restrictions. 21 A little considered
question is whether the state official as a state official can be allowed to ad-
minister Title I programs. When this question has been raised, the state official
has been described as a mere conduit or custodian of the trust that arises out
of a federal law, which is supreme over the state constitutional provision.2 2
This would answer the second objection, but it has been suggested that this is not
an entirely satisfactory explanation.523
Title I appears to be a fertile ground for litigation.524 Theories can be ad-
vanced to support the title, but it is also prone to attack. Even if found valid
under the Federal Constitution, it appears certain that at least some state courts
514 20 U.S.C. 241e(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1967).
515 SENATE REPORT, supra note 512, at 1456.
516 Id.
517 Id. at 1457.
518 For a consideration of this argument, see text accompanying notes 497-501 supra.
519 E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (formerly § 4) provides:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use . . . any public money,
or authorize or permit [it] to be used . . . in aid or maintenance . .. of any school
or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any
religious denomination .... (Emphasis added.)
520 Many state "religion clauses" are stricter than the first amendment and conceivably
require strict separation between public officials and private schools.
521 For an analysis of the trust-fund theory in relation to ESEA, see Comment, The
Elementary and Secondary Education Act - The Implications of the Trust-Fund Theory
for the Church-State Questions Raised by Title I, 65 MicH. L. REv. 1184, 1189-94 (1967).
522 Id. at 1194-98.
523 "At the very least, the state has an economic interest in the man-hours expended by
the Superintendent of Public Instruction and his staff in constructing and implementing the
Title I program." Id. at 1195.
524 See cases cited in note 504 supra.
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will limit the effect of Title I by interpretation of their constitutions.
b. Title II-Library Resources and Textbooks
Title II of ESEA authorizes the Commissioner of Education to make grants
"for the acquisition of school library resources, textbooks, and other printed
and published instructional materials for the use of children and teachers in
public and private elementary and secondary schools." ' 5 As under Title I, title
to materials provided under the federal program is to "vest only in a public
agency," '526 thereby minimizing the direct benefit argument. Further, to prevent
the purchasing by state officials of religious texts or textbooks with religious
undertones, use of Title II funds is "limited to those [materials] which have been
approved by an appropriate State or local educational authority or agency for
use . . . in a public elementary or secondary school of that State. '5 27 Where
state officials are restricted by state constitutional provisions from providing text-
books and other materials to private school children, Title II, in effect, provides
for a "by-pass" of state officials.5 21 In such a situation, the Commissioner of
Education is authorized to make the distribution to the private school and deduct
the amount of the distribution from the state's share of the funds. This procedure
is unlike Title I, where participation by local officials is essential.529 Three cases
have considered or are considering the Title II provisions, but none has as yet
reached the constitutional issue.5 0
c. Title III-Supplementary Education Centers and Services
Title III of ESEA authorizes the establishment of projects "designed to
enrich the programs of local elementary and secondary schools and to offer a
diverse range of educational experience to persons of varying talents and
needs .... "'I" Among the projects suggested are guidance and counseling,
remedial instruction, physical education, and specialized instruction and equip-
ment for students interested in studying advanced scientific subjects.532 Thus,
Title III provides federal assistance for programs similar to the auxiliary services
provided by the State of Michigan.5 3 The Senate Report on ESEA notes:
Nothing in this title is designed to enable local public educational agencies
525 20 U.S.C. § 821(a) (Supp. II, 1967).
526 20 U.S.C. § 825(a) (Supp. II, 1967).
527 20 U.S.C. § 825(b) (Supp. II, 1967).
528 In any State which has a State plan ... and in which no State agency is authorized
by law to provide library resources, textbooks, or other printed and published in-
structional materials for the use of children and teachers in any one or more ele-
mentary or secondary schools in such State, the Commissioner shall arrange for
the provision on an equitable basis of such materials . . . and shall pay the cost ..
out of that State's allotment. 20 U.S.C. § 824(b) (Supp. II, 1967).
529 See text accompanying notes 521-22 supra.
530 Protestants and Other Americans United v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.
Ohio 1967) (no standing); Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (no standing),
appeal filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. July 25, 1967) (No. 416); Carpenter v. Gardner
(E.D. Pa., filed May 24, 1967) (continued pending the outcome in Flast). See COMMISSION
ON LAW AND SOCrAL AcTIoN, AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, supra note 498, at 5, 6, 8.
531 20 U.S.C. § 843(b) (Supp. II, 1967).
532 Id.




to provide services or programs which will inure to the enrichment of any
private institution .... Facilities are not to be constructed nor equipment
procured which will be to the pecuniary advantage of any nonpublic in-
stitution.53 4
Despite this strong statement, Title III is not likely to escape the litigation mill,
although its provisions are not yet under attack. The attack may come by con-
testing who chooses the programs as well as by contesting the nature of the
program. This is due to the fact that Title III provides:
[a] grant . . . for a program of supplementary educational services may
be made to a local educational agency . . . but only if there is satisfactory
assurance that in the planning of that program there has been ... partici-
pation of persons broadly representative of the cultural and educational
resources of the area to be served.53 5 (Emphasis added.)
This administrative system was proposed by the Office of Education in order to
"effectively bypass the entrenched and moribund habits of some local public
school establishments."5 ' Included in the definition of "cultural and educational
resources" are nonprofit private agencies. " ' At first glance this may appear
to potentially vest control of public funds in a private agency - the private
agency that happens to have the most influence in the community. However,
the title itself places ultimate responsibility in the local educational agency, i.e,
the local school board.3  Actually, it appears that the participation of non-
profit private agencies is limited to recommending programs in an advisory
capacity.
5 39
The ESEA has squarely presented the issue of whether the child benefit
and indirect benefit theories are constitutionally valid. Congress has made its
policy decision that such aid is advisable. It is now for the courts to determine
if it is constitutional.
5. Frothingham v. Mellon-A Judicial Roadblock
No other decision has had a greater effect in the area of church-state re-
lations than Frothingham v. Mellon.4 In that case, the Supreme Court denied
standing to a citizen who, as a federal taxpayer, wished to contest the validity of
a federal grant-in-aid. The Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff lacked
standing since her injury, as a mere taxpayer, was insubstantial. The very pres-
ence of Frothingham may discourage potential litigants who feel very strongly
that a particular federal program violates the Federal Constitution. It is certainly
one of the reasons for the almost total uncertainty as to whether any program
that in some way assists a church-related school is constitutional. Although one
authority states that "neither before nor after Frothingham has the Supreme
534 SENATE REPoRTs, supra 512, at"1473.
535 20 U.S.C. § 844 (Supp. II, 1967).
536 Kelley & LaNoue, supra note 505, at 117.
537 20 U.S.G. § 844 (Supp. II, 1967). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 512, at 1470;
Kelley & LaNoue, supra note 109, at 136-38.
538 20 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1) (Supp. II, 1967); Kelley & LaNoue, supra note 505, at 128.
539 Kelley & LaNoue, supra note 505, at 128.
540 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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Court denied standing to a plaintiff-taxpayer who desired to protest govern-
mental assistance to religion," '' Frothingham has been greatly criticized, and
there are indications that it may be overturned or limited. At present, Frothing-
ham is being attacked by both the judiciary and the legislature.
a. Judicial Attack
The basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Frothinghamn was a fear that
a contrary result would be catastrophic." 2 Nonetheless, the Court explicitly
stated that "resident taxpayers may sue to enjoin an illegal use of the moneys of
a municipal corporation." 4 ' Apparently, the distinction is based upon the num-
ber of citizens in a particular political unit. The less citizens in a unit, the less
fear there is of a judicial contest over every appropriation. However, this policy
judgment appears ill founded on two grounds. In the first place, it is difficult to
justify that the United States, with a population of over 200 million and an
annual budget of over 180 billion dollars should be exempt from suits challenging
its appropriations, while such "municipal corporations" as New York City,
Chicago, and Los Angeles, with populations in the millions and budgets of bil-
lions, are subject to suit. It is as difficult to find a "direct and immediate" 44
interest in the case of a large city taxpayer as it is in the case of a United
States taxpayer. 45 Secondly, and most importantly, while courts have refused
to hear suits on federal appropriations, many states have allowed suits to contest
their own appropriations.546 This right to bring suit has not resulted in the dis-
aster for the states that the Supreme Court foresaw for the federal government in
1923.
Perhaps sensitive to these factors, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear
argument in Flast v. Gardner,"7 a case that questions the holding in Frothing-
ham. In Flast, seven plaintiffs brought suit to contest the validity of Titles I
and II of ESBA under the first amendment. The plaintiffs claimed standing be-
cause of their status as taxpayers and asked for the convening of a three-judge
court. The defendant, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, moved
to dismiss on the basis of Frothingham. District Judge Frankel ruled that the
541 Drinan, Standing to Sue in Establishment Cases, in 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC
ORDER 161, 176 (D. Giannella ed. 1966). But two federal district courts have recently held
that Frothingham bars a suit by a taxpayer asserting a first amendment right. See Flast v.
Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) appeal filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. July 25,
1967) (No. 416); Protestants and Other Americans United v. United States, 266 F. Supp.
473 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
542 If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer
may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under review but also in
respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration requires
the outlay of public money, and whose validity may be questioned. 262 U.S. at 487.
543 Id. at 486.
544 Id.
545 Of course, this argument could be used to show that municipal bodies should also be
exempt from suit. Hence, it does not completely satisfy the contention that the federal govern-
ment should not be exempt. It does, however, show that there should be a change in the
present rule.
546 E.g., Gogerty v. Coachella Valley Junior College Dist., 57 Cal.2d 727, 371 P.2d 582,
21 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1962); Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass'n v. Timmons, 252 Iowa 163, 105
N.W.2d 209 (1960); Singleton v. Treasurer, 340 Mass. 646, 165 N.E.2d 899 (1960); Hanson
v. Mosser, 427 P.2d 97 (Ore. 1967); cf. Helela v. State, 418 P.2d 482 (Hawaii 1966);
Booth v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 79 Ill. App. 2d 310, 224 N.E.2d 591 (1967).
547 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 895 (1967).
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plaintiffs' claim was not plainly unsubstantial and ordered the convening of a
three-judge court to determine the question of standing."' The judge noted
that "respectable arguments may flow from the difference in subject matter
between Frothingham and this case, and from related differences in the asserted
bases for the claim of standing." ' 9 However, the majority of the three-judge
court disagreed and, with Judge Frankel in dissent, dismissed the action."' 0
The majority found that Frothingham, though much criticized, is still very much
alive."5' The dissent, however, very convincingly distinguished Frothingham.
Judge Frankel noted that Mrs. Frothingham had asked for "nothing less than
a roving commission based upon her status as taxpayer, to have an adjudica-
tion concerning the validity of any appropriation of money by the Congress." '
In Flast, however, the plaintiffs asserted "now familiar 'legal rights' given by
the Establishment Clause . . . . ""' The basis of the distinction, therefore, is
that Mrs. Frothingham could show no injury to herself other than the one arising
from her status as a federal taxpayer. In Flast, the plaintiffs can show an injury
to their first amendment rights in addition to an injury arising from their status
as taxpayers. This is a valid distinction. 54
The question to be decided by the Supreme Court555 is: Do federal tax-
payers have standing to maintain a suit challenging, on first amendment grounds,
the use of federal funds in support of religious schools?55 The issue is squarely
presented. Flast presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to qualify
Frothingham, or if it chooses, to reinforce it. The time has come for Frothingham
to be repudiated.
b. Legislative Attack
If the Supreme Court chooses not to modify the Frothingham decision, the
way is still open for a legislative enactment granting taxpayers the right to bring
suit to contest the validity of an appropriation under the first amendment. This
is not a new idea. A proposed amendment557 to the Higher Education Facilities
Act of 1963 s would have provided for judicial review of the statute's con-
stitutionality. Although passed by the Senate, the amendment was rejected in
the conference committee.5 59 A more comprehensive judicial review bill was
passed by the Senate in 1966 and again in April, 1967, but both bills died in
the House Committee on the Judiciary. 50 A more limited judicial review bill
548 Flast v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 351. (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
549 Id. at 354-55.
550 Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S.
895 (1967).
551 Id. at 4.
552 Id. at 15 (dissenting opinion).
553 Id. at 16 (dissenting opinion).
554 Bue see Protestants and Other Americans United v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 473,
476 (S.D. Ohio 1967), wherein the court rejected such a distinction.
555 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a
decision of a three-judge court granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction.
556 Flast v. Gardner, 36 U.S.L.W. 3078 (V.S. July 25, 1967) (No. 416).
557 See Drinan, supra note 541, at 161; 113 CoNG. REc. 18950 (daily ed. Dec. 15,
1967) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
558 Codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.
559 See 113 CONG. REC. 18950 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1967) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
560 Id. at 18950-51.
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was then introduced as an amendment to the 1967 amendments of ESEA, and
it was again adopted by the Senate, this time by a vote of 71 to 0.56' But it was
deleted in the conference committee, largely due to the opposition of the De-
partment of Justice.5 2 Nonetheless, due to the strong support for a judicial
review bill in the Senate, and a promise by the House to hold hearings on such
a bill in the second session of the 90th Congress,563 it appears likely that, if the
Supreme Court does not act favorably in Flast, a judicial review bill will become
law.
It has been urged, however, that the judicial review bills that have been
rejected by Congress would have been "inconsistent with the 'case or controversy'
norm of the Constitution."5 6 As pointed out by Dean Drinan:
The precise and narrow point on which the Ervin-Cooper [judicial
review] proposal seems to exceed the constitutional power of the legislative
branch of government is in the exaltation of the right to be free from any
violation of the establishment clause to the point where standing to sue
is granted to any person even though this same person would concededly
not have similar rights with regard to any other of the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. 6 15
The Supreme Court has been strict in requiring standing and a justiciable
controversy when faced with a constitutional question. This was well illustrated
in the landmark decision, Muskrat v. United States.566 It is, therefore, a distinct
possibility that the Court, in reviewing a judicial review law, could find that
Frothingham was constitutionally compelled. If the Court so finds, and if it
believes the Constitution was correctly interpreted in Frothingham, a judicial
review law would be unconstitutional.
c. Conclusion
It appears likely that the Supreme Court will limit Frothingham in Flast.
Changing times and the importance of the issues left unresolved due to Froth-
ingham necessitate such a course of action. This is preferable to legislation by
Congress, for the latter alternative contains the seed of a constitutional objection.
As it is more likely that Flast will be decided before a judicial review bill becomes
law, such legislation may become unnecessary.
VII. Am TO RELIGION THROUGH TAXATrON
In a very real sense, religious organizations are the beneficiaries of aid from
the state and federal governments in the form of tax privileges. This aid takes
the form of tax exemptions granted to religious organizations and tax deductions
granted to contributors to such organizations. There is less controversy generated
561 Id. at 18951.
562 Id.
563 See 113 CoNG. REc. 18953 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1967) (remarks of Senator Morse).
564 Drinan, supra note 541, at 185.
565 Id. at 186.
566 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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over this preferential treatment than there is in the unsettled school-aid area.567
Perhaps this is due to our "instinctive acceptance" of such treatment, 568 or to
the religious nature of the American people.569 Whatever the reason, it is clear
that tax preferences for religious organizations are commonplace and approved of
by the majority of American people. Nevertheless, there is still a constitutional
issue involved as well as the policy question of whether this type of assistance
should be continued. The purpose of this section is to examine the types of tax
aid available and the constitutional and policy arguments for and against such aid.
A. Types of Tax Aid
Governmental aid through tax laws can be direct or indirect. Direct aid
usually takes the form of exemptions granted on property used for and activities
devoted to solely religious purposes.57 On the federal level, direct aid can take
two forms: exemption from the income tax"' and exemption from the un-
related business income tax.57 On the state and municipal level, the primary
direct tax aid is exemption from the property tax, although other tax aids, such
as exemptions and deductions from income and inheritance taxes are not to be
ignored."'
Indirect aid takes the form of tax deductions given to persons who con-
tribute to religious organizations. Deductions act as an incentive to contribute,
particularly among taxpayers in the higher tax brackets. On the federal level
such indirect aid can take three forms: deduction from the income tax,574 de-
duction from the estate tax,"' and deduction from the gift tax.""
1. Direct Tax Aid
a. Federal Tax Exemptions
Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides an
exemption from the federal income tax for "corporations, and any community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious ...
purposes. ... ,,177 (Emphasis added.) Whether an organization is "religious" de-
pends upon the use that it makes of its profits and the purpose of its existence."'
567 See text accompanying notes 400-566 supra.
568 Hurvich, Religion and the Taxing Power, 35 U. CINN. L. Rav. 531 (1966). Although
tax exemption of the clergy can be traced back to Biblical times, the modem tendency is
apparently derived from the status enjoyed by colonial and early post-Revolutionary churches.
See Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHio STATE L.J. 461, 462 & n.6
(1959).
569 1964-66 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 695.
570 See Symposium-The First Amendment and Financial Aid to Religion: Limits on
the Government's Conduct, 61 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 777, 790 (1966).
571 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3).
572 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 511(a) (2) (A).
573 Rabin, Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 912, 913
(1966).
574 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(a)-(b).
575 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2055(a)(2)-(3).
576 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2522(a)((2).
577 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3).
578 See St. Germain Foundation, 26 T.C. 648, 657 (1956); Unity School of Christianity,
4 B.T.A. 61, 70 (1926).
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Four requirements must exist before this exemption will be recognized." 9 The
net earnings of the organization must not inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder, " a substantial part of the organization's activities must not be
the carrying on of propaganda,"8 ' and the organization must neither attempt
to influence legislation,5 2 nor participate in political campaigns.8 3 The ex-
emption of religious organizations from the income tax is a form of direct
benefit. And so far as "church"5 4 income is concerned, the exemption cannot
be justified by the argument that the "church" is providing a service that the
state would otherwise have to provide. Apparently, the only valid justification
for the existence of the exemption is historical, i.e., it has always been done.
Congress has found this argument sufficient. Whether history is sufficient to
breach the wall of separation on this issue is a question to which the Supreme
Court has not yet addressed itself.
But this exemption is not the only direct tax benefit to religious organizations
under the Code. An exempt organization can form a "title-holding corporation,"
the sole purpose of which is to hold title to property. Profits from such a cor-
poration are also exempt.8 The title-holding corporation, however, must not
be organized for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business. In such a case
it is classed as a "feeder organization," subject to the unrelated business income
tax even if all its proceeds go to the exempt organization.5
Another form of direct aid, more limited in scope, is exemption from the
unrelated business income tax. The Code provides that organizations that are
exempt under section 501 (c) (3) are nevertheless subject to the unrelated busi-
ness income tax . 87 Obviously, this "exception to the exemption" '588 was in-
579 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3).
580 A private shareholder is defined as an individual who has a "personal and private
interest in the activities of the [exempt] organization." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-I(c) (1958).
581 Thus, an "action organization," which attempts to influence legislation by propaganda
or otherwise, cannot qualify as an exempt organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)1(c)(3)-
(ii) (1959).
582 But an exempt organization may attempt to influence legislation in areas that generally
affect its charitable operations. See Davis, 22 T.C. 1091, 1098-99 (1954).
583 This includes publishing and distributing of statements relating to political campaigns.
See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 501(c) (3).
584 A distinction is drawn in the Code between a "church" and a religious organization,
with the former receiving greater tax advantages. The test that is generally used to determine
whether a religious organization qualifies as a "church" is
whether or not it conducts religious worship or ministers' sacerdotal functions under
the tenets and practices of the particular religious body, as distinguished from
merely "engaging in religious, educational, or charitable activities approved by a
church." 4 J. RATKIN & M. JOHNsON, FEDERAL INcOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXA-
TioN § 59.02(2), at 5919b (1968).
585 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c) (2) exempts from taxation the income of "corpo-
rations organized for the exclusive purpose of holding title to property, collecting income
therefrom, and turning over the entire amount thereof, less expenses, to an organization
which itself is exempt under this section." See also Wolder, Income and Real Estate Tax
Exemption Problems of Churches and Associations, 45 TAXES 613, 614 (1967).
586 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 502 provides:
An organization operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business
for profit shall not be exempt under section 501 on the ground that all of its profits
are payable to one or more organizations exempt under section 501 from taxation.
Generally, feeder corporations are taxable on their entire income. See Sico Foundation v.
United States, 295 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (per curiam). See generally, Wolder, supra
note 585, at 614-15.
587 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 511(a).
588 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 511 (a) (2) (A) (1) provides that the unrelated business
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serted into the Code to put otherwise exempt organizations that engage in-
cidentally in a profit-making enterprise on an equal competitive basis with
non-exempt businesses.589 If this is a valid reason for taxing an otherwise
exempt organization, it should apply with equal vigor to a "church" as well as
other religious organizations. However, "churches" are specifically exempted
from its operation. 9 ' Thus, a measure that was enacted into law to take a com-
petitive advantage from a small group - exempt organizations - instead gives
a competitive advantage to an even smaller group - "churches."
b. State and Municipal Exemptions
In the state and municipal area, by far the most important tax benefit
.enjoyed by religious organizations is exemption from the real property tax. 9'
Indeed, in view of the huge landholdings by religious groups in this country,
92
it is certainly the most important tax exemption of all, state or federal. As the
amount of tax exempt property increases, the tax base decreases proportionately,
resulting in a greater burden on the remaining taxable property. Despite this
direct effect on property owners, there has been comparatively little litigation
in this area.593
The test that is most generally applied to determine if property is exempt
is the "use" test.59' Whether the use in question is sufficient for an exemption
tax "shall apply in the case of any organization (other than a church, a convention or as-
sociation of churches .... )." Interestingly, this exemption has been rather strictly inter-
preted. It has been held that "religious organizations," as distinguished from "churches,"
are taxable on their unrelated business income. In one case, a federal district court refused
to allow an exemption for the operation of a commercial winery by the Christian Brothers. See
De LaSalle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
589 This provision was inserted into the 1939 Code in 1950. See INT. REV. CODE of 1939,
§ 421, ch. 994 § 421, 64 Stat. 948 (1950), as amended. It has been stated that the amend-
ment was brought about by the purchase of a noodle factory by alumni and friends 'of an
Eastern law school. The profits from the factory were dedicated to the law school, and
they became exempt from taxation. Note, Tax Code Loopholes: Business Income of Religious
Organizations, 23 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 70, 74 (1967).
590 The constitutionality of this section was questioned in Seversmith v. Machiz (D. Md.
filed Aug. 1964), but the action was dismissed without prejudice pending the outcome of
Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.), prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 895 (1967), on
the standing issue. COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS,
LITIGATION DOCKET OF PENDING CASES AFFECTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE 33 (Dec. 1, 1967).
591 Rabin, supra note 573, at 913.
592 It is estimated that in New York City alone, the value of tax exempt property has
increased by 5 billion dollars between 1954 and 1964. Even excluding such sectarian-owned
institutions as hospitals and seminaries, the value of church-owned property is over 89 million
dollars in Baltimore, almost 43 million dollars in Buffalo, over 31 million dollars in Denver,
and over 131 million dollars in the District of Columbia. See M. LARSON, TAX-ExEMPT
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY IN KEY AMERICAN CITIES (1965).
593 In Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 816 (1966), the most notable recent case in the area, the Maryland Court of
Appeals, searching for Supreme Court precedent, could find only dicta in three Supreme
Court cases that were not decided on first amendment grounds. Other recent cases in this
area are: Evangelical Covenant Church of America v. City of Nome, 394 P.2d 882 (Alaska
1964); South Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review, 257 Iowa 1302, 136 N.W.2d
488 (1965); Lincoln Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln, 178 Neb. 357, 133 N.W.2d 455
(1965); Board of Publication v. State Tax Comm'n, 239 Ore. 65, 396 P.2d 212 (1964).
These cases have been commented upon in 1964-66 Church-State Survey, supra note 224,
at 696-700.
594 Wolder, supra note 585, at 619.
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depends on the state constitution and the state exemption statute. 9 5 "The
wording of the particular statute involved is the primary factor in explaining
the diverse results which the opinions in this area traditionally reflect." '
Exemption of the church building itself is the most universally granted of all
religious property exemptions. 97 "In most of the statutes exempting church
buildings from taxation, express provision is made for also exempting the ad-
jacent land."59 Further, living quarters of clergymen are specifically exempted
in 29 states. 9
The potential breadth of the property tax exemption varies from state to
state. However, it cannot be doubted that the effect of this exemption on the
tax base, and ultimately on every taxpayer, is substantial. Since income of re-
ligious organizations is also exempt from taxation,"0 a religious organization has
a tremendous ability to multiply its net worth by investing non-taxable income
in tax exempt property. Thus, through the use of the property tax exemption,
exempt funds continue to be exempt and continue to grow.
2. Indirect Tax Aid
In addition to exemption from most taxation, religious organizations falling
within the definition of a "charitable organization," also enjoy an indirect tax
benefit. Contributions to charitable organizations are deductible for federal
income,60 ' estate,0 2  and gift tax.6 purposes. During 1959 alone, it was esti-
mated that individuals saved over one billion dollars in income taxes by giving
4.5 billion dollars to charitable organizations.0 4 Charitable deductions, including
deductions for religious organizations, exist "almost solely to encourage charitable
giving .... "'" And giving is certainly encouraged by the deduction. "There
is little doubt that the Federal income-tax deduction is a powerful incentive to
charitable giving for taxpayers in upper brackets."6 '
For purposes of federal income tax deductions, "churches" are known as
"30 percent organizations" because, along with contributions to schools, hos-
pitals, governments, and publicly or governmentally supported charities, con-
595 For a consideration of the state constitutional provisions and the relevant statutes in
this area, see Van Alstyne, supra note 568. For a comprehensive study of the state constitu-
tional clauses that provide tax exemptions, see C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL, & T. BURXE, RELI-
GION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 120-72 (1965).
596 1964-66 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 696.
597 Van Alstyne, supra note 568, at 463. Professor Van Alstyne notes that the exemp-
tion may take a variety of forms: exemption framed in descriptive terms, such as "houses
of public worship," exemption based upon use, exemption based upon ownership by a
church or religious society, exemption based upon the dual requirements of ownership and
use, and exemption of named institutions. Id. at 463-70.
598 Van Alstyne, supra note 568, at 470. For a study of the tax exemption of church
parking lots, see Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1106 (1961); for a study of the various constructions
given to tax exemption statutes for religious bodies, see Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1222 (1947);
and for the exemptibility of property that will be used for religious purposes, see Annot., 2
A.L.R_ 545 (1919). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 568, at 470-73.
599 Van Alstyne, supra note 568, at 479-84.
600 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501 (c) (3). See text accompanying notes 578-90 supra.
601 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(a)-(b).
602 INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 2055(a)(2)-(3).
603 INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 2522(a) (2).
604 J. HELLERSTEIN, TAXEs, LOOPHOLES, AND MORALS 199 (1963).
605 Rabin, supra note 573, at 915.
606 J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 604, at 199.
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tributions to "churches" may be-deducted up to 30 percent of adjusted gross
income."' Contributions to "religious organizations" qualify for deductions of
up to 20 percent of adjusted gross income. 6 s
"The allowance of a tax deduction for charitable contributions cannot be
justified- and has not been justified- by any concept within an income tax
system; any justification it has is social . ". ..  The apparent reason for allow-
ing deductions to religious organizations can only be the same reason for ex-
empting such organizations from taxation. That is, religious organizations are
thought to be so necessary to the public welfare that contributions should be
encouraged. One authority, however, has concluded that "the revenue loss
attributable to the income tax charitable deduction is substantially greater than
the amount of contributions induced by the deduction."61 If, therefore, the
sole justification for the deduction is to encourage giving in order to obtain
services for the public without using governmental machinery, it is perhaps time
for Congress to consider whether the deduction is as desirable as originally
believed.
B. The Constitutionality of Tax Aid
1. Direct Tax Aid
Religious exemptions have been attacked as violative of the first amend-
ment.1 1 The direct-indirect aid dichotomy may have the same application in
this area as it has in the more controversial area of aid to education.1 ' How-
ever, those who favor religious exemptions are not supported by the secular
purpose theory, 8 ' at least insofar as church income is concerned. It is perhaps
significant that the Supreme Court has refused to review the more recent court
decisions on tax exemptions.614
Its actions may indicate that with respect to this question it is disposed
to accept Holmes's axiom that a page of history is worth a volume of
logic,6 15 as well as Justice Reed's observation that "devotion to the great
principle of religious liberty should not lead [the Court] into a rigid inter-
607 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(a)(1), (b)(1).
608 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(b) (1) (B).
609 G. MCGREGOR, PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS AND DEDUCTIONS 19 (1962).
610 Rabin, supra note 573, at 918. The author points out that the Government lost 2,195
million dollars in revenue due to individual charitable deductions in 1962. Id. This compares
to an estimate that the deduction attracted only 57 million dollars in contributions. Id. at
919. As Professor Rabin points out: "This hardly seems a bargain." Id.
611 We are certain that no state or the federal government could directly contribute
to the church for its religious function. It is equally clear that in any case where
the Constitution prohibits direct aid, it also prohibits the indirect aid of tax exemp-
tions. Hurvich, supra note 568, at 553.
612 See text accompanying notes 423-25 supra.
613 See text accompanying notes 411-17 supra.
614 Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 816 (1966); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal
dismissed sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956); General Finance
Corp. v. Archetto, 93 R.I.392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962).
615 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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pretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with accepted habits
of our people."1616] 617 (Citations renumbered.)
Due to the Supreme Court's refusal to reconsider the validity of tax exemptions,
the present "law" is found in cases decided in the nineteenth century. In Gib-
bons v. District of Columbia,61 decided in 1886, the Supreme Court held that
Congress and the state legislatures can exempt property, and inferentially,
church property, from taxation.61 9 Thirteen years later, in Bradfield v. Rob-
erts,62 the Court held constitutional the use of government funds to erect build-
ings for a church-owned hospital. It should be noted, however, that the case
is not thought to be applicable where a secular purpose is not involved in the
church activity.62'
When state courts are presented with a tax exemption case, the question
is generally not whether exemptions are constitutional, but whether a party
should be accorded exempt status under the relevant statutory or constitutional
provisions."'
Thus, while there are arguments against the constitutionality of tax assis-
tance to religious institutions, the historical acceptance of this type of assistance
by the American people has kept the number of cases to a minimum. Further,
it is arguable that the great number of suits by organizations seeking exempt
status, which in no way draw into question the constitutionality of the exemp-
tion itself, actually condition the courts to accept this type of assistance. The
1965-66 Survey reported that recent decisions "reflect no indications of dis-
satisfaction with the practice of granting tax exemptions to religious institutions,
but rather, continue to be in the mainstream of the law."62 There has been no
change. This religious tax benefit appears more firmly rooted than ever.
2. Indirect Tax Aid
Only two cases have considered whether the indirect religious preferences
in the federal income tax law violate the first amendment. In Swallow v. United
States.24 the defendant, convicted of tax evasion, attacked the constitutionality
of the statute. He alleged, in part, that the allowance of deductions for contri-
616 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 256 (1948) (dissenting
opinion).
617 Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religious Activities, in THE
WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95, 116 (D. Oakes ed. 1963).
618 116 U.S. 404 (1886).
619 "In the exercise of this power [of taxation] Congress, like any State legislature un-
restricted by constitutional provisions, may at its discretion wholly exempt certain classes of
property from taxation, or may tax them at a lower rate than other property." Id. at 408.
620 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
621 See Hurvich, Religion and the Taxing Power, 35 U. CINN. L. Rv. 531, 551-52 (1966).
622 E.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Wright, 215 N.E.2d 57 (Ind. 1966) (cabins used
as temporary dwelling places by ministers attending religious conferences exempt); Ruston
Hosp., Inc. v. Riser, 191 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1966) (exemption limited to portion of
property devoted solely to charitable undertakings) (dictum); Evangelical Lutheran Good
Samaritan Soc'y v. County of Gage, 181 Neb. 831, 151 N.W.2d 446 (1967) (nursing home
exempt); New Haven Church v. Board of Tax Appeals, 9 Ohio St. 2d 53, 223 N.E.2d 366
(1967) (area of building used for public worship exempt). But see Murray v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
623 1964-66 Church-State Survey, supra note 224, at 701.
624 325 F.2d 97 '(10th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
U.une, 1968]
[Vol. 43:684]
butions to religious organizations violated the first amendment. In a rather cur-
sory consideration of this contention, the Tenth Circuit stated:
Nor is there any substance to appellant's contention that exemptions
and deductions allowable for charitable and religious purposes contravene
the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment.... Constitu-
tional questions will not be decided upon hypothetical sets of facts ...
Moreover, appellant has not shown how his rights could be affected if these
activities were held to be unlawful.625
In United States v. Keig 28 the Seventh Circuit rejected a similar contention,
stating that "no court is a forum for defendant's denunciation of the tax laws.
If he seeks such a forum, it must be elsewhere, either in the halls of [C]ongress,
on public platforms, or in the general media of communication."' 27
Swallow and Keig illustrate the two difficulties that beset a potential liti-
gant who wishes to contest the validity of the income tax deduction. As intimated
in Swallow, the principle of standing enunciated in Frothingham appears to
have application in this area. The Tenth Circuit was reluctant to delve into
the constitutionality of the tax deduction in Swallow because the defendant
could not show how he was affected by it. If Swallow lacked standing, it would
appear that no taxpayer would have standing to contest the validity of the
deduction. Admittedly, Frothingham is not directly in point since it held that
a taxpayer, as a taxpayer, does not have an injury sufficiently direct and imme-
diate to give him standing to contest an appropriation. A tax deduction is not
an appropriation but Frothingham's "central principle of precluding suit by
a taxpayer whose interest is so minute and indeterminate that he cannot show
direct economic injury is in theory equally applicable as a bar to suits attacking
the constitutionality of taxing statutes."
628
Assuming, arguendo, that Frothingham is either judicially 29 or legisla-
tively... limited, Keig would still bar suit on the ground that the constitutionality
of a tax deduction simply does not present a justiciable controversy. Analytical-
ly, Keig was correctly decided. A determination by Congress that income used
in a certain way is deductible for tax purposes is equivalent to a refusal by
Congress to declare a tax on that income. Since in our system of government
Congress has the discretion to legislate or to refuse to legislate, there appears
to be nothing the judiciary can do to require Congress to legislate that income
contributed to a religious organization is taxable.
If the standing and justiciability barriers are overcome, a valid argument
can be made that tax deductions for contributions to religious organizations
625 Id. at 98.
626 334 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1964).
627 Id. at 826.
628 Korbel, Do the Federal Income Tax Laws Involve an "Establishment of Religion"?,
53 A.B.A.J. 1018, 1023 (1967). While United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), held
that a taxpayer has standing to contest the validity of a federal "processing and floor-stock
tax," the author points out that in Butler, "the crucial consideration distinguishing Frothing-
ham was that the tax was [an] 'incident of [governmental] regulation'" rather than a general
appropriation. Korbel, supra, at 1023 n.56 (emphasis added).
629 See text accompanying notes 542-56 supra.
630 See text accompanying notes 557-66 supra.
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constitute an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the rule of School
District of Abington v. Schempp.6 3' Schempp requires a "secular legislative pur-
pose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." '32 Apply-
ing this test to the tax deduction for religious contributions, it appears that both
aspects of it are violated. The only discernible intent of Congress in allowing
the deduction is to aid religious organizations. Certainly it is not to aid the
taxpayer. In addition, the primary effect of the tax deduction is to advance
religion. As stated by one authority,
the economic effect of the allowance of these deductions is to furnish the
church with a state subsidy in the amount of the tax which would have
been payable with respect to the amount of income contributed, had it not
been for such contribution. 33
Further, any feeling that the primary effect of the deduction is to promote
morality, or some equally vague public benefit, is completely eradicated when
it is realized that "religious organizations are neither by law nor by their nature
bound to render service that is of public benefit ....
It appears, therefore, that the tax deduction for religious contributions
violates both requirements of Schempp's two-pronged test of constitutionality.
But it is also apparent that the jurisdictional obstacles to judicial review are
insurmountable.
VIII. FREE EXERCISE AND THE POLICE POWER - CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Introduction
This section of the Survey examines the constitutional limitations that
restrict the power of the state to set religious values and behavior patterns for
the people. The greatest difficulty in this area arises from the inability of courts,
legislators, and administrators to recognize a given practice as "religious," and
therefore constitutionally protected. Traditionally, the state has relied upon
its power to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry in order
to interfere with the "free exercise" of such practices by certain religious minority
groups. Each of the topics discussed in this section exemplifies a particular facet
of this conflict between the state's police power and the individual's right to
practice his religion without political suppression.
B. The Amish- A Case Study in Accommodation and Suppression
1. Folk Culture
The Amish are those "plain people" who follow the teachings of Jakob
Ammann,635 a seventeenth century Swiss Anabaptist who broke with the Men-
nonite Church over the practice of shunning apostates, or Meidung.3 6 The
631 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
632 Id. at 222.
633 Korbel, supra note 628, at 1019.
634 Id. at 1022.
635 J. HOSTETLEf, AMIsH SocIETY 23 (1963).
636 Id. at 29-33. Ammann advocated complete exclusion of apostates from the religious
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Amish began migrating to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania about 1727,
settling at first in Lancaster County.3 7 They now reside principally in the rural
areas of southeastern Pennsylvania, northern Ohio and Indiana, and in scattered
smaller settlements in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Arkansas, Missouri, and
Kansas.63s The sect presently numbers some 50,000 souls."'
The Amish are a remarkable survival of a folk culture. Their religious,
cultural, and social values are so unitary in nature that the commonplace dis-
tinctions between socio-economic and religious values cannot be rightly applied
to the Amish way of life. All Amish values are religious in nature,64 and the
Amish way of life is a consistent religious pattern directed by central religious
values that are approved by the members of the church-district and are embodied
in a rule of life called the Ordnung.4"' Because of this socio-economic-religious
unity, it is difficult to draw out those "economic" and "social" concerns which
are not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment and which
may be regulated by general welfare legislation.
2. Theology and Religious Rubrics
The Amish, being a sectarian branch of the general Mennonite confes-
sion,642 do not baptize their young, but allow them to choose or reject the
Amish way of life when they reach maturity.64 Unlike the Mennonites, the
Amish do not seek converts, 6" nor do they engage in broad social service pro-
grams.64 Amish church polity is strictly congregational; each church-district
consists of a self-governing unit of thirty to forty families.646 Although the
Amish do not possess a national church juridical structure, Amish church-dis-
tricts with common or similar rules of life maintain fellowship with one an-
other.6"" Cooperation among local church-districts is informal and is usually
arranged through teachers' conferences and other like bodies.6 48 The two
community. Hostetler has reprinted Jakob Ammann's Warning Message of 1693, which
provoked the original division between Swiss Mennonites and the Amish. Id. at 32-33.
637 Id. at 38, 70-71.
638 Id. at 72, 79.
639 Hostetler, Extracts from an Address to the Geauga County Historical Society at Bur-
ton, Ohio, August, 1967, at 1.
640 HOSTETLER, supra note 635, at 10.
641 Id. at 13-14. Hostetler makes the following observations on the Amish Ordnung:
The Regel und Ordnung (or rules and order), which are formulated by each
district, cover the range of individual experience. In this little community, whose
aim is survival by keeping the world out, there are many taboos, and material traits
of culture which become symbolic. Conformity to styles of dress is important. The
district is the unit of personal observation and is full representative of the whole
of Amish culture. Id.
642 Id. at 23, 27.
643 Id. at 49.
644 Id. at 50, 51.
645 Id. at 50.
646 Id. at 71, 81.
647 Id. at 76-77.
648 Id. at 71. Recently, the Amish have instituted a multi-district program of co-operation
and exchange of views on parochial school education and teaching techniques. This pro-
gram is accomplished through the medium of The Blackboard Bulletin, a monthly Amish
teachers' magazine published by Joseph Stoll, a significant spokesman for Amish educational
freedom, who has opened an Amish publishing house in Aylmer, Ontario. Stoll's Pathway
Publishing Corporation provides all Amish persons with a vehicle for exchanging views and
plans with other church-districts on the school issue.
SURVEY
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
major divisions among Amish church-districts are Old Order and Beachy.6 9
The Old Order church-districts refuse to accept the automobile, the telephone,
and electrical power. Old Order districts continue to meet in the members'
homes for worship. The Beachy church-districts, on the other hand, have built
meeting houses and have adopted the automobile and electrical power."'
3. Internal Regulation and Exterior Threats
The rule of life embodied in the Ordnung is not unlike the rules of some Ro-
man Catholic orders of religious, since both generally prescribe a strict avoidance
of worldly behavior patterns. Amish Ordnungs are usually, but not always,
oral." ' Most contain proscriptions against worldly fashions in dress and against
involvement in worldly industry." 2 The Amish, therefore, generally prefer to
Indiana's Amish settlements maintain a multi-district Amish Executive Council, which
was organized to provide a collective bargaining unit for negotiating the August, 1967 school
plan with the Superintendent of Public Instruction. See text accompanying notes 710-13
infra.
649 Address by Dr. J. Landing, Associate Professor of Geography, Indiana University,
at Indiana University (South Bend), Dec. 13, 1967. See also HOSTETLER, supra note 635, at
250.
650 Id. There are only five Beachy Amish church-districts in Indiana.
Interview with Dr. J. Landing, Associate Professor of Geography, Indiana University,
in South Bend, Indiana, Dec. 13, 1967. Hostetler lists 31 Beachy Amish church-districts
in the United States as of 1961. HOSTETLER, supra note 635, at 79.
651 HOSTETLER, supra note 635, at 58.
652 The following Ordnung of a contemporary group, published in English, appears
to be representative of the Old Order Amish, except for those portions indicated
by brackets. That it appears in print at all is evidence of change from the tradi-
tional practice of keeping it oral. This Ordnung allows a few practices not typically
sanctioned by the Old Order: the giving of tithes, distribution of tracts, belief in
assurance of salvation, and limited missionary activity.
ORDNUNG OF A CHRISTIAN CHURCH
Since it is the duty of the church, especially in this day and age, to decide
what is fitting and proper and also what is not fitting and proper for a Christian
to do, (in points that are not clearly stated in the Bible), we have considered it
needful to publish this booklet listing some rules and ordinances of a Christian
Church.
We hereby confess to be of one faith with the 18 articles of Faith adopted at
Dortrecht, 1632, also with nearly all if not all articles in booklet entitled Article
und Ordnung der Christlichen Gemeinde."
No ornamental bright, showy form-fitting, immodest or silk-like clothing of
any kind. Colors such as bright red, orange, yellow and pink not allowed. Amish
form of clothing to be followed as a general rule. Costly Sunday clothing to be
discouraged. Dresses not shorter than half-way between knees and floor, nor over
eight inches from floor. Longer advisable. Clothing in every way modest, service-
able and as simple as scripturally possible. Only outside pockets allowed are one
on work eberhem or vomas and pockets on large overcoats. Dress shoes, if any, to
be plain and black only. No high heels and pomp slippers, dress socks, if any, to
be black except white for foot hygiene for both sexes. A plain, unshowy suspender
without buckles.
Hat to be black with no less than 3-inch rim and not extremely high in crown.
No stylish impression in any hat. No pressed trousers. No sweaters.
Prayer covering to be simple, and made to fit head. Should cover all the hair
as nearly as possible and is to be worn wherever possible. [Pleating of caps to be
discouraged.] No silk ribbons. Young children to dress according to the Word as
well as parents. No pink or fancy baby blankets, or caps.
Women to wear shawls, bonnets, and capes in public. Aprons to be worn at
all times. No adorning of hair among either sex such as parting of hair among men
and curling or waving among women.
A full beard should be worn among men and boys after baptism if possible.
No shingled hair. Length at least half-way below tops of ears.
No decorations of any kind in buildings inside or out. No fancy yard fences.
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be farmers,"' s and although outside work in factories may be permitted as a
matter of necessity, very few Amish become part of the general work force. 5
Their purpose in seeking such employment is merely to build up a nest egg
for the purchase of a farm.6 5
The guiding principles of the Amish conflict sharply with the prevailing
view of the purpose of human life as purveyed by the public school system.
Public schools stress success in this world, whereas religious tradition counsels
Amish to abstain from worldly values, since they are but pilgrims in a strange
land.56 Public schools teach a way of life that emphasizes the maximum ful-
fillment of personal talents. The Amish, however, view individual achievement
as subordinate to the values of the community, and say pungently that "self-
praise stinks."6 ' The Amish believe that exposing their children to the worldly
values of the public schools will lead to a movement away from the Amish
faith by the young.
65
8
Linoleum, oilcloth, shelf and wall paper to be plain and unshowy. Over-stuffed
furniture or any luxury items forbidden. No doilies or napkins. No large mirrors,
(fancy glassware), statues or wall pictures for decorations.
[No embroidery work of any kind.] Curtains either dark green rollers or black
cloth. No boughten dolls.
No bottle gas or high line electrical appliances.
Stoves should be black if bought new.
Weddings should be simple and without decorations. [Names not attached to
gifts.]
No ornaments on buggies or harness.
Tractors to be used only for such things that can hardly be done with horses.
Only either stationary engines or tractors with steel tires allowed. No airfilled
rubber tires.
Farming and related occupations to be encouraged. Working in cities or
factories not permissible. Boys and girls working out away from home for worldly
people forbidden except in emergencies.
Worldly amusements as radios, card playing [party games], movies, fairs, etc.,
forbidden. [Reading, singing, tract distribution, Bible games, relief work, giving of
tithes, etc., are encouraged.]
Musical instruments or different voices singing not permissible. No dirty, silly
talking or sex teasing of children.
Usury forbidden in most instances. No government benefit payments or part-
nership in harmful associations. No insurance. No photographs.
No buying or selling of anything on Sunday. It should be kept according to
the principles of the Sabbath. [Worship of some kind every Sunday.]
[Women should spend time doing good or reading God's Word instead of
taking care of canaries, goldfish or house flowers.]
Church confession is to be made if practical where transgression was made.
If not, a written request of forgiveness should be made to said church. All manifest
sins to be openly confessed before church before being allowed to commune. I Tim.
5, 20. A period of time required before taking new members into full fellowship.
Because of great falling away from sound doctrine, we do not care to fellow-
ship, that is hold communion, with any churches that allow or uphold any unfruitful
work of darkness such as worldliness, fashionable attire, [bed-courtship, habitual
smoking or drinking, old wives fables, nonassurance of salvation, anti-missionary
zeal] or anything contrary to sound doctrine .... Id. at 59-61 (footnote omitted).
653 Id. at 228-29.
654 See Ordnung, supra note 652.
655 HOSTETLER, supra note 635, at 228-29. The same impression was gained by the
author in the course of interviewing a real estate salesman in La Grange, Indiana. His
familiarity with this situation arises from the number of Amish young men who use the
money they make in local trailer factories for a down payment on a small farm plot.
656 Id. at 50-51.
657 Hostetler, supra note 639, at 3.
658 HOSTETLER, supra note 635, at 144. See generally J. STOLL, WHo SHALL EDUCATE
OuR CHILDREN? 3-51 (1965).
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4. Compulsory Education's Threat to Amish Culture
Since 1966, a re-evaluation of public education procedures by state officials
has changed the traditional treatment of the Amish by local school officials.
Formerly, the Amish communities in Indiana, Iowa, and Kansas had been
ignored by public officials. So long as the Amish sent their children to a rural
one-room grade school and did not openly flaunt the truant laws, no official
sanctions were applied to them. Within the past few years, however, the Amish
have become a major object of concern to educational officials, primarily because
they have withdrawn from the universal, free, public education system.
It should be noted that public education traditionally has been viewed
as the great assimilator and equalizer in the United States." 9 The enormous
task of Americanizing millions of Polish, German, Italian, Hungarian and other
immigrants in the nineteenth century was accomplished by the free public
school system.6 The traditional conduit for providing moral, political and
social values to this nation has been public education.6 ' No other force con-
tributes so much to the American consensus of values and traditions as does the
public school system.
However, not all Americans have supported universal public education
as the sole means for training the young in preparation for a useful life. An
equally ancient tradition of private education co-exists with the tradition of free
public education. The nineteenth century public schools dispensed a brand of
non-sectarian Protestantism as the basis of a moral training. 6 2 Roman Catholics
found this unacceptable and began their own system of parochial schools -a
system brought into being only after a prolonged struggle for legal recognition
of the right to establish such schools. 6 3 Likewise, Lutherans chose to establish
independent schools to train their children in the Lutheran faith and to teach
them German, at a time when teaching German to elementary students was
thought to be un-American.6 64 The current program of establishing church-
district parochial schools undertaken by Amish communities in the United States
merely continues this tradition of private education.
The conflict between the Amish and government officials is a result of
the primary social purpose of public schools - the development of "American"
659 The school reflects the total culture of which it is a part; it transmits the
dominant values, mores, attitudes and ideas of society. The emphasis in American
schools on learning the ways of democracy is an example of this principle of cultural
transmission. Debate as we may about what our schools should be teaching and
how they should be teaching it, there is nevertheless a general agreement that the
schools should produce a citizen who is capable of living in and sharing the respon-
sibilities of a democratic way of life. F. McDONALD, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
16-17 (1959).
See also L. HASKEW & J. McLENDON, THIS Is TEACHING 142-52 (1962); H. KLAUSMEIER
& K. DRESDEN, TEACHING IN THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 5-8 (2d ed. 1962).
660 W. BRICKMAN, EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1964); J. WIsE,
THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION 350 (1964).
661 Authorities cited note 659 supra.
662 E.g., Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 376, 38 Me. 379 (1854). A casual inspection of
any of McGuffey's Readers shows that Protestant moralizing constituted a major portion of
the curriculum of the nineteenth century public school. See S. NOBLE, A HISTORY Or AMER-
ICAN EDUCATION 503-05 (1954).
663 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the turning point for Catholics;
it legitimized the Catholic school system as an acceptable alternative to public education.
664 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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values and traditions. The Amish desire to be a people set apart and do not
want to subject their children to the conforming processes of public education.
Consequently, they have generally been opposed to the consolidation movement,
preferring that the one-room public school program be continued. As a result,
consolidation of public school systems in areas of major Amish settlements has
been retarded. Since the Amish consider politics worldly, however, consolida-
tion was not fought systematically and eventually came to Amish school districts.
The Amish now face the alternative of sending their children to the con-
solidated schools or of constructing their own parochial schools. If they choose
to build their own schools, these schools must conform to the state requirements
for specific academic curricula and minimum educational facilities and equip-
ment. Such schools must be staffed by teachers who meet the qualifications
required by statute. Finally, the school plant must meet the state requirements
for public health and safety. Since the Amish believe that some of these state-
imposed standards may be dangerous to their way of life, a collision between
the Amish and the school authorities usually cannot be averted.
The rationale for the state's assertion that it can and must specify manda-
tory standards for the education of all its citizens lies in the assumption that
education is a subject of general public concern. The state derives its definition
of a suitable education from the tradition of the whole American community.
In effect, education for everyone, whether participating in the free school system
or not, is defined in terms of what the community consensus holds to be a good
public school education.
The Amish do not accept this standard. Amish values are not those of
the community at large. The conflict of values is irreconciiable.6 65 With the
coming of consolidation to rural school districts, many Amish church-districts
have chosen to build and operate their own schools. These schools try to present
the Amish understanding of education, which is sufficient to teach the Amish
way of life, and to provide instruction in secular subjects that the Amish believe
will prepare their children to be good farmers and housewives.
666
The Amish do not wish to conform their children to an outsider's defini-
tion of life, and therefore they do not wish to conform their children to an out-
sider's definition of education. Thus the legal problem is made evident: Whose
definition of a suitable education for Amish children is to prevail-that of
the state, or that of the Amish?
5. Comparative Legal Treatment of Amish- Kansas, Iowa, Indiana
The past two years have witnessed attempts by three states to settle the
Amish school problem in three different ways. This recent surge of Amish con-
frontations with the school laws has been produced by rural public school con-
665 See STOLL, supra note 658, at 23, 27-29. Stoll summarizes the feelings of most Amish
persons on the conflict of secular and sacred values:
How can we parents expect our children to grow up untainted by the world,
if we voluntarily send them into a worldly environment, where they associate with
worldly companions, and are taught by men and women not of our faith six hours
a day, five days a week, for the greater part of the year? Id. at 23.
666 HOSTETLER, supra note 635, at 143.
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solidation across the Midwest. In order to understand the legal dimensions of
the problem, the modes of treatment must be reviewed comparatively.
a. Kansas - Suppression
In 1965, the Kansas legislature amended its compulsory education act to
require students to attend a state-certified school until age sixteen.6 7 Formerly,
anyone who had completed the eighth grade in a certified school was not obliged
to continue his schooling.6 ' This former legal standard accorded with the
convictions of the Reno County, Kansas Amish settlement. The Amish simply
sent their children to a rural one-room public school until the children finished
the eighth grade and then withdrew them. The 1965 amendment to the com-
pulsory education law forced the Amish to send their children to the consoli-
dated high school, or in the alternative, to establish their own state-approved
secondary schools.
An Amishman named Garber arranged to send his fifteen-year-old daughter,
Sharon, to an Amish secondary school, called the Harmony School, conducted
in his church-district.669 At all times, however, she continued to take certain
courses from a correspondence school in Chicago in which she had enrolled in
1964."' In the Harmony School an Amish person provided the pupils with
formal vocational instruction one day a week generally relating to agricul-
ture and home economics. The students were required to spend one hour
every day on their studies at home, as well as five hours a day on a vocational
project, upon which a written report was submitted to the instructor.67 ' The
Harmony School, however, was not approved by the State of Kansas, " and
Garber was indicted for failing to require his daughter to attend a certified
school.' Garber grounded his defense on the free exercise clause of the first
amendment, contending that the state unlawfully abridged his right to practice
his faith by prosecuting him for sending his daughter to the Harmony School.67
He was subsequently convicted.
7 5
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Garber's conviction, 6 , relying on a
rationale derived from Prince v. Massachusetts,67 7 which held that a Jehovah's
Witness could not enlist the help of his child to sell the Watchtower magazine
in violation of the state child labor statute, and Commonwealth v. Beiler,678 a
Pennsylvania case involving an Amish father who refused to send his child to
high school. The court found that the state had an overriding interest in insur-
ing that its citizens were adequately educated679 and that the Harmony School
667 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-4801 (Supp. 1967).
668 Law of March 20, 1923, ch. 182, § 1 [19231 Kan. Laws 264 (repealed 1965).
669 State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896, 898, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967).
670 Id.
671 Id.
672 Id. at 900.
673 Id. at 897.
674 Id. at 900.
675 Id. at 897.
676 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1967).
677 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
678 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
679 419 P.2d at 901.
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did not meet that standard."' 0 It found that Garber's religious freedom was
not abridged by prosecuting him for his daughter's truancy. 81 Since Garber
was simply required to compel his daughter to attend an accredited secondary
school, the court reasoned, he was not constrained to believe anything against
his religions creed, but was merely constrained to perform an act that the state
has the power to compel despite one's religious convictions.8 ? The Supreme
Court refused to entertain Garber's appeal,8 ' which was sponsored by the
American Civil Liberties Union and the National Committee for Amish Reli-
gious Freedom.
8 4
Garber assumes that only the State of Kansas knows what is best for
Amish children685 and therefore permits the state to define for the Amish a
standard of education that is antithetical to their way of life. Moreover, it
permits the state to impose its definition by criminal sanction. It is true that
the Harmony School did not comply with applicable Kansas statutes and there-
fore was not acceptable to the state. Garber did violate the Kansas truant laws
by sending his daughter to that school. Therefore, if the state's definition of
a suitable education can be applied to Amish persons like Garber, irrespective
of their religious convictions, the state has a prima facie right to close local
Amish schools and to arrest Amish participants for violating the truant laws.
However, such application can be made only if the first and fourteenth amend-
ments permit states to extinguish religious minorities by creating a standard of
education so defined as to exclude any religious school system established by
the minority to protect its own value structure.
The Amish in Kansas are in much the same situation as were the Catholics
of Oregon in 1925, when Oregon's now infamous compulsory public school
attendance law688 was in effect. At that time, the Catholic school system of
Oregon was threatened with extinction, since the statute required all school-age
children to be enrolled in a public school. The fallacy of such a statute, and the
fallacy in Garber, is the presumption that the state can absolutely prohibit parents
belonging to religious minority groups from providing a parochial education
for their children if the parents' definition of education does not mesh with the
generally accepted definition. Such a position was held untenable in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters:68 7
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
680 Id. at 900.
681 Id. at 902.
682 Id. at 901.
683 Garber v. Kansas, 389 U.S. 51 (1967).
684 AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, LITIGATION
DOCKET oF PENDING CASES AFFECTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE 39 (1967).
685 But see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) wherein the Supreme
Court lays the primary responsibility for educating the young on parents rather than on the
state.
686 Act of Nov. 7, 1922, ch. 1, [1923] Ore. Laws 9.
687 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.688
Direct suppression of Amish schools has been unsuccessfully attempted in
Indiana and Iowa."9 Not only is it impossible for school officials to prosecute
all the Amish who refuse to abide by the truant laws, but even successful prose-
cutions produce no appreciable change in the convictions and conduct of the
Amish community as a whole. 9 Moreover, considerable outsider sympathy
for the Amish and antipathy for the prosecuting officials, is generated by such
suppression. 9'
b. Iowa- Suppression Converted to Aid
Prior to 1966, some local officials in Iowa had taken a hard line against
one-room Amish elementary schools. The Oelwein School Board's decision to
seek an injunction to close the uncertified Amish schools in Buchanan County
marked the culmination of local severity in Iowa. Although the injunction was
denied, the county officials nonetheless attempted to oust the children from their
Amish school.692 When films of this incident were shown on national televi-
sion,69 nationwide sympathy was aroused for Amish resistance.69 4 The Iowa
Department of Public Instruction offered to mediate the dispute with the Amish.
A temporary agreement between the Oelwein School Board and the Amish
settlement in Buchanan County was negotiated on February 22, 1966.695 The
agreement permits the Amish to establish independent schools on land leased
from them by the school board, provided that the schools are staffed by teachers
who are certified to teach in Iowa. The Danforth Foundation of St. Louis, Mis-
souri furnishes the money for teachers' salaries.696 This temporary agreement
was augmented by a 1967 amendment to the Iowa Education Code 97 which
exempts Amish children from compliance with "any and all requirements of
the compulsory education law .... "6 9  Since the statute is silent as to the hiring
of teachers and other matters included in the 1966 working agreement, the
agreement seems to be the chief means of accommodating Amish parochial
schools in Iowa.
The combination of interim agreement and legislative amendment allows
Amish parochial schools to co-exist with the public schools. However, three
688 Id. at 535.
689 See discussion in note 703 infra, and in text accompanying notes 692-94 infra; L.
Scalise, The Amish in Iowa and Teacher Certification, 31 ALBANY L. Ray. 1, 2-3 & nn. 8-10
(1967).
690 See, e.g., Note, The Right not to be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory Edu-
cation, 53 VA. L. REv. 925, 941-43 (1967).
691 Interview with Mr. Richard Detar, former LaGrange County, Indiana Prosecutor,
in LaGrange, Indiana, January 4, 1968. Detar tells of the "Care Packages" sent from the
Eastern United States to the Amish parents incarcerated for violating the truant laws of
Indiana.
692 Scalise, supra note 689, at 2.
693 The National Broadcasting System filmed this episode and televised it on the Huntley-
Brinkley news program shortly afterward. See also NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1965, at 38.
694 Cf. LIFE, Dec. 3, 1965, at 47.
695 Scalise, supra note 689, at 3.
696 Id.
697 3 West's Iowa Legislative Service 476 [S.F. 785] (1967).
698 Id.
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possible objections can be raised to this arrangement. First, the school board
leases the premises from the Amish who conduct a parochial school thereon.
Consequently, some funds for operating the parochial school are derived from
tax money- a procedure that may arguably be in opposition to the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. " ' Second, the amendment to the Educa-
tion Code, although ostensively general legislation, amounts to special, and
therefore unconstitutional, legislation for Amish children. Third, exemption
of one religious community from the compulsory attendance law could be con-
strued as an unconstitutional religious preference. These objections may not
be substantial and might well be overcome in a judicial test of the Amish school
arrangement in Iowa. Nonetheless, any plan that presents such constitutional
ambiguities cannot be recommended as an appropriate way of protecting the
state's interest or the interest of the Amish community.
Iowa has yet to recognize officially the right of its Amish community to
establish a separate school system, as has recently been done in Indiana through
a carefully prepared school plan. Being a local ad hoc arrangement, the Iowa
plan leaves much to be desired from a legal point of view and is not such an
adaptation as truly serves the interest of the Amish community.
c. Indiana -Accommodation
Within the past two years Indiana has also had its share of argument over
the legitimacy of Amish parochial schools. Indiana's experience with the Amish
carries more national significance than do the experiences in Kansas and Iowa
because Indiana's Amish community is the third largest in the United States.""
Indiana's Amish, for the most part, live in Elkhart and LaGrange Counties,7"'
although there are scattered Anish settlements in Noble, Allen and several other
counties. The Amish make up at least one-third of the total population of
LaGrange County, 02 where the Amish parochial schools have roots which
antedate the consolidation of rural one-room public schools by some fifteen
years.70" Prior to consolidation, most of the LaGrange County Amish children
attended one-room public schools in their localities, and the schools were usually
699 See text accompanying notes 462-501 supra.
700 J. HOSTBTLER, AMISH SociETY 72, 75, 79 (1963). In 1961, 4,277 Old Order Amish
are reported to have been living throughout the State of Indiana. Id. at 79.
701 Twenty-eight of Indiana's 57 Old Order Amish church-districts are located in this
settlement. Id. at 76.
702 Interview with Mr. William G. Gohl, Superintendent of Schools, Westview Commu-
nity School Corporation, in Emma, Indiana, Jan. 4, 1968.
703 Detar, supra note 691. The first Amish school in LaGrange County, the Christian
Yoder Day School, was the subject of considerable controversy in the late 1940's. Mr. Detar
informed the writer that he had inspected the Yoder Day School personally, and that he
considered the school inadequate because (1) the school was conducted in a converted corn
bin and had no windows, (2) illumination was provided by a single kerosene lantern, (3)
the ventilation was inadequate, and (4) the teacher had no more than an eighth grade
education. He attempted to take action to rectify what he considered substandard fire, safety,
and sanitary conditions at the school, either by assisting the Amish operating the school to
comply with safety standards, or by closing the school. However, Detar could find no official
concern for the quality of Amish private education in LaGrange County. He felt he could
not prosecute the proprietors of the Yoder Day School without support from the state agencies
responsible for maintaining school safety, health, and curriculum quality. He found no such
support and discontinued his efforts.
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homogeneously Amish in enrollment."°4 After a county-wide popular consolidation
referendum was voted down in 1960,705 the trustees of the township schools
in the center townships of the county voted to consolidate their schools into
the Lakeland Community School Corporation." 6 The Amish live in the western
townships of the county, which were consolidated into the Westview Community
School Corporation in 1963.'o7 As part of the overall plan, the seventh, eighth,
and ninth grades in the Westview School Corporation were consolidated into
a junior high school, and all grades below grade seven were consolidated into
regional grade schools.70 ' As a result of this process all the one-room public
schools in Westview's jurisdiction were closed by September, 1967. A substan-
tial number of Amish parents chose parochial schools as an alternative to public
education, and seventeen one-room Amish parochial schools now provide a
curriculum for Amish children in the Westview School Corporation's area.0 5
The new parochial schools were created on the authority of an administra-
tive agreement executed on August 22, 1967 between the Indiana Department
of Public Instruction and the Amish Executive Council of Indiana.71 The
agreement allows local Amish school boards to administer the Amish parochial
school system under a general scheme of state supervision of school construction
and maintenance. In addition, the Amish school boards are permitted to retain
teachers of their own faith to serve in Amish schools.711 The schools provide a
basic course of standard studies through grade eight712 and thereafter a voca-
tional education program that continues until the student reaches sixteen, the
minimum age for withdrawing from school in Indiana."'
This agreement not only indicates that the State of Indiana acknowledges
the Amish parochial school system as a fact of life, but it also affords such
schools adequate recognition as permissible educational alternatives to public
education for Amish children. Since, unlike under the Iowa plan, the Amish
receive no assistance from the state or from any other tax-supported body, the
agreement does not even arguably offend the establishment clause of the first
amendment. Practically speaking, the agreement protects Indiana's Amish
from the legal sanction of the truant laws, while it permits an Amish school
system to be operated with some state supervision of curricula.
Two objections to this plan have been raised by those not familiar with
its terms.1 First, since the agreement permits Amish schools to employ Amish
teachers who cannot be certified under the normal procedure for teacher cer-
tification in Indiana, the instructional program for elementary students is thought
to be materially below public school standards. Second, since the vocational
704 Gohl, supra note 702.
705 Id. In the past, the Amish have opposed school consolidation and have gone so far





710 INDIANA DEPT. OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, ARTICLES OP AGREEMENT REGARDING THE
INDIANA AMIsH PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION (1967).
711 Id. at 3.
712 Id. at 3-4; e.g., English, reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, geography, and history.
713 Id. at 4-7.
714 Gohl, supra note 702.
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education program for children who have completed the eighth grade includes
many subjects pertaining to agriculture and domestic chores, some persons be-
lieve it is a fraud designed to permit Amish children who have completed the
eighth grade to remain at home and work for their parents, in lieu of completing
the state's minimum attendance requirements. The first objection is based upon
a material misunderstanding of the Amish school plan. Amish schools are essen-
tially self-hefp schools, not unlike those conducted one hundred years ago by
the pioneers. The Amish women who act as instructors generally have com-
pleted the eighth grade, and although such women are not trained by profes-
sional educators in "normal" schools, they are quite capable of conducting a
limited elementary program of studies for children."' The second objection
goes to the heart of Amish compliance with mandatory school attendance laws.
If the Amish are not providing a true educational program for students between
completion of eighth grade and age sixteen, then the truant problem persists.
However, by the terms of the agreement between the Department of Public
Instruction and the Amish Executive Committee, the vocational education pro-
gram is not to be used as a facade to permit Amish children to avoid school
attendance."1" Once each week students must come to school to receive formal
instruction in English, mathematics, and related subjects.1 ' In addition, each
child must spend four hours a day outside the weekly classroom period working
on his vocational project, and at least one hour a day outside the weekly class-
room period studying his academic subjects."' Each student's project must be
reduced to writing, and is then graded by an Amish teacher who has been
selected for his experience in agriculture, carpentry, and other like vocational
endeavors. 19 Such a program is a true educational program compatible with
Amish ways. Although it does not prepare anyone for college, nor lead to a
career in business or the learned professions, it does fulfill an educational pur-
pose- the training of Amish children in the life tasks normally expected of
them in the Amish community.
A final matter must be considered before any conclusion can be drawn
on Indiana's accommodation policy toward Amish schools. Since Amish chil-
dren do not become members of the Amish church unless and until they so
choose at maturity, a substantial72 number of them, principally boys, do not
715 See id. at 3-7, wherein every teacher in an Amish parochial school is required to take
a "General Educational Development High School Equivalency Test" in order to establish
his teaching qualifications. While it is true that these teachers have no more than an eighth
grade education, the type of school plan adopted by the Amish does not require sophisticated
educational techniques. The author visited two Amish schools in LaGrange County, Cotton-
wood Grove and Sunnyside, on January 4, 1968. Although the author is no professional
educator, he could see that the discipline of these schools was exceptional, that the work
done by the students in reading, mathematics and penmanship equaled the best work seen
at comparable levels in public schools, and that the Amish teachers were bright, alert, and
well-prepared for their limited educational functions.
716 The carrying out of the project will be supervised by the vocational teacher.
Daily chores and other routine household duties will not be considered as part
of a vocational project, except where they are a necessary part of a project. Id. at 6.
717 Id. at 5.
718 Id.
719 Id. at 4-6.
720 Unfortunately, no competent statistics are available to show the ratio of refusal of
the Amish way of life by young Amish adults. Letter from Dr. John A. Hostetler to Thomas
J. Reed, Nov. 30, 1967, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
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follow their parents' way of life. 2 These Amish "drop-outs" are a legitimate
object of state concern, because most Amish children who do not join the
church are not accepted within the Amish community and must make their
way in modern competitive society without the security of Amish home life.
If the Amish parochial schools are unable to provide some preparation for
competition on the outside by Amish drop-outs, then the state may be required
to take some positive action to ensure that those leaving that school system for
the outside world will not become welfare cases. But it appears that most
young people who leave the Amish community either before or after baptism,
are capable of making a satisfactory living in American society.722 If Amish
continue to be able to take care of themselves upon leaving their culture for
American culture, the state would seem to have no real interest to protect and
therefore no reason to interfere with the Amish educational program.
Indiana's accommodation of the Amish parochial school system seems to
be a sensible middle ground between active suppression and active aid. It offers
a way out of the collision between state-conceived programs of education for
all and the Amish community's insistence on shutting out the world. Such an
arrangement recognizes the legitimacy of Amish aspirations for survival in the
twentieth century, which should be as much a matter of public concern as is
the proper education of the young.
If local officials apply criminal sanctions to the Amish because of their
educational beliefs, they will interpret this as persecution. If so, they are likely
to leave their present settlements.72 We would be forced to admit that only
those citizens who accept our current brand of secularism, which divides life
into social, economic, political and religious fragments, are entitled to the
blessings of religious liberty. Such an admission would be most unfortunate.
c. The Practice of Islam in Prisons
Like the Amish, Black Muslims practice a culturally integrated religion-
a form of Islam that through strict dietary and fast laws and a general theological
position that black men should be set apart from whites, permits no compromise
with the world. Unlike the Amish, who wish to convert no one, the followers
of Elijah Muhammed are committed to converting every black man to their
way of life. Naturally, a radical and evangelical religious sect that tells black
men that they should not be ruled by whites is bound to create friction in com-
munity relationships.
Black Muslims have encountered the greatest difficulties in attempting to
practice their faith while incarcerated. Islamic activists have been put in soli-
tary confinement for preaching religion outside of specified Sunday worship
periods. 24 Further difficulties have arisen when members of Islam have peti-
tioned authorities for the right to observe the dawn to dusk fast of Ramadan,
721 Interview with Mr. Russell Schmidt, County Prosecutor, LaGrange County, Indiana,
in LaGrange, Indiana, Jan. 4, 1968.
722 HOSTETLER, supra note 700, at 193-211; Hostetler, Extracts from an Address to the
Geauga County Historical Society at Burton, Ohio, August, 1967, at 5.
723 Hostetler suggests that the Amish will move to the most isolated parts of America.
Hostetler, supra note 722, at 2-6.
724 E.g., Evans v. Ciccone, 377 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1967).
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since most prison meals are served after sunup and before sundown.725 Because
Islamic preaching usually leads to what would be a breach of the peace in a
non-prison environment, the state's concern for discipline and for the safety of
prison inmates conflicts with the rights of Black Muslims to act as directed by
Elijah Muhammed.
1. Prison Regulations and Islam
Prison officials argue that Islam's extreme activism leads to intolerable
prison discipline problems. They point to incidents of violence provoked by
Black Muslim prayer meetings and preaching held in cell blocks and in wash
rooms. 2 Until quite recently, the courts were reluctant to entertain suits brought
by imprisoned Black Muslims to enforce their first amendment rights to prac-
tice their creed. The traditional view of the courts has been that internal prison
management was beyond the scope of judicial review, except in extreme and
unusual circumstances.727 Lately, however, the courts have been more willing
to listen to such suits,"2" and in some instances prison officials have been in-
structed to establish a workable set of rules that permits Black Muslims to prac-
tice their faith with less restriction. 29
2. Legal Means Available to Enforce Islam's Right to be Considered
a Religion
The most difficult legal problem facing imprisoned Black Muslims who
contend they are denied their free exercise rights is the receipt of a hearing on
the merits. A substantial gauntlet of administrative and judicial obstacles must
be traversed by a Muslim litigant trying to enforce his religious rights in court.
First, there is the problem of choice of remedy,3 0 which many times decides
the suit's outcome in advance. Second, the litigant must establish that he has
exhausted the appropriate administiative remedies before applying to the
courts.8 1 This screening process cuts off a great number of potential lawsuits
prior to a hearing on the merits.
a. Habeas Corpus
Muslims have from time to time applied for writs of habeas corpus under
federal law,72 2 taking the position that any Muslim detained in prison and
725 See Ohilds v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932;
Note, Suits by Black Muslim Prisoners to Enforce Religious Rights- Obstacles to a Hearing
on the Merits, 20 RuTGFRs L. REv. 528, 536-38 & n.63 (1966).
726 Evans v. Ciccone, 377 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1967).
727 The control of federal penitentiaries is entrusted to the Attorney General of the
United States and the Bureau of Prisons, who, no doubt, exercise a wise and humane
discretion in safeguarding the rights and privileges of prisoners so far as consistent
with effective prison discipline. Unless perhaps in extreme cases, the courts should
not interfere with the conduct of a prison or its discipline. Tabor v. Hardwick,
224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955).
728 See Note, supra note 725, for a detailed discussion of the developing federal case law
permitting courts to inquire into prison discipline in order to protect the religious rights of
Black Muslims.
729 E.g., SaMarion v. McGinnis, 253 F. Supp. 738 (W.D.N.Y. 1966), enforcing Sostre
v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.)., cert. denied,;379 U.S. 892 (1964).
730 Note, supra note 725, at 558.
731 Id. at 546.
732 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 to 2255 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1967).
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denied the right to practice Islam is wrongfully detained and therefore should
be released from custody.7 3 Normally, habeas corpus is not an appropriate
remedy, since the writ lies to release someone held wrongfully, and in most cases
Muslims are complaining about the application of prison rules to their cult,
rather than the nature of the detention itself. Since the litigant cannot show
he is wrongfully detained, the writ will not issue to relieve him of the inequali-
ties of prison discipline?!3 '
b. Civil Rights Suits in Equity
The most successful suits3 3 brought by Muslims who claim their faith is
not recognized as a religion by state prison authorities are those brought under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.73" Generally, the Islamic litigant has sought to
force prison officials to permit Muslims to hold religious services, to receive mail
from Elijah Muhammed, and to otherwise keep the rules of Islam. 7 The
courts will usually entertain arguments on the merits if the suit is brought in
this fashion. 8
3. The Merits of Recognizing Islam
Once the remedy obstacle has been overcome, the legal theory behind these
suits is simple. Since Islam has been recognized as a religion for purposes of
legal protection,7 9 Islamic prisoners are entitled to practice it, provided that
such practice is compatible with prison discipline.74 Of course, the concept of
free exercise does not give Muslims the right to conduct proselytizing campaigns
in cell-blocks, lavatories, or in prison hospital wards. 4' Likewise, it is difficult to
see how aggressive anti-white propaganda dissemination can be condoned by
prison officials. It is also doubtful that any rational interpretation of the first
amendment can be used to support the contention of Islamic prisoners that they
are entitled by right to preach their doctrines to all listeners.
D. Psychedelic Religion
State v. Bullard42 and Leary v. United States43 involved criminal prose-
cutions for the illegal possession of marijuana. In each case, the defendants
pleaded the free exercise clause of the first amendment as a defense to the
733 Evans v. Ciccone, 377 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1967); Note, supra note 104, at 560-63.
734 Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963).
735 The writ of mandamus (or an action in the nature of mandamus), while theoretically
useful in this area, has been little used, Note, supra note 104 at 558-60, and is probably of
little value. Cf. Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955).
736 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not apply to
actions by federal prison officials. Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966) sug-
gests that oppressed Muslims incarcerated in federal penitentiaries may obtain relief through
a suit in equity in the nature of mandamus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
737 See Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964);
Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
738 Id. See also Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966).
739 E.g., Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C. 1962); State v. Cubbage,
210 A.2d 555, 564 (Del. Super. 1965).
740 E.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
741 Evans v. Ciccone, 377 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1967).
742 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
743 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
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crime charged."4 In each case, the court affirmed the conviction on the basis
of the landmark case of Reynolds v. United States, 45 which sustained the con-
stitutionality of an act of Congress which, as applied to Mormons, rendered their
religiously constrained practice of polygamy illegal.
Both Bullard and Leary show the emergence of a cult of quasi-religious
practices associated with the use of hallucinogenic drugs such as peyote, mari-
juana, and LSD, in the wake of the "hippie" movement. The cult owes its
intellectual basis to the teachings of such men as Dr. Timothy Leary. The basis
of Dr. Leary's theory is the Indian occult teaching that man can experience
the presence of divinity by the use of certain hallucinogenic drugs in conjunc-
tion with a program of mystical rituals. "4 '
The notion that an experience of the divine presence can be had through
the use of drugs is not a new idea. The Native American Church, an ancient
religion composed of Navajo Indians, uses peyote as the central liturgical instru-
ment in its sacramental meal.747 People v. Woody 48 established that this use
of peyote by the Native American Church is to be accorded recognition as a
constitutionally protected religious rite.7 49 With this one notable exception, how-
ever, the courts have been very skeptical of claims that the consumption of
hallucinogenic drugs is an outward manifestation of religious dogma.75 If the
potential religious drug-user is to be protected by the first amendment, he must
at least meet the narrow test of Woody, i.e., he must establish that his religious
convictions are sincere and that the use of drugs in his rites is material to his
religious cult.751 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the free exercise of one's reli-
gion does not include the right to use harmful drugs indiscriminately. After a
practitioner has established that his use of such drugs is both sincere and ma-
terial to his religious belief, he must introduce into evidence some showing that
his use is controlled." 2
Both Bullard and Leary point out that religious practices that contravene
the public health, safety, and welfare may be forbidden by the state, although
one's creed obliges him to perform such acts. 5 ' This, of course, is classical
nineteenth century American church-state law. In applying such precedent to
the drug cult practitioners, however, the courts must realize that the modem
day drug practitioner has little in common with Mr. Reynolds. For, unlike
the significance of polygamy to the Mormons, the consumption of drugs by the
744 Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 858 (5th Cir. 1967); State v. Bullard, 267
N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1966).
745 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
746 Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 1967).
747 People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 814-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69-73 (1964).
748 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
749 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
750 E.g., People v. Mitchell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1967). But see
In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964) (drug case involving
peyote eaters not members of Native American Church remanded for determination of
defendant's religious sincerity).
751 In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964); People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
752 People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (semble).
753 383 F.2d at 860-61; 148 S.E.2d at 568-69.
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drug cult practitioners is central to their religious dogma."' It is the method
of experiencing the divine presence. Therefore, indiscriminate suppression of
the drug is indiscriminate destruction of the drug cult as a religious group. The
danger of developing a facile doctrine of general suppression is quite real. Con-
sequently, the courts should be cautious to confine their reasoning to the exact
issue in each case, i.e., whether, under the particular circumstances, the con-
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754 See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964);
State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1966).
755 Text accompanying notes 1-229 supra.
756 Text accompanying notes 230-399 supra.
757 Text accompanying notes 400-634 supra.
758 Text accompanying notes 635-754 supra.
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